Da'wah of Global Islamic Resistance

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
Volume 8: Foundations of the Political Theory

Translated by

Abd ar-Rahmān al-Mansur



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بِسْمِ اللهِ الرَّحْمَٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Bismillāhi r-Raḥmāni r-Raḥīm

اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ، وَعَلَى آلِ مُحَمَّدٍ، كَمَا صَلَّيْتَ عَلَى إِبْرَاهِيمَ، وَعَلَى آلِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، إِنَّكَ حَمِيدٌ مَجِيدٌ، وَبَارِكْ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ، وَعَلَى آلِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، فِي الْعَالَمِينَ إِنَّكَ حَمِيدٌ وَبَارِكْ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ، وَعَلَى آلِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، فِي الْعَالَمِينَ إِنَّكَ حَمِيدٌ مُحَيد

Allāhumma ṣalli ʿalā Muḥammadin wa ʿalā āli Muḥammadin, kamā ṣallayta ʿalā Ibrāhīma wa ʿalā āli Ibrāhīma, innaka ḥamīdun majīd. Allāhumma bārik ʿalā Muḥammadin wa ʿalā āli Muḥammadin, kamā bārakta ʿalā Ibrāhīma wa ʿalā āli Ibrāhīma, innaka ḥamīdun majīd

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Foundations of the Political Theory for the Call of Global Islamic Resistance

If we were to establish our political theory by examining the shortcomings or failures in the political propositions of previous Jihādī experiences, we would unfortunately find that most Jihādī experiences lacked detailed political theories, and in some cases, even concise ones. This is on one hand. On the other hand, we must consider the difference between the primary political objective of Jihādī organizations, which is to overthrow existing regimes and establish an Islamic system, and the objective of the call to resistance, which is to repel the invading occupier and

his collaborators. Therefore, we will proceed directly to define the features of our political theory without addressing the shortcomings of previous experiences. And Allāh is the granter of success.

First: Introduction and General Principles

Before delving into the political theory of the call for Global Islamic Resistance, it is useful to present a number of political definitions and concepts that will aid in understanding our theory and the foundations upon which it is built.

1. The Status of Sharī'ah-Compliant Politics:

Politics is a science and an art that has existed since humanity began. It has evolved since ancient times until we reached these modern ages where human activity and interests revolve around it and its related aspects. Politics for non-Muslims differs from politics as we understand it. One of the most concise expressions I found regarding its reality among them was articulated by Montgomery, the famous British military commander in World War II, when he said:

"War is a dirty business... but politics, oh God!" It suffices that they based it on their saying:

"In politics, there are no permanent relationships... In politics, there are no permanent principles... In politics, there are permanent interests."

Today, with the dominance of the forces of disbelief, injustice, and tyranny in the unbelieving world, as well as in our world metaphorically termed "Islamic," politics has come to be based on Machiavellian principles, which demolish every religion, moral, and principle in the face of interests, purposes, and whims. Consequently, breaking covenants, changing positions, revoking principles, and violating the fundamentals of morality are not considered flaws, because they have become an accepted norm.

However, politics for us Muslims is something different, like all aspects of human activity on this earth. It is governed by Sharīʻah rulings and falls under His ta'ala saying: {We have neglected nothing in the Book} and His, Glorified be He, saying: {And We have sent down to you the Book as an explanation of all things}. Hence, its principles, sciences, and related matters among Muslims are termed "Sharīʿah-compliant politics."

This science has occupied a prestigious position among the sciences of Sharīʿah. Books have been authored on it since the early days of Islām. Scholars have addressed its rules in statements found scattered throughout their various books, interspersed with other sciences, as was the custom of the ancients. Then, it began to be treated separately with the stabilization and development of the Islamic Caliphate, its transformation to an imperial scale in the Umayyad and then Abbasid eras and beyond, and the dealings of sultans and scholars with various issues that arose from the multiplicity of Islamic peoples, the emergence of new matters, the need for codification, and the governance of "religion and worldly affairs," as it was called among Muslims, as well as the need to deal with political disputes and problems, and so on. The sciences of Sharīʿah-compliant politics began to develop, and scholars started to compile independent, categorized books on this science.

These covered all areas of ruler-ruled relations and the resulting aspects of agreement and disagreement, as well as the relations of Muslims with non-Muslims living among them, and their relations with disbelievers in states of war and peace, covenant and security, and other such matters.

They left us a tremendous heritage and wonderfully encyclopedic references that constitute an exceptionally broad point of reference, a foundation upon which contemporary jurists rely to derive rulings for recurring situations and their causes, and to lean on for independent reasoning (ijtihād), derivation, and analogy in newly arisen aspects of issues.

The rulings of Sharīʿah-compliant politics are: Sharīʿah rulings + understanding of reality and political data.

2. The Relationship Between Sharī'ah and Politics is that of the Constant and the Variable:

A legal opinion (fatwā) and ruling in matters of Sharīʻah-compliant politics, like the premises of any legal opinion, are composed of knowledge of the fixed Sharīʻah rulings, their principles, and rules; then, knowledge of the details of the incident requiring a ruling; then, applying those rulings after acquiring knowledge to that incident after understanding it. Thus, the issuer of the legal opinion arrives at the correct independent reasoning, or at least one for which he will receive either the reward of one who errs or the two rewards of one who is correct.

Sharī'ah rulings are of two types: one type is fixed, with no alteration due to the stability of causes and the bases of rulings, such as matters of worship, inheritance, and many rulings on transactions and sales, etc. Rulings in these areas do not change, neither in the past nor in the present. The other type relates to the evolution of human activities and the emergence of new issues, such as many rulings on transactions, commerce, and newly emergent financial matters, for example.

Politics is at the forefront of matters where the Sharīʻah has regulated rulings within broad outlines. Many issues therein are contingent upon the consequences of benefits and harms, and the estimations of people of opinion, experience, and expertise. Thus, an action may be permissible and lawful under certain conditions estimated by those knowledgeable in the matter, and it may be forbidden if those conditions are absent, based on the same Sharīʻah principles. Likewise, it is one of the areas where analogical reasoning (qiyās), presumption of continuity (istiṣḥāb) of circumstances and conditions, juristic preference (istiḥsān), and custom (ʻurf) are widely applicable. The domain of public interest (maṣāliḥ mursalah) and rulings of necessity are also broad in this field. Therefore, those who engage in it need to combine three things:

First, knowledge of the Sharī'ah. Second, an understanding of reality. Third, a high degree of piety (taqwā) that keeps them free from personal whims. Let us give examples that people are familiar with, one of fixed rulings and the other of variable ones.

The rulings on ritual purity (ṭahārah) and acts of worship ('ibādāt) are all fixed. Any event that nullifies ritual purity happens to a person today just as it has happened to every person since Allāh's creation; thus, the rulings are fixed. All rulings on acts of worship are based on revelation and are detailed.

Let us take an example of the variable: the rule concerning rebellion against a disbelieving ruler from whom open disbelief (kufr bawāḥ) has appeared, with explicit and authentic texts in the Qur'ān and Sunnah. However, jurists, in the well-known legal opinion transmitted from Qāḍī 'Iyāḍ, stated: If the ruler apostatizes, Muslims may rebel against him and depose him if they believe they have the ability to do so.

Who then assesses this presumed ability? Are people's understandings of it equal? How many factors intertwine and alter their assessments? How much

understanding, precision, piety, and freedom from personal whim does this require? The same can be said for matters of enjoining good and forbidding evil, which is an obligation. Scholars have stipulated for this that it should result in good and not lead to a greater evil from the enjoining, otherwise it becomes forbidden. So who assesses the outcomes to permit or prohibit a form of enjoining and forbidding? Similarly, seeking assistance from non-Muslims to repel an aggressor against Muslims. All scholars, even those who forbade seeking help from non-Muslims in Jihād, like the Zāhirīs and others, agreed that if the people of Islām are on the verge of destruction, it is permissible by consensus. In other situations, some permitted it while others differed. What are the bases for rulings in such cases? They are the assessments of just, pious individuals, those of experience and expertise, people of understanding and reason, and the leaders and pious scholars of the people.

The Sharī'ah and its rulings are constant. Their application to the reality of human actions, intentions, hearts, and behaviors – all of which are variable – results in the rulings of Sharī'ah-compliant politics being flexible and variable, within the framework of the general stability of the fundamentals of Sharī'ah principles. Therefore, opining on these matters is one of the most delicate and difficult issues, and perhaps this is the most difficult and dangerous domain of jurisprudence and legal opinion-giving absolutely.

3. Resistance Activities and Their Domains: A Religious Obligation, Sharī'ah Rulings, and Political Reality:

Contemporary sociologists and political scientists have defined war as politics by violent means. This is correct. All wars and conflicts are the violent face of political relations when avenues of understanding through diplomatic and political means are severed.

They also said that wars are instruments of politics, and this is also correct. If we look at the equivalent among us Muslims from the perspective of our Sharīʿah

rulings, we find this to be true. Jihād is a religious obligation and its rulings are religious, but its rules, principles, and consequences – whether it is offensive Jihād (jihād al-ṭalab) or defensive Jihād (jihād al-daf) – constitute a domain for political relations with enemies and friends. Activities and relations of a political nature arise from it.

If we come to our topic, which is resistance – resistance against the encroaching colonial powers attacking us with comprehensive plans targeting all aspects of human activity and civilizational components – we would find that resistance is a political act, with all the meaning and dimensions this very brief definition entails. Resistance activities, in their comprehensive sense, cannot achieve an objective or yield results without a program for the political capitalization of Jihādī sacrifices and military actions, all of which must be programmed to be a means to an end. The military means are for defeating the invaders, expelling them from our lands, deflecting their schemes from us, overthrowing the regimes of their allies, and establishing our independent, legitimate systems. Thus, it is a means to entirely political ends.

Because it is governed by the constants of our Sharī'ah, we define resistance as: Acts of armed Jihād to achieve legitimate political objectives: to repel the encroaching enemy, to make the word of Allāh supreme, to raise His banner, and to implement His law. Thereby, resistance becomes Jihād in the cause of Allāh, and being killed under its banner is martyrdom in the cause of Allāh, accepted by Allāh, Glorified and Exalted be He, through His mercy and grace.

4. Resistance Activities are a Form of Guerrilla Warfare and a Political Act:

The method of guerrilla warfare is a strategic art composed of military tactics that have become well-known and studied, evolving into a science with its own principles. In it, the weak employ their actions within their limited capabilities to exhaust the adversary through protracted war, aiming to place the enemy in

political situations that leave them with the choice of withdrawal or internal collapse.

Guerrilla warfare, throughout its entire history, has never been about the complete destruction of the adversary's forces and armies to win the war. Indeed, most wars in modern times no longer end conflicts through the material destruction of the adversary, except in very rare cases. Instead, wars have become a means to push the enemy into political, economic, and social situations that lead to their defeat and retreat.

I am not here to digress into explaining this art. I refer the reader to a number of lectures I have recorded on this subject, which are published. The most extensive among them is a series of lectures titled "Explanation of the Book 'War of the Oppressed'," recorded on 31 tapes. The relevant conclusion here is that guerrilla warfare relies on the skillful utilization of political and media means to leverage the military efforts undertaken by guerrillas or weak resistance fighters against formidable forces superior in numbers, capabilities, and resources. Coordination in resistance activities – between military effort, media, and political tactics, through a long-term war of attrition – leads to pushing the enemy into a state of collapse due to pressure from internal or external public opinion, making it impossible for them to continue the confrontation and maintain the pillars of their existence and their internal and external relations.

In summary, military victory in resistance activities has a political character and cannot be achieved without an effective military instrument and a resistance that inflicts real strikes and losses on the ground. Discussing this would be lengthy, and this brief mention suffices here as a paragraph in the introduction.

5. Resistance and the Theory of Recruitment, Neutralization, and Dismantlement:

The arena of conflict between any two opposing parties, as well as between the resistance and its enemies, consists of the following graduated spectrum:

- 1. Members of the resistance.
- 2. Supporters and sympathizers of the resistance.
- 3. Neutrals between the resistance and the adversary's camp.
- 4. Supporters and sympathizers of the resistance's enemies.
- 5. Enemies actively fighting the resistance.

The efforts of outreach (da'wah) and political action for any resistance, and for any party in any conflict, are directed through media and political means, and sometimes even military means, to make the trajectory of transformation move these components from the end towards the beginning.

That is, to convert as many components, elements, and blocs as possible from the fifth rank, the enemy's direct confrontation camp, to the fourth rank, to become mere supporters of the enemy without direct involvement in fighting or aid. Then, to move this stratum from the fourth rank to the third, to become neutral in the ongoing conflict. Then, to move these to the second rank, to become supporters of the resistance without participating in its active engagement. And finally, to convert as many of these as possible into members of the resistance, through this mechanism:

Enemy camp \rightarrow Enemy supporter \rightarrow Neutral in the conflict \rightarrow Resistance supporter \rightarrow Participant in resistance.

When a set of military, political, media, or other actions leads to a reversal of this trajectory, and the leaders of the resistance, or any group engaged in any form of conflict, even a commercial company competing in the market, notice that the equation is moving in reverse – such that members defect, supporters dwindle and become neutral, neutrals shift to supporting and endorsing the enemy, and some distant supporters of the enemy join the enemy camp – then this group should know

that Allāh has tested them with a leadership driving them towards failure and defeat, and that their program of action and method of operation are built on erroneous foundations.

This is the general rule, with few exceptions, in matters of mobilization in the world of politics and conflicts. The political process must be facilitated to ensure recruitment from the ranks of supporters, neutralization among the enemy's supporters, and dismantlement within the enemy's ranks. Thus, the circle of resistance and its members, and the circle of its supporters, expands. The circle of neutrality close to the enemy shrinks, and as many as possible are moved to the circle of positive neutrality in favor of the resistance. The circle of enemy supporters disintegrates and moves towards neutrality, and the largest possible number of blocs and individuals withdraw from the enemy's ranks.

6. The Theory of Mobilization, the Key to Conflict, and the Jihādī Atmosphere:

In books concerned with the components of revolutions, principles of resistance, and guerrilla warfare, one finds these terms:

The Theory of Mobilization:

This refers to the set of political and propaganda activities that provide resistance fighters with an expanding circle of supporters and sympathizers, which in turn facilitates the recruitment of new elements. It also provides them with logistical services, the ability to hide, and to be supplied with material necessities and information.

The Key to Conflict:

This is the set of slogans, objectives, and issues that the resistance presents to convince people of its cause and its justice, qualifying them to be among the mobilized supporters or members. We term this: The Key to Jihād and Resistance, to align with our Sharīʿah-based Islamic methodology and discourse.

The Revolutionary Atmosphere:

This refers to the general mood and the point at which public opinion becomes convinced that the problem with the enemy, whether a colonizer or a tyrannical, unjust government, has reached an impasse, such that armed action is the only possible solution. At this point, sacrifices become easier for people to bear, given their dire situation and practical suffering, whether due to the violation of religious sanctities, social customs and traditions, killing of individuals, threats to honor, plunder of wealth, erosion of national dignity, foreign occupation, injustice, poverty, or destitution, and so forth.

We call this "The Jihādī Atmosphere" to suit our thought and discourse. It is the general climate in which Muslims become convinced of making sacrifices and treading the path of armed Jihād in the cause of Allāh.

7. The Boundaries of the Circle of Conflict and the Theory of the Dividing Line Between Matters of Truth and Falsehood:

Muslims are adherents of a divine religion, a comprehensive civilization, and an integrated way of life; this is well-known. Because they are the bearers, advocates, and representatives of truth, the forces of falsehood and error, and the people of whims and corruption, have throughout history been enemies of this religion and its people, or have differed with them in methodology and principles, at varying degrees of disagreement. This is in the nature of things and one of the laws of creation; as long as there is truth, there is falsehood, and there is conflict between the bearers of each. As long as there is right, there is wrong, and there is contradiction between them and divergence between their adherents.

If we were to enumerate the principles of true Islām, and the rules of guidance, aspects of correctness, and the straight path that branch from them, we would be unable to encompass them all. It is an integrated belief system and a detailed Sharī'ah. There is no matter of life on this earth, nor any aspect of human activity,

for which the Sharī'ah does not have a ruling – be it commanded, prohibited, or permissible – and for which religion does not have an opinion as to whether it is truth or falsehood, or wrong or right.

Opposite every truth and correctness contained in the principles of this religion, there is a falsehood or error that contradicts and opposes it. If we were to represent this with a diagram to clarify the intended meaning, depicting the domains of truth and correctness, and falsehood and error, and the separator between them, we would find two domains separated by a dividing line as follows: [A diagram is implied here by the author, but not provided in the text.]

This applies to every issue in the areas of disagreement between Muslims, the people of truth, and their opponents, the people of falsehood. Thus, if you were to give examples and represent each issue as a point in the diagram, you would find that matters of creed for the People of the Sunnah and the Community (Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah), as well as all their actions and behaviors, are represented by points in domain (1). And you would find the creeds of the people of disbelief, as well as the people of whims and error among Muslims, and all their behaviors, represented by points in domain (2). We must assume that the dividing line between truth and falsehood does not allow any issue to exist upon it, because it is not possible for any issue, opinion, or statement to be both true and false at the same time, nor to be wrong and right simultaneously. This is not tolerated by reason or logic, and this is self-evident.

If we come to our conflict today, between the disbelieving invaders and their allies, and the resisting mujāhidīn and their allies, concerning any action, statement, or position today, we would find that the issues of conflict between us and our enemies have a defined circle within the absolute, open domain of matters of truth and falsehood. The boundaries of the circle of our conflict, as a call for global Islamic resistance and those who assist us, against the Jewish-Crusader campaigns led by America and its allies and those who stand with them, are that they are an aggressor

against us, seeking to destroy our civilization and eliminate our entity and existence, representing a consolidated front. We, on the other hand, want to repel this aggressor and preserve our religion, our lives, our honor, and our resources. So that matters of conflict and disagreement do not branch out into all issues of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, we represent the boundaries of our conflict as a resistance against our enemies with a limited circle within the domain of truth and falsehood. This circle has boundaries that define all its issues – doctrinal, intellectual, political, media-related, etc. We call it the "boundaries of the circle of conflict." The diagram representing general matters of truth and falsehood, and the issues of the conflict, would then be as follows: [Another diagram is implied here.] The absolute domain of truth and falsehood, right and wrong.

We would find that the dividing line between truth and falsehood divides the issues within the circle of conflict into what we term (3) and (4). From here, we can classify every idea, belief, statement, opinion, action, piece of literature, poem, legal opinion, behavior, etc., to find its place in this diagram¹ and its four domains, and it will fall into one of four classifications:

- Matters of truth and correctness that do not fall within the circle of conflict, its boundaries, and its domain: (1)
- Matters of falsehood and error that do not fall within the circle of conflict, its boundaries, and its domain: (2)
- Matters of truth and correctness related to the issues of the resistance's conflict with its enemies and its domain: (3)
- Matters of truth and correctness related to the issues of the resistance's conflict with its enemies and its domain: (4)

We clarify this diagram to say:

For the resistance to achieve its objectives, and as a matter of prioritizing, preferring

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ Translator Note: I could not find original copy of this book with the diagram

the important over the more important, procuring benefits and repelling harms, choosing the lesser of two benefits if both cannot be attained, and repelling the greater of two harms with the lesser if the choice is unavoidable; it is upon us, as a matter of specialization, to devote ourselves today in our confrontations to matters related to the issues of the "call of resistance," whether these confrontations are Jihādī military, political, media, intellectual, literary, or anything that occupies us and requires any form of effort from us, or exposes us to any form of cost. We must concern ourselves with the limited issues within the framework of the boundaries of the circle of conflict. And everyone is guided to that for which he was created.

For other domains of goodness, truth, and endeavor, there are those among Muslims who are suited for them and who have dedicated themselves to them. May Allāh assist them in what they have devoted themselves to and accept it from them.

Every idea, opinion, behavior, statement, or action that helps launch the resistance or directly nurtures its roots is an objective of the resistance, which supports it with opinion, word, and aid. Conversely, anything that obstructs the resistance, dries up its roots, and aids its enemies, the call of resistance has a stance against it, confronting it appropriately by military, political, media, or any legitimate means. Just as we must not branch out and waste our efforts on futile words and deeds, or enter into endless conflicts of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, we must also pay attention to every issue falling within the boundaries of the circle of conflict. The many forms of religious innovations (bidʿah) rampant among Muslims today, deviations, grave veneration, misguidance, manifestations of immorality (fusūq), sins, etc., are endless. All are manifestations of the absence of a legitimate Islamic leader (Imām) and the non-implementation of Sharīʿah. They appeared with its disappearance and will disappear with its appearance.

These issues fall into domain (2), and there are callers and scholars in domain (1) who address them. All forms of behavioral and moral deviation, bribery, corruption,

etc., are likewise manifestations of a wretched life due to most people – rulers and ruled – turning away from the remembrance of Allāh. They are manifestations of the absence of Allāh's law and will cease with its implementation. These are also issues of domain (2), and there are those from domain (1) who address them.

However, if an issuer of legal opinions (muftī) were to opine that American armies and institutions are under a covenant of security and should not be attacked, this is an issue located in domain (4). We must confront it appropriately with the Jihād of argument and clarification, an effort from domain (3). If his institution were to promote normalization with American intellectual campaigns, misleading people and undermining the foundations of their religion – like those established in Wādī 'Arabah on the Jordanian-Israeli border, and many others – this is an act falling within the circle of conflict in domain (4). We must deal with it by combating it, nullifying it, removing it, and assassinating those in charge of it, whether disbelievers or hypocrites among our citizens. This is achieved through acts of fighting and resistance from our domain (3), and so on.

Thus, we summarize this explanation, which we have clarified with the diagram for easier understanding:

The call of Global Islamic Resistance addresses issues related to the boundaries of the circle of conflict with the encroaching enemy and its allies, whether these are matters of the Jihād of clarification (jihād al-bayān) or the Jihād of the spear (jihād al-sinān, i.e., armed Jihād). It refrains from preoccupation with what lies beyond that, not out of disdain for truth and correctness, for all truth is sacred in itself, but as a matter of specialization, prioritization, and consolidating the Ummah's efforts, which are barely sufficient when combined to repel this great calamity afflicting us – a punishment from Allāh for some peoples, and a trial for others. We ask Allāh for success and safety.

8. The Concept of Common Denominators in Political Conflicts Between Different Parties:

Among the simple principles of modern mathematics taught today to elementary school students is what they term "Venn diagrams," named after the mathematician who pioneered the representation of sets, their elements, mathematical equations, and common denominators between different sets using diagrams. It is a simple idea that greatly helps in understanding the issue of common denominators in the world of politics among separate, different, contradictory, and even conflicting groups. The following simple example illustrates this principle:

If we have a set of numbers: $\{S = \{10, 9, 4, 3, 1\}\}$, another set: $\{A = \{10, 9, 15, 7, 3\}\}$, and a third: $\{P = \{45, 15, 9, 4\}\}$. We observe that the common numbers between $\{S\}$ and $\{A\}$ are $\{A\}$ are $\{A\}$ are $\{A\}$ and $\{A\}$ are $\{A\}$ and $\{A\}$ are $\{A\}$ and $\{A\}$ are $\{A\}$ and $\{A\}$ are $\{A\}$

This simple mathematical representation gives an idea of the concept of common denominators among independent groups in the world of politics as well. We term the section containing common elements between two or more groups the "common denominator." If we move to the world of groups in the concept of politics, ideas, principles, interests, beliefs, etc., we find that the concept of the "common denominator" is the same. For example, the "common denominator" among all Muslims who pray towards the Qiblah (Ahl al-Qiblah) is the general principles of Islām and its agreed-upon fundamental beliefs, such as belief in Allāh as Lord, belief in Muḥammad as a Prophet, in the Qur'ān as a book, prayer towards the Qiblah, and their corollaries agreed upon by those termed "Ahl al-Qiblah." This is a vast domain of beliefs and principles.

Likewise, the issues of Islām, its sanctities, its history, and so forth, are all common denominators among Muslims, forming a wide, expansive, and unencompassable field.

Confronting America and repelling its aggression against Muslims is a "common denominator" among all Ahl al-Qiblah.

America's loss and defeat, and working towards that, is a "common denominator" between them and all of America's enemies and those concerned with its defeat, even among disbelievers.

Thus, with some understanding, breadth of perspective, and conceptualization, we find that "common denominators" between different independent groups are, in political terminology, the set of shared characteristics, components, objectives, or interests, or any factor or component that logic proves to be "common."

All conflicts in the world of politics are based on a system of alliances and shared interests among those who have "common denominators," against a common adversary.

A good understanding of the term "common denominators" leads Jihādī/mujahid cadres and resistance supporters to comprehend the political decisions made by Jihād leaders to enter into direct or indirect alliances with other forces. These forces may differ in methodology or belief from resistance groups but share a common denominator with the resistance in enmity and confrontation against the enemies of legitimate resistance. Such leaders move to cooperate with those sharing these common denominators in light of the regulations of Sharīʿah-compliant politics and what the rulings of necessity permit, with clear-sightedness regarding security, political, and military calculations.

9. The Concept of Relationship, Influence and Being Influenced in Relationships, and the Network of Political Relations:

The Concept of Relationship:

We use the word "relationship" for any form of connection between two elements, groups, or entities.

The bond between brothers is called: a fraternal relationship.

The bond between a father and his children: paternity and filiation.

The bond between a husband and wife: a marital relationship.

Between adversaries: a relationship of enmity.

Between those who love each other: a relationship of love.

Between those at war: a relationship of war.

Between those with shared interests: a relationship of common interests.

Between those with no relationship at all: a non-existent relationship, or a "relationship of no relation."

And so on: a neighborly relationship, a non-aggression relationship, a diplomatic relationship, an alliance relationship, a cooperative relationship, to the end of the many terms used today, especially those relevant to political relations.

The Concept of Direct and Indirect Influence and Being Influenced Between Elements and Groups:

- Every relationship between two parties results in direct influence and being influenced by each other, to a degree that increases or decreases according to the components and characteristics of each.
- Every relationship between two parties indirectly affects these two elements and all other peripheral elements that have direct relationships with these two elements. This is clarified by an example.

In the world of commerce, for instance, if there are four companies in the market: (1), (2), (3), and (4). If there is a direct relationship between companies (1) and (2), and between companies (3) and (4).

Naturally, there is an indirect relationship among all of them, which is the relationship of existing in the same market. If a direct relationship is established between company (2) and company (4), these two companies will directly influence each other by virtue of this relationship. However, this will

also lead to an indirect first-degree influence relationship between (1) and (4), and similarly a relationship between (1) and (3) due to the relationship between (3) and (4). There will be a second-degree influence relationship between them.

From this, we can say that all elements sharing a common field have interconnected relationships of influence and being influenced, of varying degrees, forming an intricate network of relations.

If we enter the world of political relations, we will find this to be exceedingly clear and exceedingly complex. Anyone involved in the battle of political action, especially political battles of a violent nature, such as what we are discussing (resistance vs. occupiers and their allies), must understand the nature of local, regional, and international networks of relations, and the nature of direct and indirect influence and being influenced, at all levels, among all these elements.

This gives rise to what is called a network of relations. If we take an example from the heart of the resistance's struggle today in the Arab and Islamic world against America and its allies, we find the data, if greatly simplified, as follows:

1. America's Axis:

- America: Has an organic and fateful relationship with Israel.
- America: Has a very strong relationship with Britain.
- America: Has a lesser-degree relationship with some Western countries, foremost among them Australia, Italy, Canada, and Japan.
- It also has a patron-client alliance relationship with other components from Eastern European countries and some countries in Asia, Africa, and South America.

• It has a Crusader alliance relationship with Russia and with all components of the Crusader world.

These relationships are not random; they are based on beliefs, ideas, treaties, agreements, alliances, interests, and pressures.

In contrast, we find another bloc also on the side warring against us, but of a different nature, which is the independent European axis.

2. Europe's Axis:

France, Germany, Russia, Spain, Belgium, along with a group of other European countries and those in their orbit, from what remains of their spheres of influence in some African and Asian countries.

3. Relations Within the Two Axes:

All components of these two axes are linked by alliances, the most important of which are:

- NATO: Links most of the main components of these two axes and consists of (26) countries.
- 2. The European Union: Links the most important components of the second axis and currently consists of (25) countries with a total population exceeding 450 million. Other countries await entry, and it is expected to reach about 40 countries.

What further complicates the matter is that in the world of politics, elements are often linked by contradictory, intertwined, and highly complex relationships. For example, Japan, America, and Europe appear to be allies of the strongest kind in international and military fields, especially when it concerns conflict with Muslims. However, in many areas, particularly in the race for economic interests, they represent three quasi-warring economic axes: America's axis, Europe's axis, and the axis of Japan and East Asian countries. If we imagine a network depicting these

direct and indirect relationships of all degrees, it is self-evident to imagine, as in all networks, that instability in any node of the network (a certain country) due to internal or external reasons, as well as any instability or rupture in the bond of a relationship between two nodes (two countries), will lead to the instability of all elements according to their proximity or distance from the site of instability. Sometimes, instability leads to changes in the components of some nodes or the severing of some relationships and ties. If the instability is severe or explosive, it may lead to a breach in parts of the network or its fragmentation, requiring it to be rewoven and redrawn.

This is what happens during major events, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the redrawing of Europe's map, and the establishment of the new world order.

It is also similar to what is happening today with America's drive towards its imperial dream, its turn towards Crusader campaigns, and the resulting upheavals in relations between East and West, among the components of the East itself, as well as among the components of the West, and between everyone. And so on.

If we want to influence the balances of such networks, rearrange them in our favor, or emerge from their instabilities with minimal losses, this depends on two important and interconnected factors:

- First: Our precise and detailed understanding of the nature of the game, its players, its links, its relationships, and all its components. This means understanding the composition of the two conflicting parties our side and the enemy's side, and the neutral parties between them and the ability to utilize that knowledge for our benefit.
- Second: The intrinsic ability, materially and morally, to effect change. This
 depends on the given factors and capabilities in the realm of causes. And
 glory be to the Causer of causes and Owner of dominion. Often, understanding

is available, but the material means to transform it into effective action and movement are not, which is a form of subjugation under the rule of circumstance.

10. Strategy, Tactics, and Margins for Political Maneuvering:

These three terms are frequently used in political and military fields, and even in other areas of activity. What concerns us here is the political dimension of resistance. These terms have been defined in many ways, but I will briefly explain their essence relevant to us:

Strategy:

It comprises the main outlines of a planned program, established to achieve the objectives of that program, or what are called "strategic objectives." Strategy is characterized by being based on a set of real data and actual capabilities for its implementation.

One of its fundamental characteristics is relative stability, unlike tactics. Since it is supposedly based on the stability of general data, it must be characterized by stability, unless unforeseen events disrupt its surrounding circumstances and data. In that case, the strategy must be completely changed, and the cost of this change is often severe – materially, morally, operationally, and on every level. It requires crisis leadership capable of managing the consequences of the strategy's collapse and formulating an alternative. It is self-evident that one of the simplest costs of changing a strategy is that all efforts, expenditures, preparations, and tools allocated to it, and sometimes even personnel, often prove unsuitable for implementing the subsequent strategy, except to the extent that wreckage from a demolished structure can be used in new construction. Depending on the nature of the demolition, parts and bricks may or may not be reusable.

The Strategic Objective:

It is the primary, fundamental goal for the achievement of which the strategy and its necessitated tactics were designed. In our case:

Our strategic objective is:

To compel the invading forces in our lands, led by America and its allies, to withdraw from our countries and to end their ability to influence them, so that the conditions are prepared for overthrowing the existing client regimes in our lands, in order to establish the legitimate Islamic system that governs by what Allāh has revealed in our Arab and Islamic countries, on the ruins of those apostate regimes.

Tactics:

They are the set of phased programs, plans, operations, maneuvers, and partial practices aimed at implementing the general plan (the strategy) to achieve the strategic objective. Usually, the higher management that formulated the strategy also devises the general plans for the set of tactics intended to achieve it.

Often, the detailed plans for these tactics are left to subordinate leadership, except in cases of centralized leaderships that tend to interfere in details, which often yields poor results.

It is natural for tactical programs to be canceled, modified, or replaced by those implementing them, according to changes in the circumstances surrounding their execution. This has no impact, if incidental, on the implementation of the general plan (the strategy). However, if the general characteristic is the constant changing of tactics, this indicates a deficiency in the objectivity of their formulators and their lack of grasp of their capabilities or the circumstances surrounding the plan's implementation.

Maneuvers:

They are a set of flexible tactics that rely on evasion and deceiving the enemy to gain time, positions, or situations. These maneuvers depend on the intelligence of the

leaders and elements carrying them out, as well as largely on the general surrounding circumstances.

Margins for Maneuver:

These are the surrounding circumstances that enable the aforementioned tactics of maneuvering, evasion, and gaining positions, situations, and time. They often arise unexpectedly and for limited periods. Therefore, they must be seized upon, giving a boost to the strategic plan through intelligent maneuvering tactics and swift initiative.

Initiative:

Initiative is the ability to generate action towards the general environment or towards the enemy, whether the initiative is intellectual, political, military, or media-related. The more the initiative is characterized by realism, dynamism, renewal, and comprehensiveness, the greater its impact in changing the surrounding conditions and giving a strong impetus to the program.

Seizing the Initiative:

This is the ability to control the launching of actions and the management of strategy, disrupting the enemy's strategy and forcing them into reactive postures, according to the actions of the one who has seized the initiative, whether politically, militarily, or otherwise.

11. The Theory of Construction and Destruction in Strategic Movement:

This principle is fundamental in every conflict and on every level where two adversaries contend. Starting with creed, it is impossible to believe in Allāh while acknowledging tyranny (ṭāghūt). Allāh Ta'ala said: {So whoever disbelieves in ṭāghūt and believes in Allāh has grasped the most trustworthy handhold}.

On the intellectual level, one cannot advocate for an idea without proving the falsehood of its antithesis. On the military level, the best means of defense is offense. And so it is in every competitive and confrontational sphere.

When we come to the resistance and its adversaries, we find a civilizational clash on all fronts and in all domains: doctrinal, political, intellectual, cultural, and economic. In the violent form of the clash, the military domain, we find that the principle of demolishing the forces, pillars, and claims of the adversaries' agents is a priority in the resistance's offensive strategy. This is an operation that must proceed concurrently from the very beginning of the resistance, alongside the process of building the resistance's own components on all these levels.

The strategic balance between us and our adversaries is entirely unequal from a material perspective, heavily favoring them. However, from a moral perspective, it favors us, whether concerning the Arab and Muslim masses or global public opinion as a whole.

Therefore, the resistance's doctrinal theory must be based on construction and destruction: building conviction in our general beliefs and our Jihādī creed among our supporters, and proving the falsehood of what contradicts them among the adversaries, through dialogue, argument, and clear evidence. Thus, dismantling the arguments and claims of the pro-regime jurists (fuqahā' al-sulṭān) and the scholars of colonialism ('ulamā' al-isti'mār) is a strategic axis.

On the intellectual, cultural, and social levels, the thought and culture of resistance must also be disseminated, and the thought of inaction, submission, and surrender must be combated, also through dialogue, argument, and clear evidence.

On the political and media levels, we must rely on substantiating the theories of resistance, calling for it and its symbols with argument and clear evidence, and refuting the claims of the pillars of colonialism and their agents, destroying their image and the reputation of their collaborating symbols, and invalidating their political claims and proofs, also with argument and clear evidence.

In the military domain, operations of recruitment, preparation, organization, funding, and civil society institutions supporting the roots of resistance must proceed. Simultaneously, the military wings and mujāhidīn of the resistance must

destroy all enemy footholds in our land through the physical elimination of their elements and the complete destruction of their institutions by military means. The resistance also reserves the right to deterrence and to strike the enemy in its own heartland as a branch of resistance activities and an arm demonstrating the capability for reciprocity, as will be discussed.

12. The Three Adjudications of a Sharī'ah-Compliant Political-Activist Decision:

There are three fundamental adjudications to which a Muslim must subject all his decisions, actions, aspects of his life's activities, and intended deeds. They are:

- a- The Sharī'ah adjudication (forbidden or permissible).
- b- The political adjudication of benefit and harm (beneficial or harmful).
- c- The realistic and feasibility adjudication (possible or impossible).

For example, if a Muslim trader intends to undertake a transaction, he must study it from three aspects and subject it to three adjudications and studies:

- Is this transaction permissible and lawful, or is it among the forbidden sales and transactions such as usury (ribā), buy-back sales (bayʻ al-ʻīnah), sales involving excessive uncertainty (gharar), fraud, and other prohibitions?
- Is this transaction commercially and materially beneficial to him, or is it harmful?
- Is this transaction possible or not from a material and realistic standpoint?

This example extends even to a Muslim intending to marry. He will consider his choice of marriage: first, is this marriage lawful, to a Muslim woman or a woman from the People of the Book whom Allāh has permitted marriage to, or is it unlawful, to those whom Allāh has forbidden marriage to? Second, is it beneficial or harmful in all its dimensions and consequences? Finally, is this marriage feasible to execute, or are there obstacles from his side or the side of his choice that make it impossible?

These adjudications assume utmost importance in the world of politics, especially when the decision relates to fateful matters such as resistance decisions and their derivative Sharīʻah-compliant political, military, or media decisions, etc.

This domain is one of the most delicate that Jihādī/mujahid leaders mobilizing the resistance effort must grasp. Erroneous decisions, especially in the military field – such as poor target selection, leading the resistance into secondary battles, or confrontations that cause it to lose its distinct identity or its popular support – are critical. The same applies to political decisions or media activities. Every such decision by anyone active in the field of resistance must be subjected to these adjudications.

He must ask himself:

First: Is what he intends to do forbidden or permissible? If he is ignorant of this, he must adhere to His Ta'ala saying: {So ask the people of knowledge if you do not know}. He should then refer to someone trustworthy in his knowledge of Sharīʿah and reality, who is also trustworthy in his religion, and ask him. The matter involves responsibility for lives, honor, and property.

Second: He must consider and reflect on the dimensions of his action and its consequences: Is it beneficial to the cause of resistance or harmful to it? This matter is more difficult than the previous one due to its entanglement with benefits and harms. It is not enough for the apparent ruling to be lawful and permissible for it to be actually so. If it is proven through political and realistic calculations and the opinions of experienced people, people of opinion, warfare, and strategy, that the outcome and consequences of this action will result in harm and damage, then proceeding with it becomes forbidden, according to the general principle: "No harm shall be inflicted or reciprocated; everything harmful is forbidden." If he knows this, fine; otherwise, he should return to those he trusts among the people of knowledge in matters of politics and reality, who are trustworthy in their religion, from among

the people of opinion, warfare, and strategy. If its permissibility and benefit are confirmed to him, he then considers the third.

Third: He considers his capabilities to execute this action. This is best assessed by those resolved to undertake it, especially if they consult experts in the matter, under the conditions of a consultant: {Indeed, the best one you can hire is the strong and the trustworthy}. As is clear by Sharī'ah and reason, one cannot proceed with an action or decision unless it receives three approvals from the three adjudications: Sharī'ah-based, political-interest-based, and realistic-operational. Thus, it must be: permissible, beneficial, and possible.

13. The Rulings of Jihād and Sharī'ah-Compliant Politics, Their Basis in Reality, and the Phased Nature of Tactics to Achieve the Strategic Goal:

Ibn al-Qayyim (may Allāh have mercy on him) said in his book *Zād al-Maʿād*, in the chapter on the chronological sequence of the Prophet's (peace and blessings be upon him) guidance in dealing with disbelievers and hypocrites from the time he was sent until he met Allāh, Exalted and Majestic be He:

"The first thing his Lord, Blessed and Exalted, revealed to him was to read in the name of his Lord who created, and that was the beginning of his prophethood. He commanded him to read to himself and did not, at that time, command him to convey the message. Then He revealed to him: {O you who are covered! Arise and warn} [Qur'ān 74:1-2]. So He made him a prophet by His saying {Read} and sent him as a messenger with {O you who are covered!}. Then He commanded him to warn his nearest kinsmen, then he warned his people, then he warned the Arabs around them, then he warned all the Arabs, then he warned all the worlds. He stayed for some ten years after his prophethood warning through invitation, without fighting or jizyah, and was commanded to restrain, be patient, and forgive.

Then he was permitted to migrate (Hijrah) and permitted to fight. Then He commanded him to fight those who fought him and to leave alone those who

withdrew from him and did not fight him. Then He commanded him to fight the polytheists (mushrikīn) until the religion is entirely for Him. After the command for Jihād, the disbelievers with him were of three categories: people of peace and truce, people of war, and people of dhimmah (protected non-Muslims). He was commanded to fulfill the covenant for the people of treaty and peace and to honor it as long as they abided by the covenant. If he feared treachery from them, he was to renounce their covenant and not fight them until he informed them of the annulment of the covenant. He was commanded to fight those who violated their covenant. When Sūrat Barā'ah (al-Tawbah) was revealed, it came with a clarification of the ruling for all these categories. He commanded him in it to fight his enemies from the People of the Book until they give the jizyah or enter Islām, and He commanded him in it to wage Jihād against the disbelievers and hypocrites and to be harsh with them.

So he waged Jihād against the disbelievers with the sword and spear, and Jihād against the hypocrites with argument and tongue.

He commanded him in it to disavow the covenants of the disbelievers and to renounce their covenants to them. He divided the people of covenant in this regard into three categories: a category he was commanded to fight, namely those who violated their covenant and did not remain steadfast for him, so he fought them and triumphed over them. A category who had a temporary covenant which they did not violate nor did they support others against him, so He commanded him to fulfill their covenant until its term. And a category who had no covenant and did not fight him, or who had a covenant that they be granted a respite of four months; when these months elapsed, he was to fight them. These are the four months mentioned in His saying: {So travel freely in the land for four months} [Qur'ān 9:2]. These are the sacred months mentioned in His saying: {And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists} [Qur'ān 9:5]. The sacred months here are the months of free travel, the first of which is the Day of Proclamation, which is the tenth of Dhū al-

Ḥijjah, the Day of the Greater Pilgrimage, on which the proclamation occurred, and the last of which is the tenth of Rabī' al-Ākhir. They are not the four mentioned in His saying: {Indeed, the number of months with Allāh is twelve months in the register of Allāh [from] the day He created the heavens and the earth; of these, four are sacred} [Qur'ān 9:36]. For those consist of one separate month and three consecutive: Rajab, Dhū al-Qa'dah, Dhū al-Ḥijjah, and Muḥarram. He did not grant the polytheists free travel in these four, for this is not possible as they are not consecutive, and he only granted them a respite of four months. Then, after their elapsing, He commanded him to fight them. So he killed the violator of his covenant and gave a respite of four months to those who had no covenant or had an absolute covenant. He commanded him to fulfill the covenant of the one who abided by his covenant until its term. All of these embraced Islām and did not persist in their disbelief until their term, and jizyah was imposed on the people of dhimmah.

So the status of the disbelievers with him after the revelation of Barā'ah settled into three categories: those at war with him, people of covenant, and people of dhimmah. Then the condition of the people of covenant and peace evolved into Islām, so they became two categories with him: those at war and people of dhimmah. Those at war with him were fearful of him. So the people of the earth with him became three categories: a Muslim believing in him, a peaceful and secure person with him, and a fearful enemy.

As for his conduct with the hypocrites, he (peace and blessings be upon him) was commanded to accept their outward declarations and entrust their inner secrets to Allāh, and to wage Jihād against them with knowledge and argument. He was commanded to turn away from them, be harsh with them, and to convey the eloquent word to their souls. He forbade him to pray over them or to stand at their graves, and informed him that if he sought forgiveness for them, Allāh would never forgive them.

This was his conduct with his enemies, both disbelievers and hypocrites." (End of quote).

The majority of scholars hold that these rulings are not all abrogated by the final stage reached, which is the state Muslims must strive for. However, if they encounter, in certain circumstances, a situation similar to those experienced by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) in his life, they may draw analogies from it and be guided by his example (peace and blessings be upon him). As we have mentioned, the basis) of rulings in Sharīʻah-compliant politics is knowledge of the Sharīʻah ruling, understanding reality, and applying the former to the latter by people of knowledge and specialization who are trustworthy in their religion and conduct.

Now, after these introductions, definitions, and necessary fundamental political concepts, we delve into the core of the subject: to examine the reality of the American campaigns and the Arab, Islamic, and international reality concerning them. After clarifying this, we will move on to outlining the general features of the desired political theory for the call of Global Islamic Resistance.

Second: A Summary of the Reality of American Campaigns and the Arab, Islamic, and International Reality Concerning Them:

The foundation for establishing the pillars of the general strategy for resistance and its political theory is to understand the features of the enemy's strategy, the composition of its parties, and its data. Then, to understand the composition of our supporters and those with us in the resistance ranks. In previous chapters (in the first part), we addressed many details of the reality of the Islamic Ummah. In this section, we present three important points whose understanding forms the basis for laying down the pillars of the political theory for the call of resistance.

1. The Nature, Axes, Objectives, and Means of American Campaigns:

The conclusion drawn from the torrent of books, studies, statements, and documents filling various media outlets today is that the new Jewish-Crusader campaigns have an integrated civilizational dimension aimed at eliminating the components of the Islamic civilizational Ummah on all fronts.

On the Doctrinal Front:

The Zionist-American campaigns aim to alter the features of the Islamic religion and its fundamental beliefs, distort them, and distance Muslims from them. They seek to present a model of a modern, secular, Americanized Islām that is little more than formalities, customs, and some rituals, while changing fundamental beliefs and abolishing key issues related to religious identity, loyalty and disavowal (al-walā' wa al-barā'), the political entity, the Muslim personality, and Islamic life on every level. Their most important means in this endeavor is relying on a vanguard of pro-regime scholars ('ulamā' al-sulṭān) and some corrupt figures from the Islamic Awakening, to recruit factions of "scholars of colonialism" and "Pentagon preachers." They are also developing an ambitious program in cooperation with governments in the Islamic world to produce batches of scholars and preachers who are "intellectually hybridized" and "American-cloned," through so-called Sharī'ah rehabilitation courses for mosque preachers, imams, exhorters, and sheikhs.

Similarly, they establish Islamic institutions under various names that call for the dissolution of Islamic identity and the distortion of religion under slogans such as "dialogue," "moderation," "discourse of the other," and "reformulating religious discourse," presenting them as non-governmental civil society institutions. The audacity and foolishness of the Americans reached such a point in mid-2004 that, in their sick ambitions to change the Islamic religion, they gathered a number of scholars and specialists, or some apostates, to abridge the Qur'ān! They produced a new, abridged Qur'ān after deleting all verses of Jihād, loyalty and disavowal, and those calling for hatred of disbelievers, dissociation from them, and Jihād against them, under the pretext that this is the basis of terrorism in the Islamic religion.

They named the new abridged Qur'ān "Furqān al-Ḥaqq" (The Criterion of Truth)!! As if our complete Qur'ān, preserved by Allāh's protection despite them, were a criterion of falsehood! Far be it from that, and *{monstrous is the word that comes out of their mouths; they speak nothing but a lie}* [cf. Qur'ān 18:5]. You can imagine, then, the extent to which the doctrinal dimension of this battle goes.

On the Intellectual and Cultural Front:

The campaigns aim to secularize and deconstruct the Arab and Islamic mind, and to re-mold it according to the American way. This is intended to create generations of disfigured individuals who have no religious or intellectual identity, and no connection to their historical and cultural roots. They are led by a group of agents who belong to the Ummah of Islām only in name and appearance, but are Americanized Zionists in thought, culture, and beliefs. This objective and program have many details and programs that have become well-known under the slogan of the war of ideas and curricula that America is waging against Muslims, their civilization, and their peoples to separate them from those civilizational components.

In the Political Dimension:

The campaigns aim to dismantle the existing political entities in the Arab and Islamic world and reshape them by manipulating political maps, existing ruling systems, and demographic compositions along sectarian and ethnic lines. They also aim to impose an innovative model of "colonial democracy," which mixes principles of "democratic origins," "colonial conditions," and "oppressive, arbitrary methods of dictatorial governments." This is done by imposing a set of policies to remove all forms of religious, nationalist, national, and political opposition from their path and render them ineffective. America thereby removes some regimes it previously established or supported, overthrows some, keeps others, and reshapes and creates other regimes in their place. This enables it to implement its program in our region through its project named "The Greater Middle East," extending from the borders of

China to the Atlantic coasts, and from the shores of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea to the Arabian Sea and the great African desert – in short, the Arab world and most of the Islamic world.

In the Economic Dimension:

America aims for complete control over the economies and resources of this region, especially energy, particularly oil and gas. This allows it to control the economies of its allies and compel them to operate within its program. It also aims to link the region's economy to its own economy and that of Israel, through what it calls partnership agreements, the establishment of free zones, joint economic projects, and other monopolistic colonial economic tricks.

In the Social Dimension:

The campaigns aim to dismantle the social components of Arabs and Muslims and reshape them in terms of customs, traditions, and behaviors. This is done through media programs, the onslaught of satellite channels and internet networks, and what they broadcast through them, thereby manipulating people's minds to disfigure them and re-clone them according to the Western American model. This involves spreading a culture of prostitution, unveiling (sufūr), intermingling of sexes, singing, and the arts of vice, under the names of freedom, entertainment, gender equality, and women's liberation, etc. The Americans have named this scheme their "societal re-engineering programs."

In the Educational Dimension:

America is currently waging a fierce campaign against the Arab and Islamic world in the educational, intellectual, and cultural fields. This campaign is more ferocious than its military campaign, with a larger budget, and more complex in its plans, networks, and covert methods.

The Crusaders and Jews, as I mentioned in the introduction of this book under the title "Axes of Resistance," realized that the roots of resistance stem from the

Ummah's religion and its doctrinal, intellectual, cultural, and moral heritage. They also realized that the means of nurturing and preserving this heritage come through educational materials and methods. Therefore, America and its allies focused their attack on this front, using the same strategy of "construction and destruction" mentioned earlier. They work to demolish our intellectual and educational heritage while building their thought, theories, and methods of their civilization and life within our Ummah.

Or so they try to do. They have worked towards this by imposing projects to change educational curricula on ministries of education in the Arab and Islamic world, at all levels from elementary to higher education. They have particularly focused on corrupting curricula in subjects such as history, national education, Islamic education, Arabic language, political and social sciences, and ethics, etc. They have also sought to prevent specialized religious education, restrict it, and impose government control over mosques, lessons, and sermons, etc.

In the Military Dimension of the Campaigns:

American campaigns work to impose their military control over the region they have named the Greater Middle East through the following strategy:

- Direct military presence through the occupation of some areas like
 Afghanistan and Iraq, and other areas they plan to invade, such as Syria, Iran,
 Sudan, Egypt, and parts of the Arabian Peninsula.
- 2. Current presence in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as in Turkey, Egypt, North Africa, and Central Asian countries. In what it calls the Central Command area of operations, which includes the Arab world and most of the Islamic world, there are over a million American soldiers, excluding allied forces from NATO and others.
- 3. Direct military presence through land and naval bases and fleets that collectively surround this entire region and, along with their permanent bases

- in the heart of the Arab and Islamic world, constitute its occupation and control of the region.
- 4. Enhancing the capabilities of the Israeli army to be an almost sole, superior, striking strategic force in the region.
- 5. Dismantling the Arab and Islamic armies surrounding Israel, either by destroying them as in Iraq or by deconstructing them as happened to the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and others, which were repurposed for internal security tasks to suppress their own peoples.
- 6. Integrating the remaining strong, existing armies in the region into its logistical services, as the Pakistani army is doing at the time of writing these lines on the night of March 21, 2004, in its massacres targeting Arab, Uzbek, Turkestani, and Chechen mujāhidīn, and those who sheltered them in the tribal areas of Waziristan. Similarly, other Turkish and regional armies provide their services, voluntarily or involuntarily.

In the Security Dimension:

America's security strategy, in its latest form, can be summarized in the following points:

- 1. Deploying security units from various American intelligence and security agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and others newly created, directly through official, overt offices in Arab and Islamic capitals, and through covert offices under various covers, as well as through security sections in its embassies in the region.
- 2. Placing the entire intelligence apparatus of Arab and Islamic regimes in the region at its direct service, assigning them dirty work such as arrests, torture, suppression, and liquidation.

- 3. Placing the security forces of dozens of direct and indirect allied countries worldwide at the service of its security program, compelling these countries to implement its program and security regulations, arresting whomever it wishes, and extraditing whomever it wishes, even against the will of governments and their judicial bodies, and even after their acquittal. This occurred in the arrest of six Algerian Arab mujāhidīn in Bosnia after their acquittal by the Bosnian court, their kidnapping, and their transfer to Guantanamo, against the will of the Bosnian government and despite the foolish global public opinion captive to international Zionist media.
- 4. Holding regular and emergency security agreements, alliances, and conferences throughout the world.
- 5. Eliminating safe havens for Islamists pursued by their own countries or by America, and forcing countries to extradite them or expel them so that America can, in turn, pursue and kidnap them.
- 6. Drying up the financial sources of Jihādī groups and any Islamic institution it considers terrorist or supportive of terrorism, in an attempt to plunge the mujāhidīn and their families into a state of hunger, fear, and destitution, and to paralyze their ability to operate and move.
- 7. Destroying established military bases and visible frontlines of resistance hotspots through aerial and missile bombardment, or by assigning client forces from local armies or militias to advance on and liquidate them.
- 8. Liquidating resistance leaders and Jihādī figures through assassination and kidnapping.
- 9. Arresting Jihādī elements from everywhere, extraditing them to America or their home countries, or imprisoning them locally.

- 10. Practicing a policy of "preemptive strikes" and aborting supposed terrorist cells, as they claim, whereby America destroys and liquidates any institution or individual it suspects or accuses of being hostile.
- 11. Employing deterrence and counter-terrorism, using dominant technology and the capabilities of a superpower.
- 12. Recruiting agents among Islamists and planting them in supposed resistance arenas.
- 13.Launching a "war of ideas," as Rumsfeld called it, aimed at destroying the intellectual, religious, and cultural backgrounds that fuel the readiness for resistance, and instead implanting concepts of surrender to the enemy within the Ummah.

(This is regarding the offensive direction; as for the defensive direction, the following points can be added:)

- 14. Expanding the issuance of anti-terrorism legislation within America and in allied countries, regardless of civil rights and human rights.
- 15. Creating new internal security agencies and establishing a new ministry for them in America.
- 16.Internal defensive precautions and security measures that reach obsessive levels, and conducting security drills for hypothetical attacks, even with weapons of mass destruction.
- 17. Pressuring Arab and Islamic communities, besieging them securely, infiltrating them, and exploiting them.
- 18. Utilizing international organizations and UN-affiliated bodies in its antiterrorism program, such as obligating all member states to submit reports on

their achievements in combating terrorism, and providing records of banking system activities and money transfers in their countries, with the threat of sanctions for lenient states.

19. Finally, what was proposed by the old black hag and the speckled snake, Condoleezza Rice: the idea of forming local militias from friendly forces in all regions of the world to be America's local arm in combating terrorism. This is to address the apparent deficit in American manpower and its inability to meet the needs of its imperial dream.

This, in short, is what can be termed the strategy of state terrorism by the superpower, the sole global pole: America, to date. May the Almighty Avenger disgrace them.

With this, we conclude the general axes of these campaigns, which operate according to the theory of the clash of civilizations, as they have declared their objective of eliminating Islamic civilization as a path to survival and unifying their ranks.

2. The Reality of the Arab and Islamic Ummah in Confronting the Campaigns:

We will address this by examining the reality of different segments:

a. The Reality of Ruling Regimes in Arab and Islamic Countries During These Campaigns:

1. These regimes, especially in the Middle East and surrounding areas, feel threatened with removal by America if they do not comply with American demands for increased subservience and prostration, particularly in combating Islamic movements and the roots of resistance, according to American demands, which want everyone to act like the Libyan model presented by Qaddafi: surrendering everything and opening doors to all demands and concessions.

- 2. These regimes feel threatened with removal and revolution by their own peoples if they continue with further subservience, prostration, and compliance with endless American demands.
- 3. The regimes stand terrified before these two options removal from abroad or from within and are incapable of opening up to and cooperating with their peoples, due to a massive legacy of oppression, corruption, plunder, and crimes they have become accustomed to, along with the power and benefits they are used to.
- 4. It appears so far that the regimes' choice is to yield to American pressure and confront their peoples, thus heading towards an inevitable confrontation with them, in order to appease America so that it does not replace them.

b. The Reality of Muslim Scholars and Leaders of the Islamic Awakening:

Muslim scholars today are divided into two groups:

The group of hypocritical pro-regime scholars.

The group of righteous but incapacitated scholars.

Each group is further divided into two:

As for the hypocritical pro-regime scholars:

A. A faction siding with colonialism and with their rulers in their loyalty to colonialism.

B. A faction hypocritical towards their rulers but opposed to colonialism. As for the righteous but incapacitated, they are also two groups:

C. A faction trying to hold the stick in the middle, between the rulers and the seeds of the Jihādī renaissance and the features of the coming resistance. However, whenever they practice some neutrality and demand some reform, the ruler's rod looms, along with the costs of enjoining good and forbidding evil and the ruler's wrath. So they are suppressed, and they incline towards flattery, sycophancy,

muttering, and ambiguity, thereby losing the affection, love, and trust they had gained from the Muslim street. Thus, they continue to waver, belonging neither to this group nor to that, like a lost sheep straying between two flocks.

D. The second group of the righteous are reclusive and fearful. Their piety and conscience do not allow them to go along with the ruler, nor does their faith, steadfastness, and courage enable them to speak the truth and support the people of truth.

This group of "those who are silent about the truth" constitutes the best of Muslim scholars today! Incapacitated, hesitant, while people are lost, agitated, and confused in the midst of these tumultuous waves that would baffle even the forbearing. So what of the common Muslims?

There are no signs on the horizon, as of yet, of anyone from the school of Ibn Taymiyyah, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Mālik, al-Shāfi'ī, Abū Ḥanīfah, Sufyān, or al-Awzā'ī – those whose stories of steadfastness once delighted these scholars' audiences among common Muslims. And to Allāh is the complaint.

c. The Reality of the Leaders of the Islamic Awakening:

Incapacity and submission prevail among most leaders of the Islamic Awakening. They find no outlet except to vent their anger and criticism on America and its practices, especially since the regimes' discontent with American pressure has opened a window for some of them to curse colonialism, bypassing the rulers who represent and carry out its tasks in our countries. As for a program, they all call today for democracy, political reforms, and the people's choice, perhaps finding in this a sphere and an outlet. There are no signs among the senior leaders of the Awakening and its top figures today of anyone emerging to lead the resistance or call for it.

However, many of them, along with some righteous but hidden Muslim scholars, play an important role in calling the Ummah to adhere to its constants and confront

the campaigns of Westernization and intellectual and civilizational colonialism, which is a very important effort in generating the groundwork for resistance.

d. The Reality of Political, Nationalist, National, and Secular Parties and Oppositions:

As a result of the global onslaught against Islām today, and the accusation of terrorism leveled against those working under its banner, secular parties and political and intellectual figures in the Arab and Islamic world found a margin of freedom, away from the possibility of being charged with "terrorism" and consequently entering the circle of liquidation through killing, kidnapping, or imprisonment. Other factors helped this current to freely propagate its ideas. Most importantly, their call for democracy, power-sharing, and opposition rights finds support from America and aligns with its projects for political reform. So they began to voice these openly without fear, taking their liberty in denouncing the rampant corruption in regimes and their practices. Here, they split into two factions:

- 1. A faction representing honorable opposition: These denounce the corruption of regimes and the objectives of the American campaign, stand with the Ummah, and call for resistance in a strong, cohesive manner, through a national and nationalist discourse that aligns in its propositions with the objectives of resistance and Jihād, even if the doctrinal starting point differs.
- 2. A faction representing treacherous, client opposition: These have intensified their attack on Islām and their call for America to enact political reform, imposing it on regimes willingly or unwillingly. They see this as an opportunity to pounce on those regimes, thoroughly exposing their disgrace and ruin. They present themselves as a third option, alongside the regimes and the forces warring against them from Islamic fundamentalism in all its forms.

This malicious option is the one poised to move on the ground today, before

the invading American hordes, to topple those regimes and replace them as an option of even greater disbelief, error, subservience, treachery, and hostility towards Islām and Muslims.

Media outlets, satellite channels, and internet forums today are teeming with those who take the model of Karzai and the Iraqi opposition – who reached power on American tanks – as a model of hope for achieving their vile dreams.

e. The Reality of the Common Muslim on the Street:

The state of the common Arab person on the street can be summarized under the headings of frustration, anger, oppression, rejection of regimes, and rejection of what the programs of the invading campaigns impose.

The common peoples of Arab and Islamic countries are divided into two camps:

- 1. A minority that welcomes the coming change, even if on American tanks. They are weary of oppression, poverty, injustice, marginalization, and a miserable life.
- 2. A majority that rejects the regimes and the American campaign programs, calling for resistance and preparing for it.

 Anyone observing the state of ferment in the Arab and Islamic street is optimistic, very optimistic, about the birth of resistance movements extending from the borders of China in the east to the shores of the Atlantic in the west, with their fervor reaching all corners of the globe.

f. The Reality of the Jihādī Current and the Seeds of Resistance Forces:

As mentioned earlier, the entire Jihādī current, with all its spectrums, men, and organizations, and even many of its supporters, has entered the post-September global trench, as we detailed previously. Therefore, only those whom Allāh spared have survived its men and cadres from killing, kidnapping, and imprisonment. Most of those remaining from this small number have become convinced of setting aside

all previous objectives and options and adopting the option of resistance and confrontation with America and its allies.

Perhaps Allāh will guide our hands and the hands of those who remain to lay the foundations for a global resistance, which will be the solid base upon which the forces, factions, companies, and cells of resistance in the Ummah will arise. As for the seeds of innate resistance in the Arab and Islamic street, indications suggest they are in the process of formation. The revolutionary Jihādī atmosphere is heating up at an accelerating pace. Daily events fuel it with causes for anger and sacred hatred. The media, the satellite channel revolution, and information networks play an important and wonderful role in communication, news exchange, and idea sharing. The arena is "promising" in every sense of the word.

However, the fear of matters exploding uncontrollably, with all the aforementioned contradictions, is real. We ask Allāh not to let people enter a state of chaos, tribulations, great battles, and comprehensive anarchy.

Hence the importance of the Islamic and Jihādī Awakening taking the lead in rationalizing the resistance and guiding it in the right direction.

Finally, in describing the reality of Muslims, it is necessary to point out a very important and dangerous phenomenon that requires swift treatment from minds capable of directing and rationalizing the resistance – from scholars, thinkers, writers, and media figures of the call.

This phenomenon is:

The Phenomenon of the Ummah's Elite Resisting Its Own Vanguards of Resistance

Contrary to the logic of colonial situations and resistance forces in all nations, believer and disbeliever, throughout history.

And contrary to what happened throughout our Arab and Islamic history during the first and second colonial Crusader campaigns, when the Ummah and its elite stood

against the invading enemies and their allies, current conditions indicate a strange phenomenon that surrounds the resistance and resistors with danger.

In the worst cases in those previous circumstances, Arab and Islamic societies produced resistance forces. The Ummah was divided between a working, resisting, mujahid minority, and a majority that abstained from Jihād and resistance but supported it, aiding it as much as they could with material, moral, or even emotional services. Only a rare few from the segments of the Ummah deviated to lend their voice to assisting colonial powers. At the forefront of forces supporting resistance in those times were its scholars, thinkers, men of opinion, literature, and the pen. This happened in the history of Muslims and in the history of all peoples who were occupied and resisted.

But what is happening now is that many organized elite segments in Arab and Islamic societies – the ruling class, the scholarly class, the Awakening class, the political opposition class, the intellectual and thinker class – appear as if they are: acting as antibiotics against resistance, supporting the germ of new colonialism. Beyond being segments that do not resist colonialism – which targets all these classes, from the most corrupt rulers to the most wretched of the governed, with oppression, plunder, and destruction – they are rather antibiotics against the living, mujahid cells of resistance to America and its agents in the region.

Praise be to Allāh that the overwhelming majority of ordinary common Muslims, due to their sound innate compass, tend to support Jihād, the mujāhidīn, and resistance forces, as do some minorities from those elites.

In my opinion, this anomalous phenomenon, which must be remedied, is due to three reasons:

(1) The success of colonialism in its intellectual media campaign to combat "Islamic terrorism," as it termed it. This is the label they succeeded in attaching to Jihādīs, except in special cases of resistance such as in Palestine, and partially in Iraq.

(2) The convergence of interests among the aforementioned segments in confronting Jihādī resistance, for political, personal, intellectual, or material purposes.

(3) Most importantly, in my opinion:

The failure of the Jihādīs since September, for reasons that would take too long to explain, to launch a successful media and intellectual campaign capable of establishing itself as a legitimate resistance according to the standards of those circles.

While today, among the general components of Arab and Islāmic peoples—rulers and ruled of all kinds—Jihād in Palestine is viewed as legitimate resistance, and similarly, in part, some segments of the resistance in Iraq, a negative characterization prevails over all actions of Jihādīs confronting the Americans and their allies in Afghanistan and in various countries around the world. This includes operations occurring in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Europe, and elsewhere. The Jihādīs have been branded with all negative attributes, such as ignorance, bloodthirstiness, terrorism, and more. They have been cornered into a narrow, unfavorable position that requires a swift solution to restore the truth.

This is one of the most significant challenges facing the Jihādī resistance against the Crusader-Zionist campaigns led by America, its allies, and its agents.

3. A Summary of the Power Composition in the Resistance Camp, the Occupation Camp, and the Neutral Camp Between Them:

After understanding the enemy's program, objectives, and strategy for achieving those objectives—a process that is fundamental to formulating the resistance's own program and strategy—we must now complete the data required to develop our strategy. Specifically, we need to analyze the power composition of the resistance camp, identify its internal strengths, and find ways to expand them. Similarly, we need to study the composition of the enemy and its allies so that we can work on

dismantling their alliances. Finally, it is essential to understand the nature and composition of the neutral forces between us and the enemy, in order to either win them over to our side or, at the very least, ensure that they remain neutral.

Map of the Composition of Hostile Campaigns by America, Its Allies, and Its Agents:

The campaigns consist of overwhelming forces, cooperating in all military, security, political, economic, and media fields, etc. These campaigns, led by America, are composed of the following forces, in order of importance:

1 - The United States of America:

Led by political powers and media and financial lobbies that the Jews, over two centuries, have managed to infiltrate and control their direction. The United States possesses a range of data and manifestations of military, economic, and technological power that is not the place here to enumerate; they have become too famous to point out. Suffice it to say that strategic studies centers today classify America's military strength as greater than that of the next nine largest military powers combined!

2 - Israel:

It comes second in importance in these campaigns, not only due to the significance of its military capabilities, the development of which America and Europe have nurtured to high levels, but also because its rabbis, from the Sages of Zion, are the ones who direct the thinking of all these allies. Furthermore, the major financiers who own the largest financial institutions and international banks are Zionist Jews, who control global media institutions, including press, cinema, satellite channels, and publishing houses, thereby manipulating politics in major countries, let alone others. And because Israel is implanted in the heart of our Arab and Islāmic world.

3 - Britain:

It is America's natural ally religiously, as the majority of them, like Americans,

adhere to the Protestant denomination with its Zionist influences. Other ties, such as language and history, also connect them with America. Moreover, the administration of both parties that alternate in power in Britain (Conservatives and Labour) is dominated by political, media, and economic lobbies, mostly Jewish or subservient to Jewish influence, similar to the (Republican and Democratic) parties in America. The importance of this ally stems from its vast historical colonial experience, especially in our Arab and Islāmic lands.

4 - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Countries:

This is the military alliance that has linked America and Western European countries since their victory in World War II. It has been expanded in stages, most importantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when most Eastern European countries that formed the dissolved Warsaw Pact joined NATO, bringing the number of these countries today to about 26. However, the most prominent and important of these allied countries from a military and general strategic standpoint are Western European nations such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Portugal, in addition to Australia and Canada.

5 - America's Allies from Countries Outside NATO:

Because America has become the sole superpower in the world through an anomalous surge unprecedented in history, and because it now holds the keys to military and political power to influence ruling regimes and states, as well as controlling the global economy and the world's energy sources, and also controlling the main media and guidance channels in the world through the dominance of global Jewish Zionist lobbies.

Therefore, most countries in the world have become part of America's list of permanent or temporary allies, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Among the most important countries on this list of America's allies from outside NATO are:

a. Japan:

Although a rival ally in the economic field, where a fierce, albeit cold, economic war rages between them, America, after Japan's defeat in World War II in 1945, managed to dismantle Japan's religious and cultural foundations, change its civilizational identity, and integrate it into the Western world.

Since the First Gulf War (Desert Storm) in 1990-1991 and the launch of the New World Order, America has managed to draw Japan into becoming a military ally, gradually entangling it in American conflict zones. After September and the invasion of Iraq, America dragged Japan into becoming a genuine field military partner in its invasions and Crusader campaigns. These days, it is luring Japan into Afghanistan.

b. Russia:

Russia remains a historical competitor to America, but its economic and political conditions have made it a plaything in the hands of NATO and its leader, America. Despite its attempts to assert its presence, especially in its surrounding sphere in Central Asia, the Baltic states, and Eastern Europe, America has managed to draw most of those countries into its alliance as well.

Russia is left only to play on the margins of competition between the axis of major European countries (Germany, France, and recently Spain) and the axis of (America, Britain, and Italy) and their tails of weak European countries, in addition to Japan. However, because all these countries, including Russia, stand against Islām and its civilization, a Crusader alliance has united them, largely cohesive in fighting us despite its internal contradictions and conflicts. Hence, Russia stands in America's alliance, like others, despite these internal contradictions and conflicts within their alliance.

c. India:

India is on its way to becoming a great power. Its human capital amounts to one billion people, constituting about 1/6th of the world's population! Its economy is growing competitively, and its vast markets form a very important arena for the

global capitalist economy. Its military development—conventional, technological, and nuclear—has reached the ranks of strategic powers. Its historical conflict, with its fanatical Hindu identity, against Muslims, nominates it to be a fundamental pillar in the (Crusader-Jewish) axis of evil invading Muslims. Strategic studies indicate that by the year 2050 CE, India will become the third most powerful country militarily and economically, after China, which will occupy the first position, while the United States will move to the second position.

Talk of its entry as a permanent member with veto power in the UN Security Council is becoming increasingly clear and explicit, and European countries, including France, have called for it.

Therefore, America and Israel have not neglected attempts to draw this sleeping giant ally into their camp. The trajectories of the Indo-Pakistani conflict have revealed overt American bias in India's conflict against Pakistan, and an everadvancing political-military alliance between them. News of joint military maneuvers between America and India has become frequent and recurrent. American officials have also declared India their primary support for stability in South and East Asia in the fight against terrorism.

d. America's Allies in Third World Countries:

America relies on important allies in the Third World, such as some Asian countries like South Korea and Taiwan, most Southeast Asian countries, most African and Latin American countries, and Eastern European countries that have not yet joined NATO. America has drawn most of these allies into the American camp due to their corrupt regimes, whose conditions are no different from those of regimes in the Arab and Islāmic world. Some of these allies have strategic importance for America, which began to take shape with their field entry into the global campaign against terrorism, as they called it. This is in addition to their significant political importance in lending an appearance of an international coalition to America's

military adventures, as Korea, Poland, and some Latin American countries participate today in Iraq.

e. America's Allies and Agents within the Arab and Islāmic Ranks:

These are the most dangerous allies because they are within our internal ranks. This camp consists of apostates and hypocrites and contains the following malicious spectrum, mentioned in descending order of the importance of their role in favor of the enemy:

1. The Apostate Ruling Regimes in Arab and Islāmic Countries:

As a result of the historical corruption of these regimes, their bitter reality, and their sole focus on remaining in power at any cost, they have become playthings in the hands of the American administration. This is not the place to elaborate on the aspects of corruption of these regimes and their collaboration with enemies, as that would be lengthy and is, in any case, well-known. In short, these regimes have mortgaged their will and actions to the will of the enemies of Islām, especially America. They opened their lands—by land, sea, and air—for them to establish bases and launch wars against Muslims and exterminate them. They supplied them with oil and energy to run their war machine and poured the wealth of Muslims into their treasuries and banks. They made their security apparatuses, intelligence services, and prisons foul instruments to serve America's plans in the war against Islām, Muslims, and their Jihādī resistance vanguard. In short, they stood with America with all their political, military, and other apparatuses, against their own peoples and despite them. They did not allow these peoples to practice any support for their causes or for their Muslim brethren, and even deprived them of the simplest forms of protest and expression of opinion regarding all this injustice and darkness.

2. The Hypocrites among the Sultan's Scholars, the Colonial Jurists, and the Corrupt Leaders of the Islāmic Awakening:

This group, in short, represents the Sharī'ah facade that bestows legitimacy on all the injustice and hardship Muslims face. Starting with the mother of all calamities, which is their ruling by the laws of their enemies, other than what Allāh has revealed, and ending with bestowing legitimacy on the occupation of Muslim lands and considering enemy soldiers to be protected persons against whom it is not permissible by Sharī'ah to aggress. This passes through supporting normalization projects with the Jews, and last but not least, moving with all seriousness and enthusiasm in America's programs for the war of ideas. To combat Muslims, mujāhidīn, and resisters on Sharī'ah grounds in the name of religion, and intellectually in the name of Islām. To withdraw legitimacy from Jihād and resistance, after having bestowed it upon the occupation and its allies among the apostate rulers. What has been mentioned in previous chapters of this book suffices to avoid repetition here. The most dangerous and criminal of these are their longterm programs to establish a basis for distorting religion and re-presenting it according to American specifications for combating terrorism, which consider its origin to begin with the texts of the Qur'an and Sunnah and the heritage of the Ummah, upon which there has been consensus over the centuries regarding Hākimiyyah, al-Walā' wa-l-Barā', and the foundations of Tawhīd.

3. Ethnic and Religious Minorities in the Arab and Islāmic World:

America, benefiting from the accumulation of problems and injustices that befell many minorities, just like other segments of the Ummah on one hand, and from the accumulation of unjustified historical grudges among some minorities in many other cases, has managed to form the military and political spearhead that moves on the ground in coordination with American forces and their allies. This occurred with the Farsiwans, Turkestanis, and Shia Hazara minorities during its invasion of Afghanistan. It also happened with its use of Kurds and other minorities during its invasion of Iraq, and as it prepares them to move today in Syria, Turkey, and Iran. This is also happening with Christian Crusader political and military forces in

Lebanon, and as France and America try to stir up Berber nationalist sentiments in North Africa, and so on and so forth. It also tries to play on the ticking time bomb between Sunnīs and Shī'as in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf and the Levant. Ignorance at times, and historical grudges at other times, provided it with an opportunity to destroy the unity of the Ummah from within, which is one of the most important factors for its victory in this confrontation, after Arab nationalists and fanatical chauvinists from secular minorities provided the material for this deadly poison to tear apart the Ummah over successive decades.

4. Westernized Immigrants with Dual Nationalities and American Loyalty:

This segment of technocrats, holders of academic degrees, and higher studies is one of the most important and dangerous. This class of immigrants and children of immigrants from Islāmic communities in Europe and America emerged due to political and economic conditions in the Arab and Islāmic world. Western intelligence agencies have co-opted tens of thousands of these individuals and their children, selecting from them those who would become politicians and leaders in various fields in their home countries. Among the clearest examples are individuals like the Afghan Pashtun businessman and oil magnate with American citizenship, Hamid Karzai, the president of Afghanistan who immigrated to America, and a certain Zāda, the Afghan-American ambassador of Farsiwani origin, also an American citizen, who was the architect of the Bonn Conference that politically mapped out the occupation of Afghanistan. Examples also include senior Iraqi opposition figures like the professional international thief Ahmed Chalabi, and his other comrades such as Allawi and Bahr al-Ulum, and others who spent a significant part of their lives in America and the West. Among them today are Libyan opposition figures and their senior symbols in America, as well as the Syrian and Iranian opposition, which are being hastily manufactured in America today. The examples are numerous, after regimes of injustice and tyranny have created diasporas of tens of millions of Muslims in Western countries since these regimes

came into being. The program has become clear, repetitive, and well-known, as have its men and tools.

5. Americanized Agents from the Secular Current within the Arab and Islāmic World:

The American political offensive against the Arab and Islāmic world, under the pretext of reform and democracy, has produced a type of political opposition that has adopted American democratic and political reform projects. These are Westernized secularists, or rather Americanized individuals, who openly and without any equivocation welcome the replication of the American model of life in any way, even if it is on an American tank, following the Iraqi model. These opposition figures have even become emboldened against closed political regimes, as in Egypt, the Gulf states, and elsewhere, after sensing American protection and the weakness of regimes whose remaining days are numbered. This type, along with the previous one, are those whom America is preparing to rule us in the post-current-regimes phase.

6. The Class of Material Beneficiaries of Colonialism from among Senior Financiers and Businessmen in Our Countries:

With this comprehensive American offensive today, which includes major economic conspiracy projects, a class of merchants and capitalists is emerging in the Arab and Islāmic world. These are individuals who become partners in the American colonial project through partnership schemes, free zones, and major American and Western economic projects. Most of these are men of power and politics, and leaders of Arab and Islāmic societies, such as tribal chiefs, feudal lords, or capitalists whose interests align and intertwine with the goals and interests of the American project in what they call the Greater Middle East.

7. The Decadent and Corrupt Class from among the Sinful Common Muslims:Most of these are from the popular segments of the general Arab and Islāmic

Ummah, who are intellectually distorted and culturally defeated. They have linked their minds to the sources of intellectual and cultural broadcasting from American and Western media outlets, and have been raised on programs like "Video Club," "Star Academy," Rotana satellite channel, and the like. Colonial powers are keen on drawing up major Westernization plans to expand this segment by opening universities, scientific and cultural centers, and sending missions to America for long periods to qualify a client cadre that is scientifically, intellectually, and culturally subservient. From them will come the applauding audience in the American Zār ceremony whose drums are beating throughout the length and breadth of our lands today.

Composition of Resistance Forces, Their Supporters, and Allies in the Arab, Islāmic, and International Arenas:

The vanguards of the nascent resistance confronting these Crusader campaigns consist of the following forces and segments, which I arrange according to their importance as follows:

- (1) Remnants of Jihādī current organizations from the Arab Afghans, al-Qāʻidah, and Jihādīs in general from the remnants of groups and individuals scattered and displaced today throughout the world.
- (2) Mujāhid organizations (not from the Jihādī current) in various parts of the Islāmic world, such as the mujāhidīn in Palestine, Kashmir, the Philippines, Burma, Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, Chechnya, Bosnia, the Balkans, Central Asia, and elsewhere.
- (3) Supporters of the Jihādī phenomenon from among enthusiastic youth who carry Jihādī thought in the Arab and Islāmic world.
- (4) The general bases of Islāmic Awakening groups from various segments, where feelings of zeal, enthusiasm, revolutionary spirit, Jihādī orientation, and emotion are

escalating, despite most of their leaders leaning towards political and da'wah work and refraining from Jihād and resistance. This segment numbers in the millions, praise be to Allāh.

- (5) Righteous independent scholars, who are many but still in a state of incapacity, leniency, and inaction. However, they are sympathetic to the resistance. I believe they will emerge when its strength grows.
- (6) Righteous and honorable leaders in the Islāmic Awakening, especially in its second-tier and mid-level leadership. Most of them have begun to realize that Jihād is the solution after the futility of political paths and the increasing audacity of the colonial onslaught, especially within the Salafī current and groups holding the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- (7) The ordinary Muslim on the street in the Arab and Islāmic world. This is a huge segment. Those enthusiastic for Jihād and resistance, and ready to contribute some effort to resistance in the direct (military) or (civil resistance) domain, or support with money, words, or any contribution, even if only by supplication in their absence—which is one of the most potent weapons in this battle—constitute a segment of hundreds of millions in an oppressed Ummah whose population today approaches one and a half billion Muslims.
- (8) Honorable individuals and people of conscience from the nationalist, patriotic, leftist currents, and some secular opposition groups in the Arab and Islāmic world.

As for the presumed supporters and allies of the global Islāmic resistance in the external sphere, they are all enemies of the American imperialist project, its expansionist imperial program, and its imperialist Crusader campaigns.

The enemies of American imperialism in the world today are many, even in the

Western world, and even within the American populace. They form a very large segment globally. Some have openly declared their position, while others have remained hidden due to fear and pressure. However, the strengthening of the

Islāmic resistance, its heavy toll on American forces, and the erosion of some of its prestige will make this fearful segment, afraid of American repression, declare its position. It will also make the American alliance vulnerable to dissolution and disintegration.

The presumed supporters and allies of the resistance abroad in these circles are, according to their importance:

- a Leftist parties in Western countries known for their history of opposing American policies.
- b National parties and global liberation forces in the Third World known for their history of opposing colonialism, especially American domination and imperialism.
- c Green parties and nationalist and patriotic political parties opposing American policy in the West.
- d Human rights organizations and non-governmental institutions opposing American policies in the Western world.
- e Secret leftist military organizations and others, known for their hostility to America or its allies, such as the Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, the ETA organization in Basque Spain, and organizations refusing to lay down arms from the Irish Republican Army, and the like.
- f Civil society institutions and organizations within the United States itself, including blocs, bodies, and personalities opposing American expansionist policy. These are circles towards which political, media, and other efforts must be directed to benefit from the common ground between us and them against American imperialist policies, each according to its capacity.

I believe that such a move, by those who have the capabilities for it, can open up avenues for us that will confuse the enemy and completely overturn its security and strategic calculations.

The Reality of the Neutral Camp in the Conflict Between American Campaigns and Global Islāmic Resistance Forces:

Until now, the neutral camp in the conflict between America and its allies on one side, and the Islāmic resistance forces opposing them on the other, remains limited and small for three reasons:

Firstly: American political, media, economic, military, and security terrorism against all parties that declare their opposition to the American project, under penalty of being branded as supporters of terrorism.

Secondly: The lumping of the global Islāmic resistance, in all its spectrums and colors, under the label of "terrorism," and even placing them under the term "al-Qā'idah" and supporters of al-Qā'idah. Consequently, anyone who supports them is embarrassed and made to feel they are walking towards their doom.

Thirdly: The failure, so far, of the various factions of the resistance in their media and political programs, and their failure to present themselves to local and international public opinion as legitimate resistance forces. Their focus has been on incitement to action, without political and media dimensions that consider the pathways of public opinion formation.

Nevertheless, there is a spectrum of states and regional and global powers that remain in the circle of neutrality. These must be the focus of efforts by the resistance forces and their cadres, especially in the political and media fields, to convert them as much as possible to the camp supporting the resistance forces. Among these forces are:

1 - In the external sphere, there is China, which America seeks to fragment, and for which Congress has had a public program since 1995. It is a candidate to shift to the camp assisting the resistance against the Americans, if the resistance forces prove themselves, present themselves as "legitimate" resistance in the international

concept, and succeed in shedding the accusation of "terrorism." There are also many Asian and African countries, and very important segments of the populations of Western countries who detest America and its programs, and have not understood the programs and objectives of the resistance in our lands. The enormity of this camp has been proven by the massive demonstrations that have roamed the streets of Western countries and capitals. These segments are not, by nature, supportive of the resistance.

2 - As for within Arab and Islāmic societies themselves:

The segments of neutral forces are still large; they detest the Americans but do not support the resistance, do not understand its message, and have distorted perceptions of it, such as religious and ethnic minorities, and many common people.

After this brief explanation of the map of forces and allies for both conflicting camps—the camp of the invading enemies and the camp of the global Islāmic resistance forces against them—we can move to the next important paragraph, which is:

Thirdly: Pillars of the General Political Strategy for the Call of Global Islāmic Resistance:

At the beginning of the discussion about the broad outlines of the strategy for global Islāmic resistance in confronting America and its allies, it is worth drawing attention to very important points:

Strategy, as we mentioned, is characterized by relative stability, and its stability is related to the general stability of the surrounding data and general conditions. However, due to the stark imbalance in material power between the resistance forces and the forces of the American campaigns and their allies, the resistance strategy cannot be detailed.

Because the weak cannot set strategies.

This is due to their inability to impose conditions, or at least to maintain their stability. Therefore, strategies may change as a result of shifts in general conditions. It is more advisable for the resistance strategy to be a set of broad strategic lines that give it flexibility of movement and the ability to change tactics according to emerging realities.

Resistance is a confrontational act and a project of engagement. It must be stated clearly and with an understanding of a very important fact: without a strong armed confrontation present on the ground, and without resistance that takes on the character of a general phenomenon, not just a series of uprisings, there will be no value to any political or media theory of resistance. Resistance derives its existence and life from its effective armed strength on the ground. Its political and media projects derive their value and presence from the bullets of the mujāhidīn's rifles and the roar of their operations' explosions.

Similarly, without political and media action, all military efforts are wasted and cannot be employed to achieve the goal. Because, as we have mentioned, victory in resistance is a process of political exhaustion, not the annihilation of the opponent under such circumstances. Unless Allāh grants us, or others, success in striking America in its heartland with weapons of mass destruction, or it is destroyed by meteors, earthquakes, and divine hurricanes, and humanity is relieved of its evils.

 Political strategy is part of the general strategy. It must be harmonious with the military and media strategy and other dimensions of the general strategy.
 All are placed in the service of the general strategic objectives.

The four strategic objectives for the call of global Islāmic resistance are:

- (1) Defeating the Jewish-Crusader campaigns led by America and its Jewish and Crusader allies, and pursuing their remnants in the Islāmic world.
- (2) Liquidating the forces of collaboration and hypocrisy that work to achieve the objectives of the invading campaigns.
- (3) Overthrowing the apostate and treacherous regimes existing in our lands due to their support for these invading campaigns.
- (4) Establishing the rule of Sharī'ah on the ruins of those apostate forces.

General Axes of the Political Strategy for the Call of Global Islāmic Resistance:

Firstly: Expanding the concept and axes of resistance to include confrontation with all aspects and axes of the American-Zionist campaigns' onslaught, which are comprehensive axes as we have shown. It should not be limited to the field of military resistance, although that is the essence and foundation of the call to resistance.

These axes are:

1 - Military Resistance:

By targeting all forms of the enemy's presence and those who support them, their projects, and their military, security, political, economic, cultural, and other institutions, according to the Sharī'ah methodological guidelines we have explained, and as we will detail in the explanation of military theory, if Allāh wills.

2 - Political Resistance:

By resisting the enemy's political projects and objectives, and its footholds in our lands, through peaceful political means. Margins of what local and international laws consider legitimate can be utilized, especially in the fields of civil society institutions and non-governmental organizations. Attention must be paid to avoiding affiliation and membership in ruling institutions established by the enemy,

or ruling institutions that govern by other than what Allāh has revealed and are loyal to the enemy.

3 - Media Resistance:

This is a branch of political resistance. It involves using modern means in all their forms, especially satellite channels and the internet, to incite resistance in its various forms. It also involves corresponding with institutions, organizations, and personalities in our countries and everywhere, even in the enemy's own lands, especially circles expected to be influenced in any way in favor of our cause, to fuel the resistance and unify its ranks, and to fragment the enemy's ranks, weaken it, and refute its arguments and justifications.

4 - Civil Resistance:

By confronting the enemies and those who support them through demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, and various forms of popular protest, such as chanting slogans, writing on walls, and disseminating materials inciting revolution against the occupiers and their collaborators, through leaflets, audio and visual statements, and by every means possible that people can employ. This is the responsibility of popular organizations such as trade unions, student unions, and community leaders, foremost among them scholars, public figures, and symbols in every field.

5 - Passive Resistance:

This and what follows represent the weakest form of faith in the Jihād against these enemies and their hypocritical supporters in our lands. This includes boycotting all transactions: not selling to them, not buying their goods, not receiving them, and not showing them hospitality. Not belonging to their institutions, and not paying them levies and taxes except under duress. To show them all forms of disavowal according to one's ability, to boycott their media and not listen to them, and to pray to Allāh against them and curse them in one's heart, and with one's tongue if able—Allāh does not burden a soul beyond its scope.

6 - Resistance by Deepening the Roots of Resistance:

This is by preserving the religious, national, intellectual, and civilizational identity of Arabs and Muslims, and confronting the campaigns in all their general cultural and educational aspects. This type of resistance, despite its ease and the fact that it does not require any practical effort from its practitioner, is very important for keeping the flame of life burning in the Ummah. This generation may not be able to push back as it should due to its weakness and circumstances, but preserving the Ummah's religious, cultural, social, and moral identity, and all its civilizational characteristics, is sufficient to preserve the spirit and roots of resistance for generations that will be more capable of giving. This is achieved by preserving the spirit of religiosity and spreading the sciences of Islām in their purity, far from the falsification carried out by American media in our lands. Here, the role of mosques, public and secret teaching circles if necessary, and the secret and public dissemination of educational books and publications becomes prominent. Domestic education and what mothers and housewives do in raising children on religion and instilling Islāmic identity in their minds from a young age are of the greatest benefit and impact.

Secondly: Doctrinal, methodological, and intellectual regulation of the starting points of the resistance and its Sharī'ah foundations, so that they are consistent with the fundamentals of the Islāmic religion, the lofty concepts of Jihād, its established Sharī'ah-based political rules and judgments, and its known Sharī'ah etiquettes. Protecting it from turning into chaos, turmoil, and an atmosphere of tribulations. Focusing on preserving the blood and wealth of Muslims, both their righteous and their wicked, and striving for their reform. Focusing on striking the enemy and its manifest supporters.

Thirdly: Extricating the global Islāmic resistance from the accusation of "blind, aimless terrorism" drawn by the media. Highlighting the true identity of the resistance as a Jihādī movement exercising the right to self-defense, a right

guaranteed by religions and divine laws, as well as by human customs and laws.

Attempting to win public opinion across various segments of societies and peoples at the Arab, Islāmic, and global levels.

Fourthly: Developing military and security confrontation methods to suit the state of stark imbalance with the overwhelming American onslaught and its allies. Not drawing resistance forces into exposed, unequal confrontations.

Fifthly: Building bridges with various segments and components of Arab and Islāmic societies that reject tyranny. Removing the state of social, political, and intellectual isolation between resisters and Jihādīs and those segments as much as possible, foremost among them the components of the Islāmic Awakening, its leaders, scholars, and bases. Then, all honorable gatherings, parties, personalities, and forces expressing the living conscience of the Ummah in confronting invasion and aggression from all spectrums.

Sixthly: Adopting a policy of dismantling the hostile American-Crusader-Jewish alliance to limit it to the fewest possible allies with America, Israel, and the forces of Jewish Zionism and pro-Zionist Crusaderism.

Seventhly: Highlighting the civilizational dimension of the call for Islāmic resistance as an integrated civilizational movement aimed at establishing the Islāmic state and carrying the torch of civilization and salvation for humankind, and establishing relations with other peoples on the basis of justice and excellence.

Eighthly: Adopting a strategy of confining the conflict to the circle of hostile forces and their allies. Adopting the principle of possible neutralization of different forces and possible recruitment from supporting forces to place them within the sphere of performance and resistance work.

Ninthly: Forming a resistance alliance based on three circles, on fundamental principles, which are:

- (1) Jihād with the Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā'ah.
- (2) Cooperation with the People of the Qiblah from among Muslims.
- (3) Seeking assistance from all sincere forces in our support from the enemies of America and its allies from among non-Muslims.

Within the controls of the rules of Sharī'ah-based governance and the data of interest and movement in light of political reality.

Tenthly: Adopting a policy of long-term war of attrition in the comprehensive confrontation with America and its allies, using the method of secret guerrilla warfare, especially the method of terrorism and deterrence through urban guerrilla warfare, and targeting the enemy's strategic presence in our lands.

Eleventh: Adopting a strategy of construction and deconstruction in confronting the campaigns. Building up the resistance forces and all their foundations, roots, cadres, and alliances. And, conversely, deconstructing the forces of the American campaigns and their allies, and paying attention to liquidating and aborting the foundations of these campaigns and their options in all political, economic, cultural, and other aspects in Muslim lands.

Twelfth: Benefiting from the camp of supporters of our cause within Western societies and other countries forming the Crusader-Zionist alliance led by America.

Thirteenth: Working on coordinating tactics between Jihādī military, political, media, and da'wah-educational activities in the Ummah to achieve the general resistance strategy.

And forcing the enemy to be convinced that what it reaps from campaigns, occupation, and aggression is far less than the human and economic costs of its campaigns.

Fourteenth: Adopting a strategy of striving and action, and abandoning the labyrinths of stagnation and debate, for events have clarified everything, and the enemy's camp and objectives, and the resistance's camp and legitimacy, have

become clear.

{And say, "Do [as you will], for Allāh will see your deeds, and [so will] His Messenger and the believers."} (Qur'ān, Al-Tawbah 9:105).

An important question may be raised about the resistance's strategy for the phase after defeating the campaigns and overthrowing their allies, and what its political, economic, cultural, and social program will be, and so on.

Here we summarize the clarification as follows:

- (1) The long-term resistance phase will produce its men, cadres, scholars, callers, and symbols. Upon them will fall the task of answering this question through the legacy of the path and its constants.
- (2) The new reality then—after the enemy's defeat—will produce, in addition to its new men, its new circumstances, with which those working will know how to cooperate, through our constants and their experiences. It is premature to address those future stages and circumstances of victory, if Allāh wills, with the data of the current state of retreat and defeat.
- (3) The aforementioned strategic objectives, in their sequence—defeating the enemy, then liquidating its agents, overthrowing the regimes that enabled its campaigns and collaborated, then establishing the rulings of Islāmic Sharī'ah in Muslim lands according to those circumstances—remain the general program.
- (4) In the general principles of Sharī'ah and its details are comprehensive answers to all issues of legislation, codification, governance, and administration, in a way that is sufficient, adequate, and obviates the need for detailing them here. Every event has its own discourse. When the oppression of tyrants is lifted from the Ummah's scholars, men of thought, and people of understanding and intellect, those men will know how to manage their affairs according to the law of Allāh and what suits their circumstances.

The important thing now is to put into effect the strategy for the phase extending

from the beginning of the campaign until its defeat. This is our task now. And Allāh is the one whose help is sought.

Fourthly: Political Positions of the Call of Global Islāmic Resistance on Key Issues:

To complete the outline of the fundamental features of the political strategy for the call of global Islāmic Resistance, we will briefly state our position here, from a political perspective, on key important issues, both for the followers of the call and for all concerned:

1. The Issue of Conflict with Existing Regimes in the Arab and Islāmic World:

The policy of the resistance call is to focus on confronting the invading enemy, represented by America and those who assist and ally with it from internal and external forces. Accordingly:

It is not among the objectives of the resistance to confront the existing regimes—despite their deserving it—in order to consolidate the Ummah's efforts on the strategic objective of the resistance, which is the overthrow of the American-Zionist project. Targeting some sectors of those regimes remains to the extent of their entry into the American alliance, without turning this into local revolutions in the manner that Jihādīs used to operate.

As for defensive confrontation with the apparatuses of those regimes, it is a legitimate right and a necessary duty, to the extent of necessity.

2. The Position on Muslim Scholars from the Leaderships and Movements of the Islāmic Awakening:

We summarize this as:

- a Supporting the mujāhid scholars and leaders who proclaim the truth and defend the Ummah's causes.
- b Conciliating the hesitant and fearful, and strengthening their resolve with

wisdom and good counsel, and overlooking their slips as long as they do not become a method of appearing the aggression of rulers and occupiers.

c - Confronting the hypocritical scholars of the Sultan and the treacherous jurists of colonialism, firmly but with proof and evidence.

And not escalating this to confrontation with force and weapons under any circumstances or provocation.

3. Honorable Individuals in the Secular Current Who Resist American Campaigns:

The summary of the position, in circumstances of repelling the aggressor, is to search for points of convergence with them in confronting the enemy, and to redefine those circles through dialogue, correspondence, and meetings about Islām, its data, and its horizons as a political and civilizational option for the future of this Ummah, while paying attention to doctrinal constants and political margins.

4. Soldiers and Security Personnel in the Governments of the Arab and Islāmic World:

This was previously indicated in the fundamentals of the methodology.

Confrontation with them is defensive only, within the limits of necessity, avoiding being drawn into provocations, and pursuing a policy of winning them over to their Ummah's side in the ongoing battle of destiny.

5. The Position on the Palestinian Issue:

This was previously indicated in the general methodology, and its summary is:

- 1 Palestine is the cause of Muslims, not just the cause of Arabs or Palestinians alone. No one has a license to dispose of it at the tables of international slave markets.
- 2 Palestine is Arab Islāmic land from the river to the sea. We do not recognize any authority, legitimacy, or right of residence for Jews in it, except for the original Jews

from there, whose number at the time of the Zionist occupation and invasion was only about 15,000, and their descendants of apes and pigs. These accursed ones are original citizens there, and Islām has guaranteed their legislated rights. The occupying immigrants must return from whence they came on the ships and planes that brought them from overseas, or await the imminent massacre of the trees and stones, if Allāh wills.

- 3 We do not recognize the Palestinian Authority except as one of the Arab apostate entities weighing down on the chests of Muslims. We do not recognize any of their agreements and farces of false peace, from Oslo to the Roadmap, with shame and disgrace upon its proponents, leading to Hell, if Allāh wills.
- 4 We strongly support the sincere mujāhidīn in Palestine and pledge to them our support and unity in battle and destiny.

6. The Issue of Targeting Civilians in the Lands of Countries Participating in Aggression Against Muslims:

As we have previously stated, this is only a field for reciprocal treatment and for deterring aggression, and in the narrowest of emergency situations, while considering political interests and the differing positions of states. The principle in Jihād is the saying of Allāh, the Exalted: {Fight in the way of Allāh those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allāh does not like transgressors.} (Qur'ān, Al-Baqarah 2:190), and His saying, the Exalted: {So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you.} (Qur'ān, Al-Baqarah 2:194).

7. European Governments and Peoples:

As we have clarified, we believe that America's battle with Muslims is, in its results and consequences, against European strategic interests in their entirety.

Many circles in Europe have begun to grow restless with the battle into which America is dragging them. We believe that the time remaining until Europe separates from America and frees itself from the consequences of NATO and other

agreements that tie it to Europe is no longer long.

It is in the interest of the resistance forces to give the main countries in Europe a chance to withdraw from America's alliance diplomatically.

Without neglecting the precise calculations between the political and media effort that the Islāmic resistance forces can exert, and the firmness of the military deterrence policy that they must practice to compel the Europeans—especially those among them insistent on aggression—towards a policy that distances them from the American axis, and is in their interest and ours. This requires that the decision in this regard be made by the conscious leadership of the resistance. In general, we are in favor of working to unify the direction of effort against the American-Zionist axis and whoever insists on siding with them and whose participation is active.

With a reminder to clarify that the battle is with the aggressor governments and not with the European peoples, many of whom have taken good principled stances in rejecting aggression.

8. The American Administration and the American People:

Unfortunately, official statistics and opinion polls still prove that the relationship, in terms of the strategy of aggression and the tendency for domination and control over the resources of weak peoples, between the American people and the American government, is the opposite of the situation between European peoples and their stance on the aggressive orientations of some of their governments. This is true even in Britain, where most of the people do not support their government's aggression.

Despite the exposure of the falsity of the pretexts for invading Iraq and the debunking of lies about weapons of mass destruction and other justifications, despite the Abū Ghurayb scandals, despite Israel's crimes that disgust public opinion in Europe and the world, and despite news of the American army's crimes in

Afghanistan, the majority of the American people remain captive to the controlling Jewish media, and the majority still stands with Israel and with the aggression of successive American administrations against Muslims and the oppressed in the world, indeed, against all of humanity.

The biggest proof of this is the American people's re-election of the pig George Bush, by a large margin, the dull acceptance of this by his opponents, and the rallying of everyone to stand as one because they are in a state of war with Muslims.

Therefore, we believe that the war with the American administration is, by all Sharī'ah and political justifications, and even according to Western and American logic itself:

A war and confrontation with America, government and people.

It seems that this criminal rabble of a people, in its overwhelming majority, as proven by its many crimes throughout its short history, must taste the evil consequences of what its successive Zionist governments inflict upon people and humanity everywhere. Starting with their genocides of America's indigenous population, passing through their nuclear massacres in World War II, and touching upon their shameful crimes in all their wars in Vietnam, Korea, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

The day the American people are convinced—and I do not think they will be convinced except by force—of the enormity of their human and economic losses as a result of the aggression of their successive, varied governments against Muslims and all of humanity, then they will cease their evil, and consequently, they will not pay the price for supporting their rulers in killing people and plundering nations.

The peace-loving forces in the American people—as they claim—must assume responsibility, even through armed confrontation, for deterring their Zionist governments from aggression against all of humanity. Otherwise, it is the right of the peoples aggressed upon by America to repel American aggression with like

means and by all means, including weapons of mass destruction, and the policy of breaking the enemy's back through genocide and killing civilians. This is their repeated method, and it is the very essence of justice that they be treated with it. Allāh the Exalted said: {So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you.} (Qur'ān, Al-Bagarah 2:194).

9. The Position on Religious Minorities in Muslim Lands:

We have previously referred to this issue, especially regarding Christians. Their Sharī'ah rights are known within the framework of Islām, when governance is in the hands of Muslims according to what Allāh has revealed. As for now, while we are still in the stage of repelling aggression, our position towards them is not to harm them, except for those who stand in the ranks of aggression and occupation, who will be confronted for this reason, just like anyone else, even Muslims. It is in the interest of the resistance and its objectives to win over these minorities or at least neutralize them.

10. The Position on Human Rights Organizations:

In a fierce battle like the one currently raging, the positions of these organizations do not seem to be of great importance in restoring a right or deterring aggression. However, events have proven the impact of these institutions and their media stances, often in shaping global public opinion, and the impact of that public opinion in supporting causes of truth and justice, albeit in the long term. Therefore, we advise those working in the field of political and media resistance not to overlook the impact of efforts with these organizations in pressuring occupation forces and shaping public opinion in favor of our causes.

11. The United Nations, International Laws, and International Organizations:

The United Nations, in short, is an organization formed by victorious allies in World War II to ensure the division of control over the world and to codify the distribution

of that control among themselves according to their military and political strength and weight.

Some propaganda margins were left for some of its institutions, for weak peoples and subservient governments to operate within, imagining it to be a margin of political influence. Many international organizations branched out from the United Nations, sharing the task of subjugating and controlling weak peoples in the fields of education, health, agriculture, and human and economic development, leaving them dependent and revolving in the orbit of colonial states. When the international balance of power was disrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and America unilaterally managed the world, America inherited almost complete control over this organization, which will soon collapse and disappear as an institution from the remnants of the old world order.

This organization has testified against itself that it was behind the codification of the loss of Arab and Muslim rights in all their issues presented to it; this would require a full volume to detail. The organization recognized Israel and all its conspiracies after its establishment. Its resolutions in favor of Arabs and Muslims only succeeded in throwing dust—in the form of condemnation resolutions—in people's eyes. Now that America has inherited the organization.

This Kofi Annan has turned into a despicable employee subservient to the White House. The Security Council legitimized the invasion of Iraq, codified its occupation, and paved the way for internationalizing that occupation, as it did in Afghanistan and Bosnia previously.

In conclusion, the resistance forces must deal with these international institutions, each according to its harm and aggression, on the basis that they are the false curtain for the American-Zionist aggression and the control of its shadow government over the world. They must not be deceived by the farce of the United Nations confronting American ambitions. The utmost role of states opposing

America within it is their eagerness to increase the share of wolves, hyenas, and rats from what the American lion leaves behind from its predation on our bowl and plunder of our wealth.

This is not to mention the espionage and intelligence role played by the employees of these institutions wherever they settled in our lands. We must deal with them as one of the institutions of the Zio-American aggression and occupation. We will obliterate all their presence in our lands without leniency. And Allāh is the Helper against them all.

The Theory of Integrated Education in the Call of Global Islāmic Resistance

Awakening Schools and Educational Approaches:

As I mentioned earlier regarding our methodology for generating theories of action by reviewing our experiences and the experiences of others in the course of the Islāmic and Jihādī awakening, and for generating perceptions of what is correct, or what we assume to be correct and strive for, by evaluating the lessons from errors and shortcomings.

By reviewing the integrated educational approaches for the Muslim mujāhid, we find that they encompass five aspects:

- (1) Behavioral and moral education, worship, and spiritual refinements.
- (2) Sharī'ah knowledge in the fields of creed and various religious sciences, especially the jurisprudence of Jihād.
- (3) Political understanding or jurisprudence of the current reality and ongoing events.
- (4) Jihādī military preparation to equip the mujāhid with the necessary sciences of combat.

(5) Finally, the practical application of practicing Jihād in repelling the aggression of enemies against Muslims.

If we were to review the share of various Islāmic action schools in the Awakening, including the Jihādī school, what would we find regarding their state in the field of education?

We note that we are judging here based on the general case, and exceptions do not make the rule, as one might find an individual from one school of the Awakening who has adopted positive traits found in another school.

Firstly: Reformist and Behavioral Educational Schools:

Such as Tablīghī Jamā'at, Da'wah groups, Sufi groups, and the like, we find that they have taken a plentiful share in the first field—worship, ethics, behavior, spiritual refinements, and various aspects of etiquette. We find that their share (generally, of course) of Sharī'ah knowledge in matters of creed, jurisprudence, and various religious sciences is limited among their seniors and almost non-existent among their rank and file. We will find that their share of political understanding and jurisprudence of reality is also almost non-existent, except in rare cases. As for preparation for Jihād and its practice, we will find that they generally have no share in that.

Secondly: Salafi and Shari'ah-based Scientific Educational Schools:

Such as the various schools constituting the Salafī current and students of Sharī'ah knowledge, we find that their share in the first field (ethics, worship, and spiritual refinements) is small, and their circles are often dominated by harshness, severity, and the effects of a lack of spiritual raising (tarbiyah). As for the second field, they have taken an abundant share of the sciences of creed, authentication of narrations, study of the Sunnah, and various religious sciences and jurisprudence. You find their seniors to be of a high caliber, and their rank and file also generally have a decent share. Like their predecessors, we find that their share in the fields of political

understanding and jurisprudence of reality is small. As for preparation and Jihād, they are neither here nor there, like those previously mentioned, and they generally have no share in it except in individual cases.

Thirdly: Political Action Schools and Da'wah, Political, and Party Organizations:

Such as Muslim Brotherhood groups, Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr, and similar political groups. We find that their share in the field of worship, spiritual refinements, and spiritual and moral education is generally small. The same applies to the field of Sharīʿah knowledge. As for the fields of jurisprudence of reality, political science, administration, and general culture, we find their share to be plentiful. Their seniors are at a high level in this, and their rank and file are at an acceptable and good level. As for the fields of preparation and practice of Jihād, they also generally have no share in that, except in special individual cases.

Fourthly: Schools of the Jihād Current and Jihādīs:

We find them to be like their predecessors. They focused on one aspect and neglected the others. They occupied themselves and most of their time with military preparation and training, and many of them practiced Jihād and combat practically. As for the fields of preparation, behavioral and worship-related education, and the fields of ethics and spiritual refinements, you will find that the share of most of them in that is average or small, especially the later ones among them. If you come to the fields of Sharīʿah knowledge and its pursuit, you will find it to be average. And if you come to the fields of understanding reality and politics, you will find that the share of the vast majority in that is shallow and small, except for the first generation of Jihādīs who were well-educated in Islāmic groups and circles of knowledge.

Thus, we observe that all schools of the Awakening and Islāmic action have practiced in their methodologies a state of fragmented preparation and education,

focusing on one or two dimensions and neglecting the rest. If we were to represent these conditions in a table, it would be as follows:

The table shows the following distribution for different Awakening Schools:

Behavioral and Educational Reformist Schools (Sufi, Tablīghī):

Ethics, Etiquette, and Worship: Good.

Sharī'ah Sciences: Weak.

Political Understanding and Jurisprudence of Reality: Very Weak.

Military Preparation: Non-existent.

Practice of Jihād: Non-existent.

Salafi and Shari'ah-based Scientific Educational Schools:

Ethics, Etiquette, and Worship: Average or Weak.

Sharī'ah Sciences: Good.

Political Understanding and Jurisprudence of Reality: Average or Weak.

Military Preparation: Non-existent.

Practice of Jihād: Non-existent.

Political Action Schools and Da'wah, Political, and Party Organizations:

Ethics, Etiquette, and Worship: Average or Weak.

Sharī'ah Sciences: Weak or Average.

Political Understanding and Jurisprudence of Reality: Good.

Military Preparation: Non-existent.

Practice of Jihād: Non-existent.

Jihādī Current Schools:

Ethics, Etiquette, and Worship: Weak or Average.

Sharī'ah Sciences: Weak or Average.

Political Understanding and Jurisprudence of Reality: Weak or Average.

Military Preparation: Good.

Practice of Jihād: Average.

Thus, we observe that in the Jihādī school, although we are generally in a better state, our school has generally been characterized by the same fragmentation and omission in education and preparation, by focusing on one-fourth of the educational aspects and neglecting three-fourths.

Through my immersion in the Jihādī current and my long-term field experience with it, I noticed that later Jihādīs, unlike the first generation who followed a distinguished line of education, especially those who came from other Awakening groups and schools and adopted some of their educational methods, the later ones were content with their share of military preparation and the practice of Jihād, considering that this places them at the pinnacle of Islām. This is based on a fragmented and erroneous understanding of the Hadīth narrated from the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, that "Jihād is the pinnacle of Islām," taking it out of the context of the general, comprehensive Ḥadīth that includes all the fundamentals of Islām and the collection of all aspects of goodness. The full Hadīth is: "On the authority of Muʻādh, may Allāh be pleased with him, who said: I said, 'O Messenger of Allāh, tell me of an act that will admit me to Paradise and keep me away from Hellfire.' He said, 'You have asked about something great, and indeed it is easy for whomever Allāh, the Exalted, makes it easy: Worship Allāh and associate nothing with Him, establish prayer, give Zakāh, fast Ramaḍān, and perform Ḥajj to the House if you are able to find a way. Then he said, 'Shall I not guide you to the gates of goodness? Fasting is a shield, and charity extinguishes sin as water extinguishes fire, and a man's prayer in the middle of the night.' Then he recited: {Their sides forsake their beds...} until he reached {...what they used to do} (Qur'ān, Al-Sajdah 32:16-17). Then he said, 'Shall I not tell you of the head of the matter, its pillar, and its pinnacle?' I said, 'Yes, O Messenger of Allāh.' He said, 'The head of the matter is Islām, its pillar is prayer, and its pinnacle is Jihād.' Then he said, 'Shall I not tell you of what controls all that?' I said, 'Yes, O Messenger of Allāh.' So he took hold of his tongue and said, 'Restrain this.' I said, 'O Messenger of Allāh, will we be taken to account for what we say?' He said, 'May your mother be bereaved of you! Are people thrown into Hellfire on their faces for anything other than the harvests of their tongues?" Reported by al-Tirmidhī, who said it is a good, sound Ḥadīth.

If we return to the method of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, in educating the first generation of Companions, may Allāh be pleased with them, then their method in educating the Successors, then the education of these by those who followed them in excellence, and so on, up to the practice of the Salaf, scholars, and the righteous, we find that it was all based on the comprehensive method established by the Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him. He himself, peace and blessings be upon him, was an example. His character was the Qur'an, as 'Ā'ishah narrated. And whoever's character is the Qur'ān, combines all aspects of virtue, knowledge, etiquette, and noble morals. As for his biography, peace and blessings be upon him, it is a path of firm creed connected to Allah, Glorified and Exalted be He, and it is the source and abundant sea of Sharī'ah sciences. As for his morals, peace and blessings be upon him, it is sufficient to mention Allāh's description of him: {And indeed, you are of a great moral character} (Qur'ān, Al-Qalam 68:4). As for his preparation and Jihād, it is too famous to be pointed out. As for his method, peace and blessings be upon him, in preparation and education, it was an integrated, daily school with which the Companions lived that integration: ethics and worship, knowledge and action, understanding and preparation, Jihād and the path of martyrdom.

The Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, with his firm creed, jurisprudence, character, and Jihād, was the good example before them. His integrated method relied on instilling creeds, of which the first generation in Makkah took their largest share. He planted the creed and nurtured its tree until its roots were firm in their souls, then it grew in their spirits and bore fruit in their behavior.

As for his care for them, peace and blessings be upon him, in urging them to worship, devotion, and asceticism, and setting the highest example for them in that, the texts of the Sunnah and the accounts of the Sīrah are replete with it.

Similarly, this was the case in their care and upbringing on noble morals, such as truthfulness, trustworthiness, generosity, courage, honoring guests, mutual love, mercy and humility towards believers, mutual support, and altruism to the highest peak of praiseworthy ethics.

As for their living their reality, understanding it, and dealing with it, the evidence for this is abundant in their biographies, whether within their society or with the surrounding local and regional powers.

As for their military preparation, the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, urged them to train, practice archery, prepare strength, and ride horses. He witnessed their fields, races, and competition in that.

As for the practice of Jihād, his approach, peace and blessings be upon him, was the good example. He himself, peace and blessings be upon him, went out on many expeditions, and sent out detachments and armies under the command of those dearest to him to be in positions of example and danger. He himself, peace and blessings be upon him, was an example, to the extent that 'Alī, may Allāh be pleased with him, said that the bravest among them was the closest to the enemy. He would not postpone a man if he embraced Islām, delaying him from Jihād until he was prepared and educated in Islām, as the inactive callers claim today! Rather, his slogan, peace and blessings be upon him, was, as he said to someone who wanted to join him in fighting but was not a Muslim:

"Embrace Islām, then fight."

So, the summary of his method, peace and blessings be upon him, in education was that it was integrated in its aspects and based on:

(1) Creed and knowledge. (2) Character and devotion. (3) Understanding and living

reality. (4) Preparation and strength. (5) Practicing Jihād as an obligation when it occurs.

From here, we find that the Salaf, may Allāh be pleased with them, focused on these integrated aspects in their conduct, the preparation of their students, their guidance to the Ummah, and the good example they set.

I do not want to prolong the citations and evidence for what I have mentioned from the books of the Prophet's Sīrah, upon its owner be the purest prayers and peace, the biographies of the Companions, may Allāh be pleased with them, and the wonderful stories about them and those who followed them in excellence.

Masterpieces have been written about them.

From the foregoing, we discover the basic aspects of our theory upon which it must be based;

The principles of education in the call of global Islāmic resistance are:

- 1 Creed and Sharī'ah knowledge.
- 2 Etiquette, worship, ethics, and spiritual refinements.
- 3 Political understanding and jurisprudence of reality.
- 4 Military preparation.
- ${\bf 5}$ Directly engaging in Jihād and resistance to repel the aggressor.

These are the five pillars upon which our educational method is based. Accordingly, scholars, callers, and writers in these arts and their fields in this Ummah must strive to enrich the contemporary Islāmic library with a methodology and practical summaries that help educate the coming generation of resisters and mujāhidīn on these foundations.

The leaders and constructive cadres of the resistance must adopt such methodologies in preparing themselves and those with them. We will outline below general summaries and programs that help mujāhidīn and resisters, especially those affiliated with the call of global Islāmic resistance, to prepare themselves and their

cadres, and to prepare the Ummah according to these integrated horizons, which must proceed in a balanced and simultaneous manner.

The First Field in Education: Creed and Sharī'ah Knowledge

The Status and Virtue of Knowledge:

It is stated in *Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn*:

Allāh the Exalted said: {And say, "My Lord, increase me in knowledge."} (Qurʾān, Ṭāhā 20:114). And He the Exalted said: {Say, "Are those who know equal to those who do not know?"} (Qurʾān, Al-Zumar 39:9). And He the Exalted said: {Allāh will raise those who have believed among you and those who were given knowledge, by degrees.} (Qurʾān, Al-Mujādilah 58:11). And He the Exalted said: {Only those fear Allāh, from among His servants, who have knowledge.} (Qurʾān, Fāṭir 35:28).

"It is narrated from Muʿāwiyah, may Allāh be pleased with him, that the Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, said: 'Whomever Allāh wishes good for, He grants him understanding in the religion.' Agreed upon."

"And from Ibn Mas'ūd, may Allāh be pleased with him, who said: The Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, said: 'There is no envy except in two cases: a man whom Allāh has given wealth and he spends it in the way of truth, and a man whom Allāh has given wisdom and he judges by it and teaches it.' Agreed upon."

"And from Abū Mūsā, may Allāh be pleased with him, who said: The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: 'The likeness of the guidance and knowledge with which Allāh has sent me is like abundant rain that falls on land. Some of it was fertile soil that absorbed the water and brought forth an abundance of vegetation and grass. Some of it was barren land that retained the water, and Allāh benefited people by it; they drank from it, watered their animals, and cultivated crops. And some of it fell on another type of land, which was only a plain that neither retained water nor produced vegetation. That is the likeness of one who gains understanding in the religion of Allāh

and benefits from what Allāh has sent me with, so he learns and teaches. And the likeness of one who does not pay attention to it and does not accept the guidance of Allāh with which I have been sent.' Agreed upon."

"And from Abū Hurayrah, may Allāh be pleased with him, that the Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, said: 'Whoever treads a path in search of knowledge, Allāh will make easy for him a path to Paradise.' Reported by Muslim."

"And also from him, may Allāh be pleased with him, that the Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, said: 'Whoever calls to guidance will have a reward similar to the rewards of those who follow him, without that diminishing any of their rewards.' Reported by Muslim."

"And from him, who said: The Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, said: 'When the son of Ādam dies, his deeds come to an end except for three: ongoing charity, knowledge from which benefit is derived, or a righteous child who prays for him.' Reported by Muslim."

"From Abū al-Dardā', may Allāh be pleased with him, who said: I heard the Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, say: 'Whoever treads a path seeking knowledge, Allāh will make easy for him a path to Paradise. The angels lower their wings for the seeker of knowledge out of pleasure with what he is doing. The inhabitants of the heavens and the earth, even the fish in the water, seek forgiveness for the scholar. The superiority of the scholar over the worshipper is like the superiority of the moon over all other stars. The scholars are the heirs of the Prophets, and the Prophets did not leave behind dīnārs or dirhams, but they left behind knowledge. So whoever takes it has taken an abundant share.' Reported by Abū Dāwūd and al-Tirmidhī."

"And from Abū Hurayrah, may Allāh be pleased with him, who said: The Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, said: 'Whoever is asked about knowledge and

conceals it will be bridled on the Day of Resurrection with a bridle of fire.' Reported by Abū Dāwūd and al-Tirmidhī, who said it is a good Ḥadīth."

"And from him, who said: The Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, said: 'Whoever learns knowledge by which the pleasure of Allāh, the Mighty and Majestic, is sought, but learns it only to attain some worldly benefit, will not find the fragrance of Paradise on the Day of Resurrection' – meaning its scent. Reported by Abū Dāwūd."

"And from 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, may Allāh be pleased with them both, who said: I heard the Messenger of Allāh, peace and blessings be upon him, say: 'Indeed, Allāh does not take away knowledge by snatching it from the people, but He takes away knowledge by taking away the scholars, until, when no scholar remains, people take ignorant leaders. They are asked, and they give fatwās without knowledge, so they go astray and lead others astray.' Agreed upon."

Firstly: Creed:

It was previously mentioned in the first chapter of this second part, when discussing creed and methodology, the fundamental pillars of the creed of Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā'ah. We presented it briefly in broad outlines. It is obligatory for the cells and detachments of the resistance that their leaderships have an educational preparation program that includes, first and foremost, the teaching of a concise book detailing the evidence for the foundations of the creed of Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā'ah. I recommend one of two books that have found acceptance and widespread use in many Awakening movements: *Sharḥ al-'Aqīdah al-Ṭaḥāwiyyah* by Abī al-'Izz al-Ḥanafī, or one of the commentaries on *al-'Aqīdah al-Wāsiṭiyyah* by Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allāh have mercy on them both. This is as a preliminary level because they are comprehensive, concise, easy, and accessible books.

As for the field of Jihādī creed and Jihādī thought, I included in the aforementioned first chapter a summary of the basics of Jihādī creed. It contains a paragraph with

evidence for its fundamental pillars as useful material for the formation and education of resistance cells. To consolidate the Jihādī creed, I generally recommend the works of the martyr Sayyid Qutb, may Allāh have mercy on him, and the works of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qādir ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz. I also highly recommend the works of Shaykh 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām, who is a complete school in thought and education. I also recommend the library of Jihādī groups and organizations, including the works of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Raḥmān, Shaykh Ayman al-Zawāhirī, the works of Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Sā'idī al-Lībī, and the productions of their Jihādī groups in Egypt and Libya. Among the beneficial Jihādī intellectual libraries are the works of Shaykh Abū Muhammad al-Magdisī, Shaykh Muhammad al-Fizzāzī al-Maghribī, the library of Professor Muhammad Qutb, may Allāh preserve him, the works of Professor Abū al-A'lā al-Mawdūdī, may Allāh have mercy on him, and some selections from the works of Shaykh Sa'īd Ḥawwā, may Allāh have mercy on him and forgive him, especially his book Jund Allāh Thagāfatan wa Akhlāgan (Soldiers of Allāh: Culture and Ethics), and his book *Khuṭuwāt lil-Imām ʿalā Ṭarīq al-Jihād al-Mubārak* (Steps for the Leader on the Path of Blessed Jihād), while being mindful of his slips in his later works, may Allāh have mercy on him and forgive him. This is what comes to mind now. It was supposed that I point out some observations about some of what is mentioned in some books of these honorable figures, which I believe necessary to draw attention to, but I do not find the time for that now, and perhaps I will rectify that later.

I also recommend listening to the lectures and recordings of the symbols of the Awakening in the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries produced between the years 1400 AH (1980 CE) and 1415 AH (1995 CE). They contain excellent doctrinal, Sharīʻah-based scientific, and Jihādī-activist intellectual material. Especially the tapes of Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥīm al-Ṭaḥḥān, Shaykh Mukhtār al-Shinqīṭī, Shaykh Safar al-Ḥawālī (may Allāh grant him good repentance from what he is in and benefit through him), Shaykh Salmān al-ʿAwdah (may Allāh grant him a good return to the seriousness we knew from him), Shaykh Nāṣir al-ʿUmar, Shaykh ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-

Turayrī (may Allāh strengthen their resolve), and others of their contemporaries during that period. Pay attention to the productions and fatwās of some of these during the period of repression after imprisonment and the flare-up of anti-terrorism campaigns, where methodological setbacks and dangerous positions were recorded from some of them, may Allāh forgive us and them. However, this does not diminish the value of this methodological material in their productions from that time. The task of selecting and choosing appropriate material for the youth and cells of the resistance remains the responsibility of capable guides who can select useful materials.

I also draw attention to the fact that in the production of some official scholars, in the field of creeds and Sharīʿah sciences, there is useful production of the highest quality, if we exclude from it some anomalous opinions known about them in appeasing their sultans. However, my methodology in dealing with such scholars of the Sultan and their hypocrites is to turn away from their production, if there is something to compensate for it from others whom Allāh has saved from that hypocrisy. Otherwise, their abstract sciences can be benefited from, with a warning about the points of error. The purpose of distancing from them is to warn the Ummah about them so that they do not gain a status that leads the common people to adopt their major errors in fatwās that supported the misguidance of sultans and justified the occupation by colonialists, which are grave matters that became well-known.

As I mentioned earlier, I have included in this book, *al-'Aqīdah al-Jihādiyyah* (The Jihādī Creed), focused ideas important for consolidating the essential creedal foundations for the mujāhid of the resistance who is familiar with research and reading.

Secondly: Sharī'ah Knowledge:

As for the chapter on Sharī'ah knowledge necessary for the mujāhid of the resistance, the Muslim mujāhid must know three matters from the chapters of Sharī'ah knowledge, which he is obligated to learn:

1 - The Sharī'ah Rulings for Acts of Worship:

Such as the jurisprudence of purification, the jurisprudence of prayer and fasting, Zakāh if he possesses wealth, and Ḥajj if he is able. Every resistance cell must prepare for its members a simplified summary of the jurisprudence of worship according to the prevailing school of thought in their region or according to the choices they make for themselves. These are straightforward matters that need not be detailed here.

2 - The Jurisprudence Specific to His Life Activities:

He must know the Sharī'ah rulings concerning his actions. If he is married, for example, he must know the jurisprudence of rulings pertaining to women and teach them to his family. If he is a merchant, he must know the jurisprudence of sales, the rulings of trade, buying and selling, and the movement of money in his type of commerce, and the Zakāh on his wealth, and so on. This is a matter that a Muslim must seek to learn to live with clear insight from the religion of his Lord. There is no need to mention anything about this here either.

In the two preceding sections (jurisprudence of worship and general jurisprudence), I advise that what a person needs to learn, as I mentioned, a Muslim should take from the rulings of the prevailing and familiar school of thought in his locality if he is from the common Muslims and is not capable of research and further study. This is advice; otherwise, let him adhere to a school of thought or summaries that rely on jurisprudence based on evidence and its preponderant views, according to those he is convinced to follow.

3 - The Jurisprudence of Jihād and Its Rulings:

Allāh, Glorified and Exalted be He, says: {O you who have believed, when you go forth

[to fight] in the cause of Allāh, investigate.} (Qur'ān, Al-Nisā' 4:94). The mujāhid of the resistance, and the one determined to tread this path in the way of Allāh, must know the obligation of Jihād and its ruling, which is incumbent upon every Muslim in this era, so that he may continue in it with conviction and creed. He must know the status of this obligation in the religion of Allāh, what reward from Allāh results from performing it, and what He, Glorified be He, has prepared in the stations of martyrs out of His grace and generosity.

He must know what sin and punishment from Allāh, the Exalted, result from abandoning this obligation, and what torment in this worldly life at the hands of enemies results from it, upon him and his Ummah, such as humiliation, disgrace, the violation of lands, honor, wealth, dignity, and the taking of lives.

Then, if he resolves to perform Jihād, he must know its rulings, for the matter relates to blood, wealth, and rights—what is permissible and what is forbidden. It is not permissible for him to stumble into it blindly, without knowledge of its rulings and what is lawful and unlawful.

It is even more imperative that he knows its objectives, goals, and etiquettes. These are extensive topics, and the mujāhid must know from them according to his responsibility and ability. Every Jihādī organization, group, or detachment must have their reliable reference for matters that are unclear to them.

I have transmitted in the first chapter, which contained the fundamentals of thought and methodology for the call of global Islāmic resistance, Sharīʻah issues that constitute fundamental material in the curriculum of Sharīʻah education and the jurisprudence of Jihād and activism. It contained the following topics:

• Firstly: The governments of Muslim lands today are apostate and disbelieving for changing the laws and ruling by other than what Allāh has revealed, and for their loyalty to disbelievers and their betrayal of Allāh, His Messenger, and the believers.

- Secondly: Rebelling against the ruler if he apostatizes from Islām or is a disbeliever is an obligation upon Muslims by consensus.
- Thirdly: The lands of Islām are in a state of occupation by enemies, and Jihād against them is an individual obligation upon Muslims by consensus.
- Fourthly: The rulings of Sharī'ah unanimously affirm the disbelief and apostasy of whoever cooperates with disbelievers and assists them against Muslims, and mandate fighting him.
- Fifthly: The rulings of Sharī'ah affirm the obligation or permissibility of fighting an aggressor against the religion of Muslims, their lives, their honor, or their wealth, even if he is a Muslim.
- Sixthly: The rulings of Sharī'ah affirm the sanctity of the blood, wealth, and honor of Muslims. They also affirm that all forms of presence of invading disbelievers in our lands specifically, and everywhere, are lawful to kill and their wealth is forfeit.
- Seventhly: The obligation to support Muslims in religion if disbelievers
 aggress against them, regardless of the sins and shortcomings they may be
 involved in. Legitimate Jihād is ongoing with every righteous and wicked
 leader and commoner among Muslims.
- Eighthly: The issue of democracy and its practice by Islamists in the balance of Sharī'ah and reality.
- Ninthly: The issue of doctrinal and jurisprudential differences within Ahl al-Sunnah.
- Tenthly: The issue of Takfir, general rulings of Takfir, and the issue of Takfir of a specific individual.
 - These are the most important fundamental principles upon which the entire

thought of Jihād and resistance is built.

I will briefly transmit here some of the most important Sharī'ah rulings on some significant issues that confront the mujāhid in circumstances like ours these days:

(I have transmitted most of it from the book: *Mawsūʿat al-Dhakhāʾir al-ʿIẓām min Muʾallafāt al-Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh ʿAzzām* – may Allāh have mercy on him. The quoted material from Shaykh ʿAzzām will be presented, and my comments and brief evidentiary support for its paragraphs, where feasible, will be integrated.)

Important Sharī'ah Rulings and Issues for the Mujāhid of the Resistance:

1. Jihād Against the More Distant Enemy:

Al-Shāfiʿī said in *al-Umm* (4/177), as quoted by Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh ʿAzzām: "If the enemy's situation differs, with some being more harmful or more feared than others, the Imām should begin with the enemy that is more feared and more harmful, and there is no harm in doing so. Even if their territory is more distant, if Allāh, the Exalted, wills, such that by starting with them, one does not fear from them what one does not fear from others, for example. This would be considered a necessity, because what is not permissible in other circumstances is permissible in necessity. News reached the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, that al-Ḥārith ibn Abī Dirār was gathering forces against him, so the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, raided him, though there was an enemy closer than him. News also reached him that Khālid ibn Abī Sufyān ibn Shuḥ was gathering forces against him, so he sent Ibn Unays, who killed him, though there was an enemy closer." End of quote.

2. Seeking Permission from Parents, Husband, and Creditor:

Shaykh 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām states that the ruling on seeking permission depends on the enemy's situation:

According to *al-Dhakhā'ir* (vol. 1, p. 128):

- 1 If the enemy is in their own lands and not mobilizing on the frontiers, and there is no impact on Muslim lands, and the frontiers are manned by soldiers, then in this case, Jihād is a communal obligation (farḍ kifāyah), and permission is necessary because obedience to parents and husband is an individual obligation (farḍ ʻayn), and Jihād is a communal obligation. An individual obligation takes precedence over a communal obligation.
- 2 If the enemy attacks a frontier of the Muslims or enters an Islāmic town, then, as we mentioned, Jihād becomes an individual obligation upon the people of that town and those around it. In this case, permission is waived; no one needs permission from anyone. A son may go out without his father's permission, a wife without her husband's permission, and a debtor without his creditor's permission.

The waiver of seeking permission from parents and husband continues until the enemy is expelled from Muslim lands, or until a sufficient number of people gather to expel the enemy, even if all Muslims on earth were to gather.

Jihād, which is an individual obligation, takes precedence over obedience to parents, which is also an individual obligation, because Jihād is for the protection of the religion, while obedience to parents is for the protection of the self (in the sense that Jihād is a cause of their grief and hardship). Preserving the religion takes precedence over preserving the self, as Jihād itself involves the potential loss of the mujāhid's life if he is martyred for the sake of preserving the religion. Protecting the religion is a certainty, while the harm to the parents' well-being is a probability, and certainty takes precedence over probability.

An example of individual and communal obligation:

Consider a group of people picnicking on the seashore, among whom are skilled swimmers. They see a child about to drown, crying out, "Save me!" Yet, none of the swimmers move to help. One swimmer wants to act, but his father forbids him from

rescuing the child. Would any jurist, from any era, say that he must obey his father and let the child drown?

This is analogous to Afghanistan—and other occupied lands in similar situations today, such as Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, and so forth. It cries for help: its children are slaughtered, honor is violated, innocents are killed, and body parts are strewn about. Some sincere young men want to move to rescue and assist them, but they are met with strong disapproval: "Are you going without your parents' permission?"

Rescuing the drowning child is an obligation upon all swimmers who see him. Before anyone acts, the directive to rescue is addressed to everyone. If one person moves to rescue him, the sin is lifted from the others. If no one acts, all swimmers bear the sin. Before anyone acts, parental permission is not a factor. If a father forbids his son from rescuing the drowning child, he is not to be obeyed, because a communal obligation (farḍ kifāyah), in its initial address, is like an individual obligation (farḍ 'ayn). They differ only in the outcome: if some undertake it, the sin is lifted from the others; if no one undertakes it, all are sinful.

Ibn Taymiyyah states: "When the enemy attacks, there is no room for disagreement; repelling their harm from the religion, life, and honor is an obligation by consensus." The evidence for seeking parental permission in a communal obligation and not seeking it in an individual obligation, and the reconciliation between the following two Hadīth, is as follows:

First: The Ḥadīth narrated by al-Bukhārī from 'Abdullāh ibn 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ (may Allāh be pleased with them both): "A man came to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) seeking permission for Jihād. He asked, 'Are your parents alive?' The man replied, 'Yes.' The Prophet said, 'Then strive in their service.'"

Second: Ibn Ḥibbān narrated from 'Abdullāh ibn 'Amr (may Allāh be pleased with them both): "A man came to the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) and asked him about the best of deeds. He said, 'Prayer.' The man asked, 'Then what?'

He said, 'Jihād.' The man said, 'But I have parents.' The Prophet said, 'I enjoin you to be good to your parents.' The man then said, 'By Him Who sent you with the truth, I shall certainly go for Jihād and leave them.' The Prophet replied, 'You know best.'" Al-Ḥāfiz said: This is interpreted as referring to Jihād that is an individual obligation, to reconcile the two Hadīth.

Seeking Permission from the Shaykh and Educator

No jurist, early or late, has stipulated that a shaykh or educator has the right to grant permission to his student regarding acts of worship, whether they are communal or individual obligations. Whoever claims otherwise should provide us with a Sharīʻah text or clear authority. Every Muslim individual may go for Jihād without seeking permission from his shaykh or teacher, because the permission of the Lord of the Worlds takes precedence, and He has permitted, indeed obligated, Jihād.

Ibn Hubayrah said: "Among Satan's deceptions is to erect idols in meaning, worshipped besides Allāh, such as when the truth becomes clear to a person, but he says: 'This is not our school of thought,' in blind imitation of someone he venerates, whom he has placed before the truth."

If this student wanted to study engineering, medicine, or history in Western countries or America, where tribulations are like patches of a dark night, and where there is a tumultuous sea of temptations and oceans of raging desires and inflamed passions; I say, if this student went, neither the shaykh nor anyone else would object. However, if he sets out for ribāṭ (guarding the frontier) or goes for Jihād, you find tongues wagging against him from every side, asking: "How can he go without permission?" His shaykh has missed hearing the noble Prophetic words: "Guarding for one night in the cause of Allāh Almighty is better than a thousand nights spent in prayer with their days fasted." And in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim: "Ribāṭ for a day and a night is better than fasting for a month and praying its nights. If he dies, the reward for his deeds which he used to do will continue, his provision will be bestowed upon him, and

he will be safe from the Fittān (the trial of the grave)." And, "A morning or an evening spent in the cause of Allāh is better than the world and what it contains." Therefore, the shaykh and his students should hasten to good deeds and vie in virtues, and not miss the advice of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him): "Take advantage of five before five: your life before your death, your health before your sickness, your free time before you become busy, your youth before your old age, and your wealth before your poverty." They should also heed the authentic Ḥadīth: "Standing for an hour in the line of battle in the cause of Allāh is better than standing in prayer for sixty years."

Al-Shāfi'ī said: "Muslims are in unanimous agreement that whoever has a Sunnah of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) made clear to him, it is not permissible for him to abandon it for the saying of anyone."

Seeking Permission in an Individual Jihād

It has become clear to us that no one seeks permission to perform the obligation of Jihād when it becomes an individual duty (farḍ ʻayn), just as one does not seek permission from a parent or master to perform the dawn prayer before sunrise. Similarly, no one seeks permission to perform the obligation of Jihād. If a father and son are sleeping in the same place, and the son wants to pray Fajr while his father is asleep, would anyone say that the son must seek his father's permission to perform the obligatory prayer? Let us suppose the father has forbidden his son from getting up to pray for some reason of his own—perhaps so as not to disturb those who are sleeping (and not praying Fajr), or because the father himself does not want to pray. Should the son obey his father? The answer is clear: "Obedience is only in what is right" (agreed upon). "There is no obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator" (narrated by Aḥmad). "There is no obedience to one who does not obey Allāh" (narrated by Aḥmad). And abandoning Jihād is a sin. There is no obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator.

However, if Jihād becomes an individual obligation after the general call to arms, then seeking permission from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) becomes a sign of hypocrisy. It is stated in the clear revelation: {Those who believe in Allāh and the Last Day would not ask permission of you to be excused from striving with their wealth and their lives. And Allāh is Knowing of the righteous. Only those would ask permission of you who do not believe in Allāh and the Last Day and whose hearts have doubted, and they, in their doubt, are hesitating.} (Qurʾān, At-Tawbah 9:44-45).

As for the Rightly Guided Caliphs—Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān, and 'Alī (may Allāh be pleased with them)—we do not know that the Companions and the Successors used to seek their permission. Not everyone who wanted to raid or engage in Jihād would come to Abū Bakr to ask his permission. The important thing was that the banner be raised and the expedition set out. Regarding the Commanders of the Faithful after the Caliphs, we do not know that anyone intending ribāṭ or Jihād would send to them for permission. Nor do we know of any Muslim in the entire history of Islām who was punished by the Commander of the Faithful for engaging in Jihād or raiding without his permission. Rather, permission is sought from the military commander and the leader of the battle for raiding and attacking, for the sake of organization and coordination, and so that an individual attacking the enemy does not spoil the Muslims' plan. Some jurists, like al-Awzāʿī, specified seeking permission from the Imām in the case of soldiers who receive their salaries from the military treasury. Al-Ramlī said in *Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj* (vol. 8, p. 60): "Raiding without the permission of the Imām or his deputy is disliked, but there is no dislike in the following cases:

- 1. If seeking permission would cause the objective to be missed.
- 2. Or if the Imām has suspended raiding.
- 3. Or if one strongly believes permission will not be granted, as al-Bulqīnī discussed."

We reiterate: all this applies if Jihād is a communal obligation. However, if Jihād becomes an individual obligation (farḍ ʻayn), then there is no permission or seeking of permission. Ibn Rushd said: "Obedience to the Imām is binding, even if he is unjust, as long as he does not command a sin. Prohibiting an obligatory Jihād is a sin."

To further clarify the issue, we say: Permission and seeking permission apply to a communal obligation, that is, after the number of mujāhidīn is sufficient to fulfill the obligation. However, before sufficiency is achieved, the directive is addressed to everyone, it is obligatory upon all, and it is fulfilled by the action of some. There is no difference between a communal obligation and an individual one before sufficiency is met. Before sufficiency, there is no permission or seeking of permission; this only comes after knowing that there are enough Muslims on the battlefield to fulfill the obligation. This concludes the quoted section from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*.

3. Jihād in the Absence of a Single Leader

Should we engage in Jihād if we do not have a single leader? Yes, we engage in Jihād even without a unified leader. No one has said that the Muslims' lack of unity under one leader nullifies the obligation of Jihād. Indeed, we saw Muslims during the Crusades and the Tatar invasions fighting even though their leaders were disunited, with each land having one or several emirs. Aleppo had an emir, Damascus had an emir, and Egypt had more than one emir. Some of them even sought help from the Crusaders against their fellow emirs, as happened with Emir Shāwar, who sought the Crusaders' aid against another emir in Egypt, Dirghām.

No scholar has said that this situation and this disarray nullify the obligation of Jihād to defend Muslim lands; rather, it doubles their duty. The same was true in al-Andalus, about which the poet said:

"They fragmented into factions, so in every locality... there was a Commander of the

Faithful and a pulpit."

No scholar said there is no Jihād in such a situation; rather, prominent scholars were at the forefront in al-Andalus.

A battle might lack a legitimate commander appointed by the general leader, as happened on the Day of Mu'tah. Khālid ibn al-Walīd stepped forward, took the banner, and Allāh saved the Muslim army through him. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) approved of this and praised him.

The Imām or Commander of the Faithful may be absent, but this does not nullify the obligation to fight and defend Muslim lands. We do not wait until a major state is established and the Caliphate is resumed, because general authority and the Caliphate do not come about theoretically through culture and study. Rather, Jihād is the soundest way for specific authority—that is, the command in battle—to become general authority and a Caliphate. The mujāhidīn choose a leader for Jihād from among themselves who can manage their affairs, unite them, and restrain the strong from harming the weak. In an authentic Hadīth from 'Ugbah ibn 'Āmir, who was from his clan, he said: "The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) sent out an expedition and armed a man with a sword. When he returned, he said: 'I have never seen the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) blame us as he did then. He said: "Were you unable, when I sent a man and he did not carry out my order, to replace him with someone who would carry out my order?"" The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) incited them to change the commander of the expedition to whom he had given the banner with his noble hand. So, what if there is no leader at all? The need to appoint a commander for war is even greater. This concludes the section from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, p. 129.

4. One Person Fighting if Others Sit Back

Should a person fight alone if others sit back? Yes, he should fight, because Allāh, the Mighty and Majestic, addresses His Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him),

saying: {So fight, [O Muḥammad], in the cause of Allāh; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And incite the believers [to fight] that Allāh may restrain the might of those who disbelieve. And Allāh is greater in might and stronger in punishment.} (Qurʾān, An-Nisāʾ 4:84). The verse commands the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) to do two obligatory things—because a command implies obligation:

- 1. To fight, even if alone.
- 2. To incite the believers.

The Lord of Glory mentions the wisdom behind fighting, which is to restrain the might of the disbelievers, because the disbelievers only fear our presence through fighting: {And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allāh.} (Qur'ān, Al-Anfāl 8:39). (This is from Al-Dhakhā'ir, vol. 1, p. 133.)

By abandoning fighting, polytheism (shirk), which is fitnah (strife, trial), prevails, and disbelief triumphs. The Companions (may Allāh be pleased with them) understood the verse according to its apparent meaning. Abū Isḥāq said: "I said to al-Barā' ibn 'Āzib (may Allāh be pleased with him): 'A man charges against the polytheists; is he throwing himself into destruction?' He replied: 'No, because Allāh sent His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) and said: {So fight, [O Muḥammad], in the cause of Allāh; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And incite the believers [to fight].} (Qur'ān, An-Nisā' 4:84). That [verse about destruction] refers to spending.'"

Ibn al-'Arabī said in *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* (vol. 2, p. 954): "There may be a situation where a general mobilization is obligatory if Jihād becomes an individual duty due to the enemy's conquest of a region or their presence in the homeland. In such a case, Jihād and mobilization become obligatory for all people. If they fall short, they have sinned." If the call to arms is general due to the enemy's dominance or their capture of prisoners, then the mobilization is general. It is obligatory for people to

go forth, whether light or heavy, mounted or on foot, slaves or free men, whether one has a father (without his permission) or has no father, until the religion of Allāh is made manifest, the community is protected, the territory is preserved, the enemy is humiliated, and the captives are rescued. There is no disagreement on this.

So, what should one person do if everyone else sits back? He should ransom a single captive if he can, and raid himself if he is able, otherwise he should equip a raider.

Indeed, a man fighting alone pleases Allāh and He marvels at it. In a Ḥasan Ḥadīth narrated by Aḥmad and Abū Dāwūd, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Our Lord marvels at a man who raided in the cause of Allāh, and his companions were defeated. He knew what was upon him, so he returned until his blood was shed. Allāh, the Mighty and Majestic, says to His angels: 'Look at My servant; he returned out of desire for what is with Me and out of fear of what is with Me, until his blood was shed.'" This concludes the section from Al-Dhakhā'ir, vol. 1, p. 133.

5. Jihād and Fighting Alongside the Iniquitous and Profligate

Should we fight alongside Muslims who are not at an acceptable level of Islamic upbringing? (This is from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, p. 134.)

This question is raised by some people, some of whom are sincere. They ask: How can we fight with a people (like the Afghans) among whom are the truthful and the liars, where smoking tobacco and naswār (similar to tobacco) is widespread, and some might even sell their weapons? They are people fanatical about their Ḥanafī school of thought, and some of them wear amulets (tamāʾim). Before I explain the Sharīʿah ruling, I ask: Show me a people on earth who are free from these matters. Should we then abandon the disbelievers in all Muslim lands because these things exist?

The answer is that fighting is obligatory, because fighting is based on repelling the greater of two harms. There are jurisprudential maxims for this: in the *Majallat al-Aḥkām al-ʿAdliyyah*, Article 26 states: "A private harm is borne to repel a public

harm." Article 27: "A more severe harm is removed by a lesser harm." Article 28: "If two evils conflict, the one whose harm is greater is averted by committing the lesser." And Article 29: "The lesser of two evils is chosen."

So, the lesser of two evils must be chosen. Which is the greater evil: the Russian takeover of Afghanistan and its transformation into a land of disbelief where the Qur'ān and Islām are forbidden, or Jihād with a people among whom there are sins and mistakes?

Ibn Taymiyyah says in *Majmūʻ al-Fatāwā* (vol. 28, p. 506): "Therefore, one of the principles of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʻah is to raid with every righteous person and every profligate one. For Allāh supports this religion with the profligate man and with people who have no share [of good], as the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) informed. If raiding is not possible except with profligate leaders or with an army full of profligacy, then one of two things must be done:

Either abandon raiding with them, which would result in the dominance of others who are more harmful in religion and worldly affairs; or raid with the profligate leader, thereby repelling the more profligate ones and establishing most of the rites of Islām, even if not all of them can be established. This is what is obligatory in this situation and all similar ones. Indeed, much of the raiding that occurred with the Rightly Guided Caliphs happened only in this manner. And it is established from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): 'Goodness is tied to the forelocks of horses until the Day of Resurrection, along with reward and spoils of war.' As long as they are Muslims, fighting with them is obligatory."

The banner in Afghanistan is Islamic, and the declared goal is to establish the religion of Allāh on earth. If the Muslims had fought in Palestine, Palestine would not have been lost, despite the corruption that existed at the beginning, and before the matter was completely corrupted and George Habash, Nayef Hawatmeh, Father Capucci, and their likes emerged.

Fighting is obligatory with any group of Muslims as long as they are Muslims, regardless of their iniquity and profligacy, if the fight is against disbelievers, People of the Book, or atheists.

Al-Shawkānī says in *Nayl al-Awṭār* (vol. 8, p. 44): "It is permissible by consensus to seek the help of the iniquitous against the disbelievers."

Is it permissible to raid with the profligate and iniquitous?

Fatwa: Yes, one raids with every righteous and profligate person, meaning every leader. Abū 'Abdullāh (Imām Aḥmad) was asked about a man who says, "I will not raid," and the son of al-'Abbās takes him, for he is merely saving the spoils for them. He said: "Glory be to Allāh! These are evil people, these are the sitters-back, discouragers, ignoramuses. It is said to them: 'Do you see? If all people sat back as you have, who would raid? Would not Islām have vanished? What would the Romans have done?!" Abū Dāwūd narrated with his chain from Abū Hurayrah, who said: The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Jihād is obligatory upon you with every leader, whether righteous or profligate." And with his chain from Anas, who said: The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Three things are from the root of faith: withholding from one who says 'Lā ilāha illAllāh' (There is no god but Allāh)—we do not declare him a disbeliever for a sin, nor do we expel him from Islām for an action; Jihād is ongoing since Allāh sent me until the last of my ummah fights the Dajjāl; and belief in the divine decrees." Because abandoning Jihād with the profligate leads to the cessation of Jihād, the dominance of disbelievers over Muslims and their extermination, the ascendancy of the word of disbelief, and great corruption therein. Allāh Almighty said: {And were it not for Allāh checking some people by means of others, the earth would have been corrupted.} Ahmad said: "I do not like one to go out with a leader or commander if he is known for defeat and for causing the Muslims to be lost. One should only raid with someone who has compassion and concern for the Muslims. If the commander is known for

drinking alcohol and embezzlement (ghulūl), one raids with him; that is only upon himself." It is narrated from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): "Indeed, Allāh supports this religion even with a profligate man."

The leader should not take with him a *mukhadhdhil* (one who discourages others), who is one who dissuades people from raiding and makes them averse to going out for it, fighting, and Jihād, such as by saying, "The heat and cold are severe," or "The defeat of this army is not unlikely," and the like. Nor a *murjif* (one who spreads alarming rumors), who says, "The Muslim expedition has perished," "They have no reinforcements," "They cannot withstand the disbelievers who have strength, reinforcements, and patience," "No one can stand against them," and the like. Nor one who aids the disbelievers against the Muslims by spying for them, informing them of Muslim vulnerabilities, writing to them with their news, guiding them to their weaknesses, or sheltering their spies. Nor one who incites enmity among Muslims and strives to cause corruption, due to the saying of Allāh Almighty: {And if they had intended to go forth, they would have prepared for it [some] preparation. But Allāh disliked their being sent, so He kept them back, and it was said, "Remain with those who remain [behind]." * Had they gone forth with you, they would not have increased you except in confusion, and they would have hurried among you, seeking [to cause] fitnah among you. And among you are those who would listen to them. And *Allāh is Knowing of the wrongdoers.*} (Qur'ān, At-Tawbah 9:46-47).

Because these people are harmful to the Muslims, it is necessary to prevent them [from joining]. If one of them goes out with him, he is not given a share [of the spoils] nor is he given a lesser gift, even if he feigns helping the Muslims, because it is possible that he feigned it out of hypocrisy, the evidence of which has appeared. Thus, he is purely harmful and deserves nothing of what they gained. If the leader is one of these types, it is not recommended to go out with him, because if his going out as a follower is prevented, then as a leader it is even more so, and because harm

to his companions is not unlikely. This concludes the quoted section from Al- $Dhakh\bar{a}$ 'ir.

135-1017.)

(Qur'ān, Al-Bagarah, from verse 2:193).

6. Killing Non-Combatant Disbelievers and Destroying Their Property Killing Women, Children, and the Elderly. (This is from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, pp.

We have previously explained that Islām does not permit killing anyone except combatants, or those who aid the polytheists and enemies of Islām with wealth or opinion, because of the verses: {Fight in the way of Allāh those who fight you...} and {And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allāh...}

A combatant (*muqātil*) implies mutual engagement from both sides. So, whoever kills or participates in combat by any means is to be killed and fought. Otherwise, there is no need to kill them. Therefore, there is no need to kill women due to their weakness, unless they fight; nor to kill children; nor to intentionally kill monks, unless they mix with the polytheists and we are unable to strike the polytheist combatants individually. In such cases, we strike the polytheists without intending the non-combatants.

Inflicting harm on offspring and the vulnerable breeds hatred, written with tears and blood, to be passed down through generations. This is what Islām does not want. Islām wants people to love it, and it wants Allāh, His Messenger, and His religion to be beloved by people. However, at the same time, Islām does not indulge people's desires, nor does it change its methodology to please their whims: {But if the Truth had followed their inclinations, the heavens and the earth and whoever is in them would have been corrupted.} (Qur'ān, Al-Mu'minūn 23:71).

Scholars have differed on this issue, holding various views:

The first view: It is not permissible to kill women and children under any circumstances. This is the view of Mālik and al-Awzāʿī. Even if the disbelievers use

their children and women as human shields, it is not permissible to shoot at them. If they fortify themselves in a stronghold with their offspring, it is not permissible to bombard them with catapults or other means.

The second view: Non-combatants are not intentionally targeted in fighting unless they participate in combat or mix with combatants in such a way that we cannot fight the combatants without killing them. This is the opinion of al-Shāfiʿī and the Hanafīs.

Al-Māwardī states in *Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah* (p. 41): "It is not permissible to kill women and children in war or otherwise, as long as they do not fight, due to the Prophet's (peace and blessings be upon him) prohibition against killing them." Al-Sarakhsī states in *Al-Mabsūṭ* (vol. 10, p. 31): "The presence of women and children in their fortresses does not prevent burning them, nor does the presence of a Muslim captive in them prevent burning their fortresses; however, the polytheists should be the intended target."

It is permissible to kill an elderly man if he possesses sound judgment [for warfare], as the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) approved Abū 'Āmir al-Ash'arī's killing of Durayd ibn al-Ṣimmah, who was over one hundred years old. The Hadīth is in the two Sahīh collections.

The blind, the crippled, or the mentally disabled among the captives are not to be killed, because only those who fight are killed (and combat is mutual). There is no harm in diverting water towards a city of belligerents, burning them with fire, or bombarding them with catapults, even if there are children or Muslims among them. It is permissible to shoot at them even if they use Muslim children as human shields. The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) clarified the reason in the Ḥadīth narrated by Aḥmad and Abū Dāwūd—although there is some debate about its chain—that the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) passed by a slain woman and said: "This one was not fighting." Therefore, the basis for killing is combat (muqātalah). Whoever is capable of fighting is killed and fought.

The Imāms differed regarding Ḥadīth that are apparently contradictory:

Mālik adopted the general meaning of the text, the narration of Ibn 'Umar (may
Allāh be pleased with them both), who said: "A woman was found killed in one of the
Prophet's (peace and blessings be upon him) expeditions, so the Messenger of Allāh
(peace and blessings be upon him) forbade the killing of women and children"
(narrated by the Jamā'ah except al-Nasā'ī).

As for the Shāfiʿīs, they argue that this text is general but has a specific qualifier from the Ḥadīth of al-Ṣaʿb ibn Jaththāmah, that the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) was asked about the polytheists whose homes were attacked at night, resulting in casualties among their women and children. He said: "They are from them" (narrated by the Jamāʿah except al-Nasāʾī; Abū Dāwūd added, and al-Zuhrī said: "Then the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade the killing of women and children").

Although this is used as evidence by those who adhere to the prohibition of killing women and children under any circumstances and consider al-Zuhrī's statement as abrogating, it nevertheless supports the Shāfi'ī and Ḥanafī view, as does the mursal Ḥadīth narrated by al-Tirmidhī: "The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) set up a catapult against the people of Tā'if."

And the Ḥadīth narrated by Salamah ibn al-Akwa': "We attacked Hawāzin at night with Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, and the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) had appointed him as our commander" (narrated by Aḥmad).

Bayāt means raiding at night. The campaigns against Ṭā'if and Hawāzin occurred late in the life of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him).

Preventing the Muslim army from fighting polytheists if they are mixed with their children under any circumstances would mean halting Jihād against them. This poses a danger to Muslims and harms the interests of the Muslim community, especially in these times when combat largely involves long-range projectiles from

artillery, aircraft, and tanks. This would mean prohibiting the use of all these weapons and bringing them to a halt.

If the jurists have unanimously permitted the killing of Muslims when disbelievers use them as human shields, how can they not permit fighting disbelievers if their children and women are with them?

Is the sanctity of the blood of polytheist women and children greater than the sanctity of Muslim blood?

Furthermore, the prohibition against killing women today applies if the woman does not participate in war, does not join armies, and does not embrace ideologies like communism, for which she would fight and die. However, the situation has now changed, and women—in this respect—are not much different from men. Ibn Taymiyyah states in $Majm\bar{u}^c al$ - $Fat\bar{a}w\bar{a}$ (vol. 28, p. 537): "The ummah is in agreement that if disbelievers use Muslims as human shields, and it is feared that Muslims [i.e., the attackers] will suffer if they are not killed, then it is permissible to shoot at them, intending the disbelievers. Even if there is no fear for the Muslims [attackers], it is permissible to shoot those Muslims [shields] as well, according to one of the two scholarly opinions."

Ibn al-'Arabī states in *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* (vol. 1, p. 104): "Women are not killed unless they fight, due to the Prophet's (peace and blessings be upon him) prohibition against killing them. This is unless they fight; if they fight, they are killed."

The Shāfiʿīs differentiated between killing children and women, and killing monks, the elderly, and the blind. They prohibited intentionally killing women and children except out of necessity. Al-Ramlī states (vol. 8, p. 64): "It is forbidden to kill a child, an insane person, a woman—even if she is not from the People of the Book—an intersex person of ambiguous gender, and one who is on the verge of death, unless they fight or insult Allāh or one of His Messengers (peace and blessings be upon him)."

As for the monk and the elderly man, al-Ramlī states (vol. 8, p. 64): "It is permissible to kill a monk, a hired laborer, an elderly man, a blind man, and those among them who do not fight and have no [military] opinion, according to the sounder view, due to the general statement of Allāh Almighty: {...kill the polytheists...} The second view is that it is not permissible to kill them."

Killing a Monk

As for the monk, the permissibility of killing him hinges on whether he mixes with people. If he mixes with people, he is killed. If he is secluded for his worship, he is left alone. It is narrated in the Ḥadīth of Ibn 'Abbās (may Allāh be pleased with them both): When the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) dispatched his armies, he would say: "Go forth in the name of Allāh Almighty, fighting in the cause of Allāh those who disbelieve in Allāh. Do not be treacherous, do not embezzle, do not mutilate, do not kill children, nor the occupants of hermitages" (narrated by Abū Dāwūd).

It is stated in *Al-Mabsūṭ* by al-Sarakhsī (vol. 10, p. 128) that Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad, and the narration in *Al-Siyar al-Kabīr* from Abū Ḥanīfah hold that they are not killed. Abū Yūsuf said: "I asked Abū Ḥanīfah about the occupants of hermitages and monks, and he considered killing them to be good, saying, 'These are leaders of disbelief.'" The reconciliation between Abū Ḥanīfah's two narrations is based on mixing with people: whoever mixes is killed, and whoever does not mix is not killed.

Killing Elderly Polytheists, the Sick, the Blind, and the Chronically Ill There are two opinions on killing elderly polytheists:

1. Some, like the Ḥanafīs and Mālik, equated the elderly with children and women. They cited the Ḥadīth narrated by Abū Dāwūd from Anas in a marfū' form: "Do not kill a decrepit old man or a young child." The Ḥadīth contains Khālid ibn al-Fazr, who is not considered strong. Jurists have said that the reason for not killing them is the same as for children: they are of no benefit

- to the polytheists and no harm to the Muslims. Ibn Nujaym said in *Al-Baḥr* (vol. 5, p. 84): "A woman, a non-mukallaf (one not legally responsible), a decrepit old man, a blind man, and a crippled person are not killed, unless one of them has [military] counsel in war."
- 2. Others, like the Shāfiʿīs—according to the sounder view—permitted killing them. They cite the Ḥadīth in the two Ṣaḥīḥ collections that Abū ʿĀmir al-Ashʿarī killed Durayd ibn al-Ṣimmah, who was over one hundred years old. They also cite a Ḥadīth from Aḥmad and al-Tirmidhī, authenticated by him, from Samurah: "Kill the old men of the polytheists and spare their young men" (narrated by al-Nasāʾī). Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal explained that the Prophet's (peace and blessings be upon him) command to kill the old men was because they would hardly ever embrace Islām, whereas the young were closer to Islām. Added to this is that old men often possess [military] opinion and cunning in war; Durayd ibn al-Ṣimmah had advised Mālik ibn ʿAwf not to take women and children [to battle], but he refused. Among the evidence cited by this group is the general statement: {So kill the polytheists wherever you find them.} And because he is a disbeliever whose life has no benefit, he is killed like a young man.

The summary of the matter, and what we deem most correct, Allāh knows best, is: Anyone who is of benefit to the polytheists or others [in their war effort] is killed—whether an old man, a monk, or a crippled person.

As for the senile old man, the secluded monk, and the sick person suffering from his ailments, who are of no benefit to disbelief and no harm to Muslims, it is preferable to leave them, based on the reported texts (even if there is weakness in them, because analogy supports this, alongside their lack of benefit or harm). Abū Bakr advised Yazīd ibn Abī Sufyān, saying to him: "Do not kill a woman, a child, or a decrepit old man." (Narrated by Mālik in *Al-Muwaṭṭa*'; see *Al-Muwaṭṭa*' with

Sharh al-Zurqānī, vol. 3, p. 290). However, the Ḥadīth is mursal.

In *Al-Mabsūţ* by al-Sarakhsī (vol. 10, p. 137): Abū Yūsuf said: "I asked Abū Ḥanīfah about killing women, children, very old men who cannot fight, and those with chronic illnesses. He forbade it and disliked it."

Cutting Down Trees and Killing Animals

The majority of jurists from the four schools of thought agreed that anything beneficial to Muslims or harmful to disbelievers during battle or in preparation for it is permissible, whether this action is killing a person or an animal, cutting down trees, or destroying buildings. This is because the primary and ultimate purpose of battle is to remove fitnah, spread the call [to Islām], and elevate the religion of Allāh. If Islām permits killing humans who stand in the way of the call, then it is even more permissible to destroy their property if it harms them or compels them to submit to this religion.

As for the verse: {And when he turns away, he strives throughout the land to cause corruption therein...} (Qur'ān, Al-Baqarah 2:205), it was revealed concerning al-Akhnas ibn Shurayq when he came to the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) and declared his Islām, then, upon leaving, burned crops and hamstrung livestock. Applying this verse to a Muslim army—forced to cut down trees—has no relevance whatsoever to the issue.

We return to say: everything that serves the interest of Jihād by benefiting Muslims or harming disbelievers is to be done, because the interest of Jihād takes precedence over everything.

Killing Communist Women in Afghanistan

As for communist women in Afghanistan, they must be killed, whether they participate in war or in [offering] opinion, or not; whether they are alone or mixed [with others]; and whether it is one woman or a group. This is because they are adherents of creeds that fight against Islām and harm Islām and Muslims. It has been established that the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said

concerning two women who belonged to Banū 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib and used to harm the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him), his family, and Islām with their words, and concerning a group of men: "Kill them, even if you find them clinging to the curtains of the Ka'bah."

Using Artillery, Aircraft, Mortars, and Missiles for Bombardment

We have indicated that fighting in Islām is to remove obstacles before its call and to demolish political systems that prevent Islām from reaching the peoples. If we can convey it without killing or fighting, this is what the Muslim desires: that Allāh guides one person through him (which is better for him than red camels). If we cannot, then by removing barriers through all possible means without taking the lives of the vulnerable or destroying property.

If we cannot reach the tyrants deifying themselves on earth except by killing offspring, cutting down trees, and destroying installations, then there is no harm in it, because we were forced into these actions, and they were not our intended purpose or goal.

We have already mentioned the Hadīth of al-Ṣaʿb ibn Jaththāmah that the Messenger

of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) was asked about the polytheists whose homes were attacked at night, resulting in casualties among their women and children. He said: "They are from them" (narrated by the Jamāʿah).

Al-Zuhrī said: "Then the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade the killing of women and children." Al-Zuhrī considers the killing of women and children, if not intentional, to be forbidden, and also because it is abrogated. We have responded to this with the mursal Ḥadīth narrated by al-Tirmidhī that the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him): "Set up the catapult against the people of Ṭāʾif:" Its narrators are trustworthy; see Subul al-Salām (vol. 4, p. 1352). And with the other Ḥadīth from Salamah ibn al-Akwaʿ: "We attacked Hawāzin at night with Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, and the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be

upon him) had appointed him as our commander" (narrated by Abū Dāwūd, and al-Mundhirī remained silent about it). The campaigns against Ṭā'if and Hawāzin occurred in the final days of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him).

Al-Tirmidhī said: "A group of scholars permitted raiding at night and attacking by night. Some disliked it. Aḥmad and Isḥāq said: There is no harm in attacking the enemy by night."

Al-Ṣanʿānī said regarding the Ḥadīth about setting up the catapult: "The Ḥadīth is evidence that it is permissible to kill disbelievers with a catapult if they fortify themselves." Other cannons prepared for use in raids, as mentioned by Ṣiddīq Ḥasan, are analogous to this. This concludes the quoted section from *Al-Dhakhāʾir*.

7. The Ruling on Martyrdom Operations

Therefore, Jihād itself involves risking one's life. Do you not see that the young boy [in the story of the King and the Boy] killed himself for the sake of spreading the religion?

Ibn Taymiyyah states in *Majmū* al-Fatāwā (vol. 28, p. 450): "The boy ordered his own killing for the benefit of the religion's manifestation. For this reason, the four Imāms permitted a Muslim to plunge into the ranks of the disbelievers even if he strongly believes they will kill him, if there is a benefit for the Muslims in doing so." It is stated in *Aḥkām al-Jaṣṣāṣ* (vol. 1, p. 1262): Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan said in *Al-Siyar al-Kabīr*: "If a man were to charge alone against a thousand men, I see no harm in that if he hopes for survival or to inflict casualties. Even if he does not hope for survival or to inflict casualties, but his action would intimidate the enemy, there is no harm in that, because this is the best form of inflicting casualties and it benefits the Muslims."

(This is from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, pp. 288-294.)

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ said: "If the loss of his own life brings a benefit to the religion, this is a noble station which Allāh praised in the Companions of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), saying: {Indeed, Allāh has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise.}" (from Al-Dhakhāʾir, vol. 1, p. 292).

Suicide is forbidden, because the soul does not belong to its owner but to Allāh, the Mighty and Majestic. Therefore, one may not dispose of one's soul except in accordance with Allāh's pleasure. The one who commits suicide deserves Hellfire. The two Shaykhs (al-Bukhārī and Muslim) narrated from Thābit ibn Qays from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): "Whoever swears by other than Islām falsely, he is as he said. Whoever kills himself with something will be tormented with it on the Day of Resurrection. Whoever accuses a believer of disbelief, it is like killing him. And cursing a believer is like killing him."

It is not considered suicide for a person to sacrifice himself in service to Islām, to raise the morale of Muslims, or to inflict casualties upon the enemies of Allāh, the Mighty and Majestic. It is narrated in an authentic Ḥadīth by Muslim, in the commentary on Sūrat al-Burūj, the story of the young boy whom the king was unable to kill. The boy showed the king how to kill him, saying, after gathering the people and crucifying him: "Take an arrow and say, 'In the name of the Lord of this boy, I kill this boy.'" The king killed him, and the people said, "We believe in the Lord of the boy." This and similar examples are among those about whom we believe Allāh Almighty said: {And of the people is he who sells himself, seeking means to the approval of Allāh.}

Shaykh al-Islām [Ibn Taymiyyah], Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan, al-Jaṣṣāṣ, and al-Sarakhsī have stated that it is permissible for a Muslim to attack a thousand disbelievers even if he is certain of his own demise and death, if there is a benefit for the Muslims in doing so, or if it inflicts casualties upon the disbelievers, or if the

Muslims are weak and disheartened and he wants to strengthen their resolve and sharpen their determination. The story of al-Barā' ibn Mālik is of this kind, when he asked the Companions to place him on a shield, raise him on the tips of their spears, and throw him into the "Garden of Death" upon the army of Musaylimah the Liar on the Day of Yamāmah. I was asked about women who threw themselves into the Kunar River in Afghanistan, fearing for their honor from the Russians who had begun to violate [women's] honor. I said: This is martyrdom, if Allāh wills, because scholars are unanimous that it is not permissible for a woman to surrender to captivity if she fears for her honor, and likewise for a beardless youth. This concludes the quoted section from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*.

Important Question:

What is the ruling on a man who wears an explosive belt on his body and then throws himself among a group of disbelievers or tanks, causing it to explode with him and them together? And what is the ruling on a single man who charges alone into the enemy's stronghold?

Fatwa:

Jurists have permitted sacrificing one's life for the victory of Islām, and this is not considered suicide.

There is a difference between suicide and self-sacrifice.

Suicide is killing oneself to escape the worries and pains of life. Self-sacrifice, however, is giving one's life to protect the religion of Allāh and support His Sharī'ah, without worry or grief.

(This is from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, p. 323.)

It is stated in *Aḥkām al-Jaṣṣāṣ* (vol. 1, p. 262) from Aslam Abū 'Imrān, who said: "We raided Constantinople, and the commander of the group was 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Khālid ibn al-Walīd. The Romans had their backs to the city wall. A man charged at the enemy. The people said, 'Stop! Stop! Lā ilāha illAllāh! He is throwing himself into

destruction!' Abū Ayyūb [al-Anṣārī] said: 'This verse was revealed about us, the Anṣār, when Allāh granted victory to His Prophet and made His religion—Islām—manifest. We said: Let us stay with our properties and manage them. Then Allāh Almighty revealed: {And spend in the way of Allāh and do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into destruction [by refraining]. And do good; indeed, Allāh loves the doers of good.} (Qurʾān, Al-Baqarah 2:195).'"

So, throwing oneself into destruction means staying with our properties, managing them, and abandoning Jihād. (Narrated by Aḥmad and al-Tirmidhī, who said it is a ḥasan ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth).

As for a single man charging alone into the enemy's stronghold, Muḥammad ibn al-Hasan said in Al-Siyar al- $Kab\bar{\imath}r$:

"If a man were to charge alone against a thousand men, I see no harm in that if he hopes for survival or to inflict casualties.

If he does not hope for survival or to inflict casualties, then I dislike it for him because he exposes himself to destruction without any benefit to the Muslims. A man should only do this if he hopes for survival or benefit to the Muslims.

- 1. If he does not hope for survival or to inflict casualties, but he emboldens the Muslims thereby, so that they do as he did, killing and inflicting casualties on the enemy, then there is no harm in that, if Allāh wills. In that case, even if he does not hope for survival, I see no harm in him charging them.
- 2. Likewise, if he hopes that others will be [emboldened] by his charge against them, there is no harm in that, and I hope he will be rewarded for it.
- 3. If he does not hope for survival or to inflict casualties, but his action would intimidate the enemy, there is no harm in that, because this is the best form of inflicting casualties and it benefits the Muslims."

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ said: "If the loss of his own life brings a benefit to the religion, this is a noble matter which Allāh praised in the Companions of the Prophet (peace and

blessings be upon him).

{Indeed, Allāh has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties.}
(Qur'ān, At-Tawbah 9:111). {And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allāh as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision.}
(Qur'ān, Āl 'Imrān 3:169). {And of the people is he who sells himself, seeking means to the approval of Allāh.} (Qur'ān, Al-Baqarah 2:207).

And similar verses in which Allāh praised those who gave their lives for Allāh. In the noble Ḥadīth: "The worst things in a man are distressing avarice and debilitating cowardice." Condemning cowardice necessitates praising boldness and courage in what benefits the religion, even if one is certain of perishing."

Ibn Taymiyyah states in *Majmūʻ al-Fatāwā* (vol. 28, p. 540):

"The boy ordered his own killing for the benefit of the religion's manifestation. For this reason, the four Imāms permitted a Muslim to plunge into the ranks of the disbelievers even if he strongly believes they will kill him, if there is a benefit for the Muslims in doing so. We have elaborated on this issue elsewhere." This concludes the quoted section from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*.

I say, and with Allāh is success: I asked Shaykh 'Abd al-Qādir ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz (Dr. Faḍl)—may Allāh grant him relief—about the ruling on martyrdom operations. He told me: "He did not see their permissibility due to not finding explicit textual evidence that would exclude them from the ruling on suicide. He thought about it for a long time until he found evidence for their permissibility in the Almighty's saying: {And do not kill the soul which Allāh has forbidden, except by right.} (Qur'ān, Al-An'ām 6:151). Jihād against enemies and inflicting casualties upon them is of the truest right." I found this evidence of his to be among the clearest adduced for martyrdom operations in their contemporary form, as most of the statements of the predecessors concern a man plunging into the enemy's ranks where he strongly suspects his demise, but by being killed at the hands of the enemy. As for the text our Shaykh adduced, it is general. And Allāh knows best.

8. The Ruling on Enemy Captives

The ruling on a captive differs according to gender, age, and religion. Captives are usually of three types:

(This is from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, p. 1016.)

First: Women and children: These may not be killed during war if they are separate, and likewise, they may not be killed after capture. They become slaves (raqīq) merely by being captured.

Second: Men from the Magians and People of the Book: Jurists have differed in their opinions concerning these. Here are the details, if Allāh wills:

Some scholars, like al-Ḥasan and Mujāhid, said: It is not permissible to kill a captive. Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī narrated a consensus of the Companions on this.

As for the four jurists, they agreed that the Imām has a choice regarding captives between execution and enslavement. As for releasing them without ransom (mann), the Ḥanafīs forbade it, while the Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs permitted it.

As for Imām Mālik, narrations from him differ regarding the permissibility or impermissibility of releasing without ransom.

As for ransoming with money (fidā'), the Mālikīs, Shāfi'īs, and Ḥanbalīs permitted it. The Ḥanafīs, however, forbade it.

It is stated in *Al-Mabsūṭ* by al-Sarakhsī: "I asked him about the captive: Is he killed or ransomed? He said: He is killed or made fay' (spoils)."

Al-Shāfi'ī said: He is ransomed for a large sum of money.

Muḥammad [ibn al-Ḥasan] said: He is ransomed if the Muslims are in need of money.

Abū Ḥanīfah cited the statement of Abū Bakr: "Do not ransom them, even if you are given a city full of gold for them."

Because releasing a polytheist to return to fight Muslims is a sin, and committing a

sin for monetary benefit is not permissible; it is abandoning an obligation. Killing a polytheist is an obligation. If they were to give us money to abandon prayer, it would not be permissible for us, even with the need for money.

It is not permissible to strengthen polytheists with weapons, and likewise, it is not permissible to strengthen them with men. What indicates the permissibility of releasing without ransom and ransoming is His saying, Mighty and Majestic: {And either [generosity] after or ransom...} (Qur'ān, Muḥammad 47:4).

He explicitly stated the permissibility of releasing without ransom and ransoming with money.

As for the Ḥanafīs, they hold that this verse is abrogated by the Almighty's saying: {And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them...} (Qur'ān, At-Tawbah 9:5).

Because it was revealed after it, as Sūrat At-Tawbah was revealed after Sūrat Muḥammad (peace and blessings be upon him). However, there is no evidence for abrogation, and the actions of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) indicate that he did release without ransom, ransomed, exchanged prisoners, killed, and enslaved.

As for releasing without ransom, in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim from Anas: "Eighty men from Mecca descended upon the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and his companions from Mount Tanʿīm at the time of the Fajr prayer to kill them. He (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) took them captive peacefully and then freed them. Then Allāh, Mighty and Majestic, revealed: {And He is the one who withheld their hands from you and your hands from them within [the area of] Makkah...}} (Qurʾān, Al-Fatḥ 48:24).

And from Jubayr ibn Muṭʿim, that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said regarding the captives of Badr: "If al-Muṭʿim ibn 'Adī were alive and spoke to me about these foul ones, I would have released them for him" (narrated by al-Bukhārī). In the two Ṣaḥīḥ collections, it is narrated that the Messenger of Allāh (peace and

blessings be upon him) released Thumāmah ibn Uthāl of Banū Ḥanīfah, who was the chief of the people of Yamāmah. (*Nayl al-Awṭār*, vol. 8, p. 140).

As for the evidence for the permissibility of ransom, it is the Ḥadīth of Ibn ʿAbbās (may Allāh be pleased with them both):

"The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) set the ransom for the people of the Jāhiliyyah on the Day of Badr at four hundred [dirhams]" (narrated by Abū Dāwūd, about which he, al-Mundhirī, and al-Ḥāfiz in Al-Talkhīṣ remained silent, and its narrators are trustworthy).

As for the evidence for the exchange of prisoners:

It is narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim that the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) ransomed the man from Banū 'Uqayl—the owner of al-'Adbā'—for two Muslim men.

(Al-'Adbā' was the name of the Bedouin's she-camel which became the property of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him and his family)).

Two narrations are reported from Abū Ḥanīfah, the more apparent of which is impermissibility. As for his two companions [Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad], they permitted the exchange of prisoners. (*Al-Mabsūt*, vol. 10, p. 129).

The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) killed the men of Banū Qurayṣah, numbering between six hundred and seven hundred. And on the Day of Badr, he killed al-Naḍr ibn al-Ḥārith and 'Uqbah ibn Abī Mu'ayṭ—this is evidence for the permissibility of killing captives.

The Soundest Opinion on Captives:

Undoubtedly, the soundest opinion on captives is that of the majority: the Imām has discretion regarding captives based on what is in the best interest of the Muslims, choosing between execution, enslavement, release without ransom, or ransom with a Muslim or money.

This is the opinion supported by the evidence. The Imām chooses what is most

beneficial for the Muslims regarding the captives.

It is stated in *Al-Sharh al-Kabīr* with *Al-Mughnī* (vol. 10, p. 407): "If among them there is one who has strength and can inflict harm on the Muslims, then killing him is more appropriate. If among them there is a weak person who has much wealth, then ransoming him is more appropriate. If among them there is one who has a good opinion of Muslims and whose Islām is hoped for by releasing him without ransom, or who can help Muslims by securing the release of their captives or defending them, then releasing him without ransom is more appropriate. And if among them there is one whose service can be beneficial and whose harm is not feared, then enslaving him is more appropriate, like women and children. The Imām is most knowledgeable of the best interest, so this matter is delegated to him. If this is established, then this is a choice based on benefit and ijtihād (scholarly reasoning), not a choice based on desire. Whenever he sees the benefit in one option, it is not permissible to choose another, because he acts on their behalf by considering their best interest. Thus, it is not permissible for him to abandon what is in their interest, like the guardian of an orphan. Whenever he is hesitant among these options, execution is preferable."

Mujāhid said regarding two emirs: "One of them kills captives, and he is better." Mālik said likewise.

Isḥāq said: "Inflicting heavy casualties (*ithkhān*) is more beloved to me, unless he is known [to be valuable] and much can be hoped for from him [through ransom]."

The Ruling on Afghan Communist Captives:

Many communists, when captured by the mujāhidīn and sensing they will be killed, pronounce the two testimonies of faith (Shahādatayn). Nevertheless, the mujāhidīn kill them. Some people objected to this action, thinking that the words of the Shahādah protect their blood. These people cited the Ḥadīth of Usāmah: "How could you kill him after he said 'Lā ilāha illAllāh'?"

The truth is that the situation in Afghanistan is different. It is the custom of the

mujāhidīn, when they capture prisoners, to bring them before the judicial council of the party. They investigate them, and they know each other. When they confirm that he is a communist and the people of his village identify him as such, they kill him, whether he utters the Shahādatayn, prays, or performs Islamic rituals.

Yes, the Sharī'ah ruling on a disbeliever captive who embraces Islām is that it is not permissible to kill him; his blood becomes inviolable, and he immediately becomes a slave, having the same ruling as children: he may not be killed and becomes a slave. This is when the words "Lā ilāha illAllāh" are the differentiator between disbelief and Islām.

However, the situation in Afghanistan is completely different. Babrak Karmal and Najibullah, the leader of the Afghan Communist Party who was eradicating Islām from Afghanistan, would say, "I am a Muslim," and pray, and his picture would appear on television.

Such people are killed, and their claims are not accepted. Here is the evidence for the validity of this ruling:

- 1. On the day of the Conquest of Mecca, the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said about a group: "Kill them, even if you find them clinging to the curtains of the Ka'bah." Among them were al-Muqīs ibn Ṣubābah, Ibn Khaṭal, and the two slave girls who used to sing satirical songs about him—even though women of belligerents are not killed, just as offspring are not killed.
- 2. Imām Muslim narrated: From 'Imrān ibn Ḥuṣayn, who said: "Thaqīf were allies of Banū 'Uqayl. Thaqīf captured two men from the companions of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him), a man from Banū 'Uqayl, and they captured al-'Aḍbā' with him. The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) came upon him while he was in bonds. He said, 'O Muḥammad!' The Prophet came to him and said, 'What is your matter?' He said,

'Why did you take me and the forerunner of the pilgrims (meaning al-'Aḍbā')?'
The Prophet said, 'I took you for the crime of your allies, Thaqīf.' Then he turned away. The man called him, saying, 'O Muḥammad!' The Prophet said, 'What is your matter?' He said, 'I am a Muslim.' The Prophet said, 'Had you said it when you were in control of your affairs, you would have succeeded completely.'"
Al-Shawkānī said about this Ḥadīth: The Imām may refuse to accept the Islām of one who is known not to desire Islām but was driven to it by necessity, especially if there is a benefit for the Muslims in not accepting it.

- 3. The Afghan communist is either a zindīq (heretic whose disbelief is concealed) or an apostate. The ruling on a zindīq is that he is killed without being asked to repent. This is the opinion of the majority of jurists, including Mālik, Aḥmad, al-Layth, and others.

 From Ibn 'Umar (may Allāh be pleased with them both): The repentance of one who repeatedly apostatizes, like a zindīq, is not accepted, due to the Almighty's saying: {Indeed, those who disbelieve after their belief, then increase in disbelief—never will their repentance be accepted, and it is those who are the misguided.} (Qur'ān, Āl 'Imrān 3:90). In Al-Dirāyah (Ḥanafī school), there are two narrations regarding the zindīq: "It is not accepted," like the view of Mālik and Aḥmad. In another narration, it is accepted, like the view of al-Shāfi'ī.
- 4. As for the apostate whose apostasy has become severe by taking up arms against Islām and Muslims, it is permissible to kill him without asking him to repent.
 - Ibn Rushd says in *Bidāyat al-Mujtahid* (vol. 2, p. 344): "As for when an apostate wages war and is then overcome, he is killed for waging war (ḥirābah) and is not asked to repent, whether his warfare was in the land of Islām or after he joined the land of war, unless he embraces Islām. Islām

nullifies the ḥadd (prescribed punishment) of ḥirābah for him, but his ruling regarding what crimes he committed is the ruling for an apostate who commits crimes during his apostasy in the land of Islām and then embraces Islām"—meaning he is killed in retribution (qiṣāṣ) if he killed someone. Ibn al-Qayyim says in Zād al-Ma'ād (vol. 3, p. 464): It is permissible to kill an apostate without asking him to repent if his apostasy has become severe. 'Abdullāh ibn Sa'd ibn Abī Sarḥ had embraced Islām and emigrated, and he used to write down the revelation for the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him). Then he apostatized and joined Mecca. When the day of the Conquest came, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān brought him to the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) to pledge allegiance. The Prophet withheld from him for a long time, then accepted his pledge and said: "I only withheld so that one of you might get up and strike off his head." A man said to him, "Why did you not signal to me, O Messenger of Allāh?" He replied: "It is not befitting for a prophet to have a treacherousness of the eyes."

5. Anyone who openly insults Allāh, His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him), or the religion of Islām is killed without being asked to repent, whether he is a Muslim or a dhimmi (protected non-Muslim). This is why when the blind man killed his umm walad (slave-mother of his child) for insulting the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him), her blood was declared lawful to be shed.

Whoever wishes to learn more about this topic should consult the book *Al-Ṣārim al-Maslūl ʿalā Shātim al-Rasūl* (The Drawn Sword against the Reviler of the Messenger) by Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah. This ruling is by consensus of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (may Allāh be pleased with them), is the implication of the texts, and is supported by more than forty Ḥadīth. This communist is known among his people for insulting Islām and showing

- enmity towards the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him), and he continued to fight Islām until the very last moment.
- 6. Let us assume they were originally Muslims and were forcibly taken to battle and killed Muslims. They are then killed in retribution (qiṣāṣ). 'Umar said: "If the people of Sanaa collaborated in killing one man, I would kill them all for him."

Notes on Captives:

- 1. Whoever captures a prisoner is not allowed to dispose of him; rather, his matter is referred to the leader. The leader in the Afghan Jihād is the leader of the organization or party. It is not permissible for one who captures a prisoner to kill him unless he refuses to walk with him or is wounded and unable to walk.
- 2. Wounded enemy combatants may be killed and finished off.
- 3. (Ellipses in original)
- 4. A communist woman is killed because she is an apostate. In the Ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth: "Whoever changes his religion, kill him." She is also killed because she participates in war, in [offering] opinion, and in inciting disbelievers against Muslims.
- 5. It is not permissible to mutilate a captive, nor to cut off his ears or gouge out his eyes, because the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade mutilation (muthlah). It is not permissible to cut off his head or his feet. This concludes the quoted section from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*.

9. The Ruling on the Spy (Jāsūs)

The ruling on a spy differs according to his religion and situation. There is the disbeliever spy, the non-dhimmi, the one under a treaty (muʿāhad), and the non-Muslim...

A spy is one who uncovers people's secrets and faults and transmits them.

The spy intended here is one who transmits Muslims' secrets to their enemies.

As for the disbeliever spy, he is killed according to the majority of jurists.

The evidence for this is the Ḥadīth in the two Ṣaḥīḥ collections from Iyās ibn Salamah ibn al-Akwaʻ, from his father, who said: "A spy from the polytheists came to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) while he was on a journey. He sat with his companions, talking, then slipped away. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: 'Seek him out and kill him.' Ibn al-Akwaʻ killed him, and the Prophet gave him his spoils (salab)" (This is the narration of al-Bukhārī).

In Muslim's narration, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Who killed the man?" They said, "Ibn al-Akwa'." He said, "His spoils are all his."

Al-Nawawī said: "This concerns the killing of a belligerent disbeliever spy, which is by agreement. As for a dhimmi under a treaty, Mālik and al-Awzā'ī said his treaty is thereby nullified. According to al-Shāfi'ī, there is a difference of opinion on this. However, if this was stipulated in his treaty, it is nullified by agreement."

As for the dhimmi: If he spies on Muslims, jurists have differed as to whether his spying nullifies his treaty, such that he is killed or becomes fay' for the Muslims, or not.

(This is from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, pp. 299-303.)

The Ḥanafīs said: This does not nullify [the treaty] unless it was stipulated against him in the contract of dhimmah or the treaty of security (amān).

It is stated in *Sharḥ Siyar al-Kabīr* (vol. 5, p. 2040): "Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan said: Likewise, if a dhimmi engages in such spying, he is severely punished and imprisoned, but this does not constitute a nullification of the treaty on his part. The same applies if a musta'min (one granted safe passage) does so among us, except that he is severely punished in all such cases."

If, when he sought safe passage, the Muslims told him, "We have granted you security if you are not a spy," and he ignored the matter, then there is no harm in

killing him. If the Imām deems it appropriate to take his spoils as an example to others, there is no harm in that. And if he deems it appropriate to make him fay', there is no harm in that either, like other captives. However, it is preferable here to kill him so that others may take heed. If the person is a woman, there is no harm in killing her either, though it is disliked.

An elderly, sensible man who does not fight is also in the position of a woman; he is not made fay' nor killed.

As for the spy whose outward appearance is that of a Muslim:

Jurists have differed in their opinions concerning him.

The Ḥanafīs, Shāfiʿīs, and Ḥanbalīs said: He is not killed but is given a discretionary punishment (taʿzīr). Mālik, Ibn al-Qāsim, and Ashhab of the Mālikīs said: The Imām exercises his judgment in this. Ibn al-Mājishūn of the Mālikīs said: If this is his habit, he is killed because he is a spy. Mālik has said the spy is killed, and this is correct due to the harm he causes to Muslims and his striving for corruption in the land. (Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī, vol. 18, p. 52). Al-Awzāʿī said: The Imām inflicts an exemplary punishment on him and exiles him to distant lands. (Sharḥ al-Sunnah by al-Baghawī, vol. 10, p. 71). It is stated in *Al-Siyar al-Kabīr*: "Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan said: If Muslims find a man who claims to be a Muslim acting as a spy for the polytheists against the Muslims, writing to them about their vulnerabilities, and he willingly confesses to this, he is not killed, but the Imām inflicts a severe punishment on him."

The basis for this issue is the Ḥadīth of Ḥāṭib ibn Abī Baltaʿah, a Badr veteran, who wrote to the disbelievers of Mecca informing them that the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) intended to raid them. The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "What is this, O Ḥāṭib?" He replied, "Do not be hasty with me. I am a man attached to Quraysh but not one of them by lineage. The Muhājirīn with you have relatives [in Mecca] who protect their kin, but I have no relatives in Mecca. So, I wished, if I missed that [kinship], to do them a favor. By Allāh, I did not do it out of doubt in my religion, nor out of contentment with

disbelief after Islām." The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "He has spoken the truth." 'Umar said, "O Messenger of Allāh, let me strike off the neck of this hypocrite." The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "He witnessed Badr. And what do you know, O 'Umar? Perhaps Allāh looked upon the people of Badr and said, 'Do as you wish, for I have forgiven you.'" Then the verse was revealed: {O you who have believed, do not take My enemies and your enemies as allies, extending to them affection...} (Qur'ān, Al-Mumtaḥanah 60:1).

It is stated in *Sharḥ al-Sunnah* by al-Baghawī (vol. 10, p. 74): The Imām said: In the Ḥadīth of Ḥāṭib is evidence for the ruling on one who, through interpretation (ta'awwul), deems permissible what is forbidden, as opposed to the ruling on one who deliberately considers it permissible without interpretation. And that one who commits something forbidden and then claims a plausible interpretation for it is not killed for it. And that one who spies for the disbelievers is pardoned. The majority have cited the verse: {O you who have believed, do not take My enemies and your enemies as allies...} Allāh called Ḥāṭib ibn Abī Balta'ah a believer, and a believer may not be killed nor his blood shed.

Imām Ibn al-Qayyim inclined towards the opinion of Imām Mālik. We also favor the opinion of Imām Mālik (may Allāh have mercy on him). Imām Ibn al-Qayyim said in Zād al-Maʿād (vol. 4, p. 114): "It is established that he [the Prophet] killed a spy. 'Umar sought permission to kill Ḥāṭib, and he said: 'And what do you know, O 'Umar? Perhaps Allāh looked upon the people of Badr and said, "Do as you wish, for I have forgiven you."' This was also used as evidence by those who hold that he [the spy] should be killed, like Imām Mālik and some of the companions of Aḥmad and others (may Allāh have mercy on them). They said this because he [the Prophet] gave a reason that prevented his killing, and he did not give a reason more specific than [being one of] the people of Badr. For if a ruling is justified by a general reason, a more specific reason has no effect. This is stronger, and Allāh knows best." This concludes the quoted section from Al-Dhakhāʾir.

I say, and Allāh knows best what is correct:

(From *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, p. 304.)

It is preferable for the mujāhidīn today to adopt the opinion of Imām Mālik and Imām Ibn al-Qayyim, and to execute spies who appear to be Muslims. This is especially so since most confrontations with our enemies are now decided by espionage and security breaches, from which the mujāhidīn and secret organizations have suffered greatly. It is sufficient to know that in the Palestinian territories, there are thousands of spies working for the Jews for decades. Indeed, the Jews give those who have spent their lives in this work a retirement pension and build special villages for them, some of which have populations of thousands of families! It is sufficient to know that Jihād in Syria, Algeria, and elsewhere has been crushed due to intelligence espionage programs. Therefore, I am inclined towards the opinion of Shaykh 'Abdullāh 'Azzām, who chose the school of Imām Mālik and the preference of Ibn al-Qayyim, that this [decision] rests with the Imām. I advise executing spies who claim to be Muslims, except in rare cases where the leaders of Jihād see specific circumstances similar to the example of Hāṭib, in a man of proven service to Islām and Jihād whose foot slipped in a limited mistake that did not result in the death of a Muslim—if they deem it appropriate to pardon him as an exceptional case, assessed accordingly. Otherwise, the default today is the execution of spies.

May Allāh curse them and disgrace them.

10. The Prohibition of Selling to the Enemy What Strengthens Them Against Muslims

As for commercial transactions between Muslims and disbelievers during wartime, when jurists established their commercial rules, they based them on their understanding of what would benefit Muslims and restrict the disbelievers.

Imām Mālik, for example, permits importing from disbeliever lands and allows belligerent merchants to enter Muslim lands carrying their goods, because this strengthens Muslims. Meanwhile, Imām Mālik prohibits exporting to disbeliever lands because this strengthens them.

However, purchasing manufactured goods from disbelievers in the current international reality is considered strengthening the disbelievers by channeling hard currency to exporting countries. The search for commercial markets to sell products is one of the main reasons for which modern wars have been waged and colonialism was established by major powers.

In any case, the rule in the commercial field according to jurists is: "Exporting or importing anything that strengthens the disbelievers is prohibited." "Exporting or importing anything that strengthens Muslims is permitted."

For example, exporting weapons to disbeliever lands is forbidden, as is petroleum used to run weapons factories, and all instruments of war. Jurists even forbade exporting brocade and silk because war machinery components are made from them, and they forbid exporting iron from which weapons are made. It is stated in *Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah*: "Nothing that is a staple in warfare is to be sold." In modern times, selling copper, cobalt, radium, and uranium (from which atomic bombs are made) is prohibited. Imām Mālik said in *Al-Mudawwanah*: "As for anything that provides strength to the people of Islām [meaning, against them if sold to the enemy], with which they strengthen themselves in their wars, such as mounts, weapons, scrap metal, goods, or anything known to be a strength in war, like copper or otherwise, these are not to be sold to them." This concludes the quoted section from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*.

11. Disbelievers Using Non-Combatants or Muslims as Human Shields in War First: Disbelievers Using Their Women and Children as Human Shields

Tatarrus means to shield oneself or take cover with a turs (shield). A turs is a steel

plate carried for protection against swords. So, a *turs* is what is used for protection in war.

(This is from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, p. 164.)

Tatarrus here means using Muslims as a shield (what they call today: human shields) for disbelievers. Disbelievers may sometimes resort in battle to placing a Muslim captive or a group of Muslim children with them inside a fortress or castle to prevent the mujāhidīn from opening fire on them. This is because they know that the mujāhidīn fear killing their captive brothers who are in the same fortress with the disbelievers, and because Muslim blood is sacrosanct ("All of a Muslim is inviolable to another Muslim: his blood, his property..." - authentic Ḥadīth).

Disbelievers may also sometimes resort to placing their own children (disbelievers' children) with them in fortresses or camps as a pretext to prevent Muslims from launching projectiles at them, because disbelievers know that "the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade the killing of women and children" (agreed upon).

This is a major problem facing the mujāhidīn in modern warfare because the brunt of war mostly involves heavy projectiles like mortars, rockets, and heavy machine guns. Some mujāhidīn, due to lack of knowledge, may hesitate to fire projectiles at a fortress containing polytheists' children or a Muslim captive. The issue becomes more complicated when we know that there is no communist center without Afghan soldiers who have been forcibly conscripted. The brothers see them in the communist centers praying and hear their call to prayer. These conscripts are sometimes numerous and have no power, as they were taken by force and placed to guard communist centers, even though these forcibly conscripted men hate communism. What is the ruling in such cases?

Cases of Communists Mingling with Their Children:

First: Islām Prohibits Killing Children if They are Separate or Can Be **Distinguished.** This is due to the Ḥadīth: "The Messenger of Allāh (peace and

blessings be upon him) forbade the killing of women and children" (narrated by al-Bukhārī and Muslim). As for women, they are not killed unless they fight or apostatize after Islām, like the communist women in Afghanistan. This is the opinion of the three Imāms; the Ḥanafīs differed regarding the killing of an apostate woman, saying she should be imprisoned and not killed.

Second: If the Children of Polytheists Mingle with Their Combatants: Here, Scholars Differed on Launching Projectiles at the Fortress Where They Are, with Several Opinions:

Mālik and al-Awzā'ī said: It is not permissible to kill women and children under any circumstances, even if the belligerents use women as human shields, or fortify themselves in a fortress or ship and place women and children with them. It is not permissible to shoot at them or burn them. (*Awjaz al-Masālik*, vol. 8, p. 223).

The majority of Shāfi'īs, Ḥanafīs, and Ḥanbalīs said it is permissible to shoot at them, but one should not intend to kill the children. If children and women are killed [unintentionally], there is no harm and no blame. The majority cited the Ḥadīth of al-Ṣa'b ibn Jaththāmah: "The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) passed by al-Abwā' or Waddān and was asked about attacking the polytheists' homes at night, resulting in casualties among their women and children. He said, 'They are from them'" (narrated by al-Bukhārī and Muslim).

The meaning of $bay\bar{a}t$ is attacking at night so that one cannot distinguish between a child and a man. The meaning of "they are from them" is that their ruling is like their [combatants'] ruling. Al-Nawawī said in his commentary on Muslim (vol. 12, p. 49): "What is meant is if they are not intentionally targeted without necessity. As for the previous Ḥadīth prohibiting the killing of women and children, what is meant is when they can be distinguished. This Ḥadīth we mentioned concerns the permissibility of attacking them at night and killing women and children. Attacking at night ($bay\bar{a}t$) is our school's view and that of Abū Ḥanīfah and the majority." Al-

Nawawī stated similarly in *Al-Minhāj*. See: *Zād al-Muḥtāj bi-Sharḥ al-Minhāj*, vol. 4, p. 303.

Among the arguments of the Mālikīs is their claim that the Ḥadīth of al-Ṣa'b ibn Jaththāmah is abrogated, evidenced by al-Zuhrī's statement after narrating the Ḥadīth: "Then the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade the killing of women and children." The Mālikīs also argue with the Ḥadīth narrated by Mālik in Al-Muwaṭṭa' from 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ka'b, who said: "The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade those who killed Ibn Abī al-Ḥuqayq from killing women and children. One of them said: 'The wife of Ibn Abī al-Ḥuqayq was troubling us, so I raised my sword against her, then I remembered the prohibition of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) and refrained. Were it not for that, we would have been relieved [of her].'" (Awjaz al-Masālik, vol. 8, p. 220). If there had been any license to kill women, he would have killed her. As the Companion said, "Were it not for that, we would have been relieved," even though she participated in defense, at least by screaming, and the Companions' lives were in danger due to her screaming because they were inside the fortress of Ibn Abī al-Huqayq, the Jew.

Hadīth: the prohibition of killing women and children, and the Ḥadīth of al-Ṣaʿb ibn Jaththāmah ("they are from them"). They said the Ḥadīth of Ṣaʿb ibn Jaththāmah applies when they cannot be distinguished, and the Ḥadīth of prohibition applies when they can be distinguished. If we were to adopt Imām Mālik's opinion, the door to Jihād would be closed in these times because most fighting is done by long-range projectiles, machine guns, and the like. The majority opinion is also supported by the Ḥadīth of Makḥūl that the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) set up a catapult against the people of Ṭāʾif (narrated by Abū Dāwūd). The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him), having hurled stones with

the catapult, knew that the stones might hit children and women. The siege of Ṭā'if was late in the life of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him), at the end of 8 A.H.

Based on the foregoing: It is permissible to shoot at disbelievers along with their children and women if they cannot be distinguished. It is not permissible to kill children and women if they are separate. If women participate in fighting, even by opinion, and then become separate, they are killed.

Second: Disbelievers Using Muslims as Human Shields:

Some communist centers contain forcibly conscripted soldiers who pray and call the adhān at all times. Brothers in Jaji, in the nearby communist bases, saw people praying and calling the adhān and hesitated to fight them. They asked me about the Sharīʻah ruling on this. I say, and with Allāh is success: If we refrained from attacking these centers, the door to Jihād would be closed, disbelief would spread, fitnah would prevail, communism would rest easy, and its foothold in Afghanistan would be solidified. Therefore:

It is obligatory to fight these centers, even if these coerced Muslims are killed, for the following reasons:

- 1. Repelling a general harm by committing a specific harm. This is an agreed-upon Sharī'ah principle. Killing these Muslim soldiers is a specific harm, while the loss of the country is a general harm that is repelled by the specific harm.
- 2. The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "An army of people will raid this House (the Kaʿbah). While they are in a desert land, the earth will swallow them up." It was said, "O Messenger of Allāh, among them are the coerced." He said, "They will be resurrected according to their intentions" (narrated by al-Bukhārī and Muslim).

Ibn Taymiyyah says in *Majmūʻal-Fatāwā* (vol. 28, p. 537): "Allāh Almighty destroyed the army that intended to violate His sanctities—both the coerced

and uncoerced among them—despite His ability to distinguish between them, though He will resurrect them according to their intentions. So how can it be obligatory for the believing mujāhidīn to distinguish between the coerced and others when they do not know this?"

3. The outward appearance of these individuals is against the Muslims: they are protecting communist bases that corrupt the land and destroy its inhabitants. These bases are used to cut off the paths of passing mujāhidīn, some of whom may be wounded or killed.

Their standing in the ranks of the polytheists, armed with weapons, makes their blood lawful. Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan says in *Al-Siyar al-Kabīr* (para. 2799/1446): "Likewise, it is permissible to fight a Muslim in the ranks of the polytheists if he is armed and in the polytheists' ranks, even if he has not fought any Muslims. For whoever is prepared to fight in the ranks of the polytheists, his blood is lawful, although it is recommended to ascertain his situation when possible."

The outward appearance is evidence for the mujāhidīn for the permissibility of fighting Muslims who are in the ranks of the disbelievers. It is narrated: Al-'Abbās ibn 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib said to the Prophet, when the Muslims captured him on the Day of Badr: "O Messenger of Allāh, I was coerced." The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "As for your outward appearance, it was against us. As for your inner state, it is up to Allāh" (Majmū' al-Fatāwā, vol. 28, p. 537).

Ibn Taymiyyah comments on this Ḥadīth, saying: Even if there were righteous people among them, from the best of people, and it was not possible to fight them [the enemy] except by killing these [righteous ones], they would be killed too.

When Muslims hesitated to fight the Tatars because some of them prayed and

fasted, Ibn Taymiyyah said: "If you see me among them with the Qur'ān on my head, then kill me."

4. The living of these Muslim soldiers among disbelievers who fight Allāh and His Messenger and cut off the path for the mujāhidīn, and even kill mujāhidīn—the least that applies to them is the punishment for highway robbery:

{Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against Allāh and His Messenger and strive upon earth [to cause] corruption is none but that they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled from the land. That is for them a disgrace in this world; and for them in the Hereafter is a great punishment.} (Qur'ān, Al-Mā'idah 5:33).

These Muslims live with the defiant group that kills Muslims and cuts off their path, so their ruling is the same as that of the polytheists when it is not possible to distinguish.

'Alī (may Allāh be pleased with him), when he fought the people of Basra with his army, said: "Do not start fighting them until they start fighting you." His intention with this was to demonstrate that "the initiation of fighting by some of them is like its initiation by their entire group regarding the permissibility of fighting them" (*Sharḥ al-Siyar al-Kabīr* by Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥanafī, 2798/1446), even though all the people of Basra were Muslims.

5. Jurists are unanimous that if a disbeliever army uses Muslim captives as human shields, and harm to the Muslims [attackers] is feared if they do not fight, then they should fight, even if it leads to killing the Muslims used as shields.

The existence of these [communist] centers is a definite and certain harm, without any doubt or suspicion. Their existence is for the purpose of cutting off the Jihād and allowing the disbelievers to remain in the land.

a. It is stated in the commentary of al-Dasūqī al-Mālikī (vol. 2, p. 178): "If they use a Muslim as a shield, they are fought, and the shield [the Muslim] is not intentionally targeted by shooting if we fear for ourselves, because a Muslim's blood becomes lawful due to fear for one's own life, even if most Muslims are not feared for. If [general harm is] feared, the sanctity of the shield is lifted, and it is permissible to shoot him."

b. Al-Nawawī says in *Al-Minhāj*: "It is permissible to besiege disbelievers in cities and castles, divert water towards them, shoot them with fire and catapults, and attack them by night when they are unaware. If there is a Muslim captive or merchant among them, or if they engage in battle and use women and children as shields, it is permissible to shoot them. If they use them [women and children] to defend themselves and there is no necessity to shoot them, the sounder view is to leave them. If they use Muslims as shields, if there is no necessity to shoot them, we leave them; otherwise, it is permissible to shoot them according to the sounder view." (*Zād al-Muḥtāj*, vol. 4, p. 302).

c. It is stated in *Sharḥ al-Siyar al-Kabīr* (para. 2800, vol. 4, p. 1446): If they [Muslims] burn or sink a ship belonging to the polytheists, and there are Muslims on board, there is no blood money (diyah) or expiation (kaffārah) incumbent upon the Muslims, because they directly performed an action that is lawful for them according to Sharī'ah, knowing the true state of affairs. However, if we fear harm to the mujāhidīn in the case of human shields made of Muslim captives, is it permissible to shoot them? Here the four jurists differed. The Ḥanafīs permitted it, while the other three forbade it. It is stated in *Fatḥ al-Qadīr* (vol. 9, p. 198) by Ibn al-Humām al-Ḥanafī: "If they use Muslim captives and their children as shields, whether it is known that if they refrain from shooting them, the Muslims will be defeated, or this is not known, but they only intend to shoot the disbelievers—if any Muslim is hit,

there is no blood money or expiation."

According to the three Imāms, it is not permissible to shoot them in the case of human shields unless refraining from shooting them in this situation would lead to the defeat of the Muslims. This is also the view of al-Ḥasan ibn Ziyād. The fatwā of the three jurists is based on the situation where Jihād is a collective obligation (farḍ kifāyah), as when Muslims are conquering new lands. However, in a situation like Afghanistan, where Muslim lands have been usurped, their religion is threatened with extinction, and these Muslim soldiers are deployed to protect the disbelievers and perpetuate the usurpation and violation of honor, I do not believe any jurist would rule that fighting them is impermissible.

We must be careful in our intentions not to kill Muslims:

We must intend to fight the polytheists and not to kill Muslims, even if we cannot distinguish between them in our fighting. As for intention, it is within our capacity and ability.

There is no blood money (diyah) or expiation (kaffārah) for Muslims killed in the ranks of the polytheists:

Al-Marghīnānī states in *Al-Hidāyah*: "If they use Muslim children or prisoners as human shields, one should not refrain from shooting at them," for the reason we have explained, "and they should aim their fire at the disbelievers." This is because if distinguishing them physically is impossible, it is possible by intention, and obedience is according to one's capacity. For any of them (Muslims) they hit, there is no blood money or expiation upon them, because Jihād is an individual obligation (farḍ 'ayn), and financial penalties are not conjoined with obligations (See *Fatḥ al-Qadīr* 5/198). Al-Ḥasan ibn Ziyād said that killing a Muslim in this situation entails blood money and expiation. According to the Shāfi'īs, there is one opinion regarding expiation and two opinions regarding blood money.

- 6. Among the evidence for the permissibility of fighting when Muslims are present with them is what al-Bukhārī narrated from 'Ikrimah, who said: Ibn 'Abbās informed me: "Some people were with the polytheists, swelling their numbers. An arrow would be shot, hitting one of them, or he would be struck and killed. So Allāh revealed: {Indeed, those whom the angels take [in death] while they are unjust to themselves [the angels] will say, "In what [condition] were you?" They will say, "We were oppressed in the land." The angels will say, "Was not Allāh's earth spacious [enough] for you to emigrate therein?" For those, their refuge is Hell and evil it is as a destination.} (Qur'ān, Al-Nisā': 97). This is the ruling concerning the oppressed believers in Makkah who did not emigrate to protect their wealth and were killed in Badr. So, what is the ruling concerning the oppressed Afghans who swell the ranks of the apostate Afghan communists? Their ruling is more severe, and their punishment is harsher, and Allāh knows best.
- 7. Fighting these polytheists who have Muslims among them is an act of repelling an aggressor (ṣāʾil). Repelling a Muslim aggressor is obligatory (farḍ) according to the majority of jurists, and permissible according to some. No Muslim has ever said that repelling an aggressor is disliked or forbidden, even if the aggressor is among the best of Muslims.
- 8. The interest of preserving the religion takes precedence over the interest of preserving life. Killing these Muslims in the ranks of the polytheists serves the interest of preserving the religion, even if it entails the loss of the interest of preserving life.

Ibn Taymiyyah says in $Majm\bar{u}^c al$ - $Fat\bar{a}w\bar{a}$ (28/540): "The Sunnah and scholarly consensus agree that if an aggressor cannot be repelled except by killing, he is to be

killed, even if the property he is taking is worth a qīrāṭ of a dīnār, as the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said in the authentic Ḥadīth: "Whoever is killed defending his property is a martyr, whoever is killed defending his life is a martyr, and whoever is killed defending his family is a martyr." So how much more so is the case of fighting these polytheists who have Muslims with them, who are assaulting the religion, honor, life, and property? There is no doubt or uncertainty that it is more fitting and more obligatory. Even if everyone in the (enemy) base were Muslim, it would be obligatory to fight them if they did not withdraw on their own, because they are aggressors against Muslim land and their religion."

Summary of the Matter:

If we can distinguish Muslims who are intermingled with the disbelieving army and know they are coerced, it is not permissible to fight them. However, if we conquer a fortress and find Muslim soldiers therein after gaining power over them, then if they had killed a Muslim, they are to be killed in retribution (qiṣāṣ).

As for when they are mixed with the polytheists and we cannot distinguish them, and we do not know who is coerced nor are we able to differentiate, then if we kill them by Allāh's command, we are rewarded and excused for that, and they will be judged according to their intentions. Whoever was coerced and could not resist will be resurrected on the Day of Judgment according to his intention, as stated in *al-Fatāwā* 28/540 and *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, pp. 1022-1026.

Here, I wish to draw attention to a very important issue related to this matter:

An Important Note on the Issue of Infidels Using Muslims as Human Shields:

I say, and Allāh is the one whose help is sought:

As we can see, all the preceding statements by scholars on the issue of using Muslims as human shields pertain to one of two situations:

The first is when infidels take some Muslim prisoners or detainees and place them among their ranks to prevent Muslim mujāhidīn from attacking, out of reluctance to kill their brothers. We have seen that the summary conclusion in this regard is the preference for the permissibility of attacking them, even if it leads to the killing of the detained Muslims, if it is feared that the Muslims will be defeated if they do not do so, or if the harm resulting from not attacking them is greater than the harm of killing some Muslim prisoners and detainees. Nevertheless, some jurists have been strict on this issue and prohibited the killing of Muslims, due to the sanctity and status of preserving Muslim blood.

The second issue is that of those coerced into fighting in the ranks of the infidels (such as Muslims forcibly conscripted into the infidel army). The ruling, as has passed, is the permissibility of killing them if they cannot be distinguished, and that Allāh will not wrong them – far be it from Him, Blessed and Exalted is He – and that they will be resurrected according to their intentions.

However, new situations have arisen these days, posing an issue of utmost precision, difficulty, and sensitivity. The forces of the invading occupiers have entered our lands with capabilities that the mujāhidīn cannot confront openly in two distinct, opposing lines – as is the case in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere. Their military, security, and civilian presence has taken various forms among the Muslim populace within cities and residential areas. Guerrilla warfare, hit-and-run tactics have become the primary method of confronting them, and the use of explosives by the mujāhidīn has become common, whether through remote detonation, martyrdom operations, or other methods of using explosives. The same applies to the presence of apostates from among the tyrants loyal to the enemies of Allāh, the invaders who wage war against Allāh, His Messenger, and the Muslims. Their intermingling, and the intermingling of their soldiers, security forces, guards, and the guards of their infidel allies with Muslims, and their spread among residential areas and their movement in Muslim markets

and places of congregation, has meant that targeting these enemies of Allāh with various explosive methods leads to many casualties among innocent Muslims – killed and wounded – and the destruction of their homes, properties, and wealth.

It has become common in some statements by the mujāhidīn to draw an analogy between these situations and the ruling on human shields (tars), and the permissibility of killing Muslims whom the enemies use as shields in war. I believe there is no clear, direct relationship between the issue of human shields and many of these cases. I also believe that taking this matter lightly and applying it indiscriminately without careful examination, detail, controls, or conditions is not free from flaws that could make some mujāhidīn bear the sin of shedding innocent Muslim blood, destroying property, and violating the sanctities of protected Muslims, which are not permissible – and Allāh knows best – in this absolute manner, which is not justified by relying on the ruling concerning infidels using Muslims as human shields in war. I draw attention to a number of points as a reminder:

- (1) I am not advocating for stopping the fight against the invading infidels or their allies and collaborators from among the tyrants who wage war against Allāh, His Messenger, and the believers, if they are completely intermingled with Muslims. This is because such a cessation would lead to their establishment in our lands and consequently the corruption of the Muslims' religion and worldly affairs, which is what the enemies of Allāh desire. And Allāh forbid that I should call for that.
- (2) The mujāhidīn must exert themselves in studying the repercussions of every operation from a Sharīʿah and political perspective, just as they exert themselves in studying it militarily and from a security standpoint. Among the most important aspects of this is what we are discussing: the issue of which Muslims will be killed by the mujāhidīn's bombings. It is obligatory to strive to avoid them by all means, to calculate the operation's returns and importance, and the proportion of Muslims

who might be mistakenly and unintentionally harmed, relative to the expected damage inflicted upon the infidels and its impact on them. We have found in some operations that bombs are placed in a crowded Muslim market, intending to kill a few individuals from an infidel military patrol, or a car bomb at the gate of an American consulate, outside the fence enclosing a garden, behind which are offices where most of the occupants are not Americans. In such an operation, no sane person would expect a single American to be harmed! Yet, the few targeted enemies may be killed or injured, or perhaps not harmed at all, while dozens of Muslims, including children, women, and innocent people, are killed or injured, and their property destroyed. This outcome is known to every sane person through simple calculation and study of the location and the likelihood of Muslims being present. I believe this is not permissible.

There is a significant difference that must be taken into account between using explosives in the lands and capitals of infidels, such as Tel Aviv, Washington, and London, and using them in the capitals and lands of Muslims.

We have previously discussed at length a section titled "The Sanctity of Muslim Blood, its Inviolability, Property, and Honor," from which we recall the Prophet's (peace and blessings be upon him) saying in the Ḥadīth narrated by Muslim in his Ṣaḥīḥ: "Whoever abandons obedience and separates from the community and dies, dies a death of jāhiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance). Whoever fights under a banner of blindness, becoming angry for partisanship, calling to partisanship, or supporting partisanship, and is killed, his death is one of jāhiliyyah. And whoever rebels against my ummah, striking its righteous and its wicked, not sparing its believer, nor fulfilling his covenant with one who has a covenant, he is not of me and I am not of him."

Striking the wicked and the disbeliever does not justify failing to avoid harming the believer and one who has a dhimmah (covenant of protection) or a valid Sharī'ah covenant. Similarly, what is narrated from him (peace and blessings be upon him) in

the Ḥadīth reported by al-Bayhaqī from al-Barā' ibn 'Āzib: "The demise of the entire world is lesser in Allāh's sight than the killing of a believer. If the inhabitants of His heavens and His earth were to participate in shedding the blood of a believer, Allāh Almighty would cast them into the Fire." And his saying, addressing the honored Ka'bah while looking at it: "Indeed, you have a great status with Allāh, yet your demise is lesser in Allāh's sight than the killing of a Muslim man." Or as he (peace and blessings be upon him) said.

So, does the mere possibility of eliminating some infidel brutes or their collaborators, who are worthless and change nothing in the course of the long-term battle we are waging, justify the certain or highly probable demise of dozens of believing souls? I believe that this intention and aim do not justify such an act in all these cases.

Many Qur'ānic and noble Prophetic texts have passed concerning the gravity of the sanctity of a Muslim soul, sufficient for the mujāhidīn in the path of Allāh to reflect upon and scrutinize their actions.

- (3) Some mujāhidīn may think that their mere intention of targeting infidels, and not intending to kill any Muslims who might be killed, is sufficient to deem all such actions permissible. I believe that the soundness of intention and purpose alone is not enough. Allāh does not accept from a servant except that which is purely for His sake and is correct. Correctness means following the Book and the Sunnah as explained by the scholars, and this undoubtedly includes avoiding the shedding of the blood of believers and those protected by Sharīʿah in combat, as much as one is able.
- (4) If the target intended by the mujāhidīn is (based on a strong probability) certain to inflict significant damage on the enemies, contributing to the defeat of the enemy and the victory of the Muslims such as an important enemy leader, or inflicting a heavy, impactful loss on the infidel ranks and the mujāhidīn have exerted their

utmost effort to keep Muslims away from the scene of the event, to avoid them, and to choose times when their presence is rare, and so on, to the extent of all possible precautions, and then something happens by fate, unintentionally causing some Muslims to be harmed despite these precautions, then I hope that Allāh will forgive them for that, due to their exertion of effort and the soundness of their intention and purpose.

- (5) I have heard from some mujāhidīn, during discussions of this emergent issue, statements that suggest their disregard for losses among the Muslim common folk, such as saying that most of these afflicted Muslims are sinners, or those who sit back and do not engage in Jihād, or that they are innovators whose beliefs are largely corrupted, and other such descriptions which may or may not be accurate. However, this talk is baseless. The fact that their fundamental status is Islām protects them and necessitates avoiding them. No one of repute among the people of Islām has ever permitted the shedding of the blood of such individuals. The blood of a Muslim is not lawful except according to known rulings. However, I have seen in some cases that the psychological state some mujāhidīn reach, due to pressure from the enemies of Allāh on one hand, and the public's reluctance to support Allāh's religion on the other, along with the corrupt conditions they might be involved in, has led some to belittle the issue of genuine avoidance. This is dangerous and impermissible.
- (6) Finally, I advise every organization or detachment of mujāhidīn to have a Sharī'ah reference to whom they can present confusing matters in these calamitous emergent issues, despite my knowledge of the scarcity of those whose knowledge can be trusted or who are prepared to support the mujāhidīn with their knowledge, if available in this era. And to Allāh we complain of what 'Umar (may Allāh be pleased with him) complained: the audacity of the sinner and the helplessness of the trustworthy. And there is no might nor power except with Allāh, the Most High, the Most Great.

12. The Ruling on Residing in the Lands of Polytheists

Shaykh 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām (may Allāh have mercy on him) said:

Residing in the lands of polytheists is forbidden except in cases of extreme necessity. In the ḥasan Ḥadīth narrated by Abū Dāwūd from Samurah, attributed to the Prophet (marfūʻ): "Whoever associates with a polytheist and lives with him is like him." And in the ḥasan Ḥadīth narrated by al-Nasāʾī: "Allāh does not accept any deed from a polytheist after he has embraced Islām until he separates from the polytheists."

The crux of the ruling revolves around the principle of preserving one's religion, honor, and property. Wherever a place is found that is safer for the integrity of one's religion and honor, one must choose it as a residence.

The author of *al-Mi'yār* (in Mālikī jurisprudence) says about residing in the lands of disbelief: "It is a prohibition definitively established in the religion, like the prohibition of blood, pork, and killing a soul without right, and similar universal principles among the five essentials that the people of all religions and faiths have agreed upon prohibiting." Al-Qurṭubī said: "Based on this, it is not permissible for a Muslim to enter the land of disbelief for trade or other purposes except for a religious necessity, such as entering to ransom a Muslim. Imām Mālik invalidated the testimony of one who entered the land of war for trade." Responsibility is according to capacity, and necessity is assessed by its measure. And praise be to Allāh, Lord of the worlds. (End of quote from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, p. 1022).

And I say, and Allāh is the one whose help is sought:

The prohibition of residing in the lands of disbelievers and polytheists is a general ruling agreed upon by the scholars of Islām and all their schools of thought, due to the tribulation (fitnah) it entails in religion, the absorption of polytheistic customs, the familiarity with them which, over time, leads to the affection that Allāh has forbidden with them, and the intermingling of the nascent offspring with their

children and learning their many vile and corrupt customs. This is not to mention the distance from Islamic customs and the norms of believers, the absence of mosques, reminders of Allāh, and those who enjoin good and forbid evil. Furthermore, there is the attempt by disbelievers to harm Muslims, persecute them, and test them in their religion. Allāh decreed that I be compelled to live in European countries for a long period: during the years (1983-1997), due to security conditions that forced people like me to emigrate and flee from the rule of tyrants. I resided in those countries, studied there, and worked in various fields of life, from commerce to journalism and more. It was decreed for me to stay for about three years in France, nearly eight years in Spain, and over three years in Britain. I visited many European countries such as Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and others, and I worked among the diverse Islamic awakening circles there. I practically concluded, through what I saw, that the prohibition by the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) for Muslims to reside in the lands of disbelievers and polytheists is, in truth, one of the miracles of prophethood. This is due to the events, scenes, and conditions I witnessed among Muslims – their righteous and their wicked, their believers, their sinners, and their disbelievers – and even those who attributed themselves to working for the Islamic awakening, and even those Jihādīs who had reached Europe!

Those countries affected them and their offspring, all of them without any exception. The only difference was in the degrees of influence and corruption, from gradual sinfulness to rampant apostasy, may Allāh protect us.

There is no space here to record a summary of what I saw and heard of conditions that make the heart bleed and break with sorrow for the state of Muslims, their religion, their customs, and what has befallen them there. Perhaps if I have the opportunity, I will record that in a separate treatise. The overwhelming majority of those called "Muslims" in the lands of disbelief, numbering tens of millions in Europe alone (it is said more than 45 million "Muslims!"), and similarly in America,

Canada, Australia, and other parts of the world, east and west, do not establish prayer, nor pay Zakāh, nor perform most of the rituals of Islām. Nothing remains of their fathers' religion except fragments of customs and traditions that dissolve over time in their children and grandchildren. Their women and daughters are unveiled, mingling with Muslim and non-Muslim men, studying in their schools, and working among them. Their youth are mostly sinners, many of whom drink alcohol, and many eat pork. Adultery and debauchery have become rampant among them, even among many of their women. The prevalence of marriage to non-Muslim women (most of whom are atheists whose marriage is not permissible in the first place because they are not People of the Book, having no religion, like most Western youth today who openly declare and boast of this) has led to the birth of offspring who do not know the language of their Arab or Muslim fathers and live according to the ways of their mothers! Indeed, recently, the marriage of Muslim daughters to non-Muslim men through civil marriage has become widespread, and some misguided, Westernized scholars of evil have even permitted some forms of this forbidden marriage. This is not to mention the various Western forms of illicit cohabitation, different types of fornication, and moral decay that have become customary in those Western circles. So much so that many Muslim daughters cohabit with men and boyfriends with the knowledge of their fathers, who cannot even reprimand them, lest they leave home! Let alone the daughters of "Muslims!" who have taken up cheap prostitution, as in Central European countries! As for other European customs, holidays, occasions, and ways of life regarding food, drink, and dress, you can find no difference between the disbelievers and those who, if you ask them about their religion, will enthusiastically reply that they are "Muslims!!" This is the state of the overwhelming majority. I tried to imagine the number of worshippers in some of the countries I lived in, based on the total number who attend Friday prayers (most of whom do not pray the five daily prayers), and I found it to be a small percentage of the total Muslim communities. Perhaps I would not be

mistaken if I said that the percentage of those who pray Friday prayers does not exceed 1% or 2% of the total, at best!

As for the circles of the committed, the attendees of mosques and Islamic centers, one can understand their ideas and conditions by following some satellite channels that cover their news, such as (Igra Channel) and others. The summary of what I found is that these people have created for themselves a European-American religion under the pretext of necessities, dispensations, moderation, winning hearts, and being gentle with Muslims to call them to Islām. I can testify – with knowledge – quite simply that what remains in their new Western Islamic religion of the religion of Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) is a modest amount of creedal principles and some acts of worship and customs. Most of the activities of these centers and mosques are confined to providing (halāl) meat, arranging Friday prayers, Islamic marriage contracts, matters of the deceased and funerals, holding lectures, and some celebrations and occasions for which they have found Western Islamic methods compatible with claims of moderation, centrism, and nonextremism! This is for this minority clinging to their religion in those communities whose majority of members have – practically and realistically – apostatized, and there is no might nor power except with Allāh, the Most High, the Most Great.

Distorted, deviant ideas have spread among those they call "Islamic thinkers!!" and some who are attributed to scholars in the West, concerning interfaith dialogue, religious tolerance, dialogue of civilizations, Islamic-Christian dialogue, and what they call dialogue with the "other"!!, and refuting the accusation of terrorism from the religion. "Islamic" ideas and fatwās of extreme heresy and deviation have spread, requiring a separate study to investigate and refute them. One example of these oddities is what I heard from some of those they call Muslim thinkers, with their plucked or shaved beards, white caps, and (cravats) – the tie of humiliation or (the halter of civilization!) as one of our shaykhs called it. They said: The rising of the sun from the West before the Day of Judgment means the Islām of Europeans

and Americans from the West, which is the rising of the sun of Islām in its West! Where Americans and the West will carry the call of Islām and come to our lands as conquerors with Islām (which "rose in the West")! Because they possess military power, and they will possess the banner of Islām! This is similar to what happened with the Tatars who came to us as conquerors then embraced Islām, and (Tamerlane) and his descendants from the Muslim Tatars returned and conquered our lands and others with Islām!

You can imagine how much distortion, triviality, and disregard for the explicit details of Prophetic Ḥadīths, their explanations, and their detailed sensory evidence in authentic Ḥadīths are contained in this contrived nonsense. This is not to mention what these opinions indicate of ignorance of history and the state of disbelief of those Tatars – whom they cite as evidence – after their claim of Islām and their corruption in the land, and the Jihād of our Muslim ancestors against them.

But this is the state of minds when they are inverted, fall, and are debased from the heads of their owners, to babble these inanities. As for the political sycophancy today, speak of it and there is no end. From the call for integration into Western societies, joining their political parties, forming lobbying groups to pressure governments, and conforming to prevailing social customs, and other such religious calamities.

With the exception of a very small minority of Islamists and Jihādīs fleeing with their religion from their countries and forced to seek refuge through political asylum in some Western countries – a rare minority living in compounded alienation (may Allāh grant them patience) – the alienation of religion and homeland, alienation among disbelievers, and alienation among those Muslims whose condition we have described. Most of those Islamic circles, including imams and Islamic centers, view these young men with suspicion, apprehension, and disapproval of their conduct and beliefs, to the extent that some expel them from

mosques and prevent them from entering, fearing the spread of the "infection" of their righteousness to the corruption of the corrupt and the complacent. With the exception of this rare minority, the conditions of the communities are as I have briefly described.

I have many stories and testimonies of strange, wondrous, and painful incidents that I witnessed myself, not to mention what I heard from trustworthy sources about the conditions of Muslims, their ways of life, and the religion of the imams of their mosques and the directors of their "Islamic!" centers. There is no space for them here, and I leave their mention for a treatise related to this important topic, if Allāh facilitates it.

However, since the contemporary Crusader campaigns began in 1990, and with them what was called the global war on terrorism, the conditions of Muslims in the West began to take another dimension, reaching its peak today after the events of September 2001, after the occupation of Iraq, and America and its allies' announcement of their projects in the Greater Middle East! And the explicit launching of their Crusader campaigns.

A wave of racist practices and campaigns against Muslims began to spread among Western populations in Europe, America, and elsewhere. This manifested in attacks on mosques and Islamic centers by burning and bombing, and in aggression against Muslims, their children, and their women, especially those distinguished by the ḥijāb. The matter was not limited to attacks by fanatics and racists, who are very numerous and increasing, as a result of the state of war and what the mujāhidīn are doing in their war. But aggression against Muslims now extends to being the policy of Western governments themselves. All Western countries have enacted new legislation restricting Muslims under the pretext of combating extremism and terrorism. A law was passed to ban the ḥijāb in France, and similar measures are being considered in other countries. Laws were issued to monitor mosque sermons

and expel preachers who do not comply with arbitrary government directives. Most worshippers, especially the youth, were placed under surveillance and in the circle of suspicion, and many were summoned for investigations. Intelligence agencies recruited thousands of spies among mosque attendees. This is in Europe. As for America, the arbitrary measures are severe and aggressive, where hatred is mixed with security procedures. This news is repeated daily in the media today, making elaboration unnecessary.

However, it is worth noting and emphasizing that these conditions and pressures are now pushing many Muslims residing in the West to commit forbidden acts and to utter statements that threaten their religion and creed in order to ward off the accusation – the accusation of terrorism and extremism – from themselves, and to demonstrate their distance from their religion, such as abandoning the hijāb or attending mosques, or openly stating their religion or belief. Some have even resorted to openly committing sins and forbidden acts for the same purpose. More egregious than all this is what the imams of Muslims, directors of centers, and heads of Islamic communities are doing in terms of dangerous concessions due to these pressures. It has reached the point of showing explicit loyalty to disbelievers and explicit disavowal of believers, especially the mujāhidīn in the path of Allāh, even cursing and reviling them openly in the media. This is not to mention issuing misleading fatwās and opinions that contradict the requirements of religion and the fundamentals of creed. Whoever follows the media will encounter such statements and practices that make one blush with shame.

If you look at the reasons for this, you will see very clearly that the summary of the reasons is the adherence of those "Muslims!" to their residence in the lands of disbelievers for the sake of the worldly benefits they obtain, for which they sacrifice their religion and the religion of their offspring, most of whom become disbelievers over time. This residence was originally forbidden even before these pressures and

this aggression from the disbelievers, the inhabitants of those lands, befell them. So what about after these unjust campaigns?

But the truth is that most of those people have become content with the worldly life there and are at ease with it.

Before concluding this section, we must remind those Muslims and draw their attention to two matters of utmost importance:

First: Everyone in whose heart there is concern for his religion and for obedience to Allāh and His Messenger should know the Sharīʿah ruling concerning their situation, which is the prohibition of residence in the lands of disbelief and disbelievers for anyone not compelled by necessity, and the obligation to return to his country (Muslim lands) despite the injustice, poverty, and other difficulties therein, if there is no danger to him from the rulers of his country. If there is, then he must seek refuge in Muslim lands. Emigration from the land of disbelief to the land of Islām is obligatory if it exists. If it does not exist, then to Muslim lands where he feels safe for his religion, honor, self, and property, and he must seek the best, then the next best, and the least corrupt, then the next least corrupt. As for worldly life, wealth, and sustenance, Allāh Almighty has guaranteed them. Work, trade, and seeking a comfortable life are not excuses for remaining in the lands of disbelievers, especially when conditions have deteriorated to this extent.

It is not permissible to remain in the West or other lands of disbelief except under duress for one who is overcome and finds no other recourse, or for a legitimate Sharī'ah interest, such as Jihād against the disbelievers in their lands to repel them from Muslim lands, which is an individual obligation (farḍ 'ayn) on every Muslim, as we explained earlier in the first chapter of this section. It is also permissible for scholars or callers to Allāh whom Muslims there need to remain, provided that it does not harm them or their families in their religion, that they are able to call to Allāh freely, and that they do not engage in the hypocrisy that has spread in those

circles out of desire for or fear of the disbelievers and their lackeys. And Allāh is the Watcher over hearts and intentions.

Second: We draw the attention of Muslims in Western lands and other countries at war with Muslims and allied with America in its invasion of our lands, that the war has begun and will be prolonged, and it is intensifying. The vanguards of the mujāhidīn and resisters have begun to confront America and its allies, both in our lands and in theirs. This situation, which will naturally escalate, will lead to the disbelievers taking revenge on them and increasing pressure on them. I do not think any sane person would demand that the mujāhidīn in the path of Allāh abandon their Jihād against the enemies of Allāh who occupy our lands, slaughter our children, women, and men, plunder our wealth, and subject us to all forms of torment, for the sake of preserving the interests of herds of Muslims who have chosen to live among the feet of disbelievers and polytheists and under their heels for the sake of their worldly life and their existence amidst that filth, causing many of them to apostatize, while most of those remaining are sinners! So, the obligation (of Jihād) should not be abandoned for the sake of these people, the overwhelming majority of whom are disobedient to their Lord, turning away from the clear and explicit commands and warnings of their Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) regarding his disavowal of them if they reside in the lands of disbelievers.

Those who have assumed religious leadership for these communities must explain these rulings and their details to the Muslims around them. And the scholars of Islām must declare to them the ruling on their residence and its consequences, especially now that the Crusader wars have convened and flared up with all clarity.

13. Prohibition of Mutilation, Disfigurement, and Dealing with the Corpses of Polytheists

Islām is a religion that rises above baseness, despicable acts, and petty grudges that manifest in taking revenge on the bodies of the dead. Even the custodians of

Jāhiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) refrained from this act, and if it occurred from their juniors, they would disavow it.

Mutilation (muthlah) is the disfigurement of a corpse, such as cutting off the limbs of the slain, gouging out an eye, or cutting off an ear, nose, or any other limb.

Jurists have differed regarding mutilation, holding two opinions:

- 1. The first opinion: The view of the Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs, who do not permit mutilation initially but allow it if it is by way of retribution and reciprocal treatment.
- 2. The second opinion: The view of the Shāfi'īs and Mālikīs, who deem mutilation disliked (makrūh), whether initiated or as reciprocal treatment. (End of quote from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, p. 167).

Shaykh 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām (may Allāh have mercy on him) said:

Among the etiquettes of Jihād is the burial of the corpses of the slain polytheists. If they wish to take them and pay a price, it is better not to take the price. The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) cast the bodies of the Quraysh leaders into the well (al-Qalīb) on the day of Badr, and he had trenches dug for Banū Qurayṣah when they were killed. Ibn Isḥāq mentioned in *al-Maghāzī* that the polytheists asked the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) to sell them the body of Nawfal ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Mughīrah, who had stormed the trench. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "We have no need for his price nor his body."

We prefer the view of the Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs, which prohibits mutilation because it aligns with the general principles of Islām and is consistent with the spirit that pervades the teachings of this religion. (End of quote from *Al-Dhakhāʾir*, vol. 1, p. 169).

14. The Pledge of Allegiance in War

Shaykh 'Abd Allāh ['Azzām] (may Allāh have mercy on him) said:

1. It is narrated from Ibn 'Umar (may Allāh be pleased with them both) who said: "We returned the following year, and no two of us could agree on the tree under which we had pledged allegiance. It was a mercy from Allāh. He was asked: For what did he take their pledge? For death? He said: No, he took their pledge for patience." (Narrated by al-Bukhārī).

The pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) in war is a Sunnah transmitted from the Chosen One (peace and blessings be upon him) to steady hearts and remind them of a covenant they made with themselves before the battle.

"The tree under which we pledged allegiance": The tree under which the Pledge of Riḍwān took place in the year 6 AH. In the following year, 7 AH, no two of us knew the location of the tree. This was a mercy from Allāh so that the tree would not become something sacred, leading to the spread of innovations and superstitions through its existence, and so that people would not come to seek blessings from it. The Ḥadīth of Jābir in Muslim states: "We pledged that we would not flee, and we did not pledge to him for death."

The tree was a Samurah tree, one of the desert trees. Its location became hidden from the Companions in the year following al-Ḥudaybiyah, for fear of fitnah (tribulation).

1. It is narrated from 'Abd Allāh ibn Zayd (may Allāh be pleased with him) who said: "During the time of al-Ḥarrah, someone came to him and said: Ibn Ḥanẓalah is taking a pledge from the people for death. He said: I will not pledge for this to anyone after the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him)." (Narrated by al-Bukhārī).

Al-Ḥarrah: A battle that took place in Madīnah in the year 63 AH. It was named al-Harrah because the cavalry of Yazīd stormed the Harrah (a volcanic tract), which

was the first time cavalry had breached the stony ground of the Ḥarrah. The Ḥarrah is an area of black stones surrounding Madīnah from its east (Ḥarrah Wāqim) and from its west (Ḥarrah al-Wabarah), hence it is said "between its two Ḥarrahs" or "its two lābahs," referring to these two Ḥarrahs. When Yazīd's army violated Madīnah, the Companion 'Abd Allāh ibn Ḥanẓalah began taking a pledge from the people for death to fight Yazīd after revoking his pledge of allegiance.

2. It is narrated from Salamah ibn al-Akwa' (may Allāh be pleased with him) who said: "I pledged allegiance to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), then I moved to the shade of a tree. When the crowd thinned, he said: 'O Ibn al-Akwa', will you not pledge allegiance?' I said: 'I have already pledged allegiance, O Messenger of Allāh.' He said: 'And also (again).' So I pledged allegiance to him a second time. He was asked: 'For what were you pledging allegiance on that day?' He said: 'For death.'"

The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) used to select some of his companions whom he prepared for future tasks and then take special covenants from them by which they were distinguished from the rest of the Companions. Just as he took from Thawbān, Abū Bakr, and a group of Companions a pledge "not to ask people for anything," so much so that if one of them dropped his whip from his hand, he would not ask anyone to hand it to him.

The pledge is always for righteousness and piety, because it is a covenant to cooperate in righteousness and piety. It is not permissible to pledge for sin and aggression, such as those who make a special covenant and then, after a period, the one who pledged is asked to do deeds that Allāh does not approve of and the Sharīʿah does not endorse, like boycotting so-and-so, spying on so-and-so, and tracking the faults of others.

It is permissible for a Muslim to give several pledges to several people. He may give a shaykh a pledge to engage in Jihād with him, and to others a pledge to receive knowledge at their hands and be educated by them. There is no contradiction between these pledges. It is not permissible for anyone to impose his obedience in everything on someone who has covenanted for something specific, nor is it permissible for anyone to use his pledge to prevent the one who pledged from doing a righteous act stipulated in the Book and the Sunnah, such as Jihād in the path of Allāh, for example, because the pledge then turns into a pledge for sin. "Obedience is only in what is right (ma'rūf)" and "There is no obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator." (End of quote from Al-Dhakhā'ir, vol. 1, p. 263).

15. Rulings Pertaining to the Martyr

In the section "The Martyr and His Rulings" from Shaykh 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām's (may Allāh have mercy on him) encyclopedia *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, there are useful details from which we briefly transmit the following:

Reason for being called a Shahīd (Martyr):

Al-Azharī said: "Because Allāh Almighty and His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) testified that he is in Paradise."

It was said: The Shahīd is "the living one," so they were named thus because they are alive with their Lord. And it was said: because the angels of mercy witness him and take his soul. And it was said: because he is witnessed to have faith and a good end by his outward state. And it was said: because his soul witnesses the Abode of Peace {at the time of his death}, while the soul of another does not witness it until the Day of Resurrection.

Definition of a Shahīd:

 According to the Shāfi'īs: "The martyr who is not washed nor prayed over is one who died due to fighting disbelievers while the fighting was ongoing, whether killed by a disbeliever, struck by a Muslim's weapon by mistake, his own weapon turned back on him, he fell from his horse, his mount kicked him and he died, he was trampled by the mounts of Muslims or others, he was struck by an arrow and it is unknown whether it was shot by a Muslim or a disbeliever, or he was found slain when the battle ended and the cause of his death was unknown, and whether there was a trace of blood on him or not. And whether he died instantly, or lingered for some time then died from that cause after the war ended, and whether he ate, drank, and made a will, or did none of that. All of this is agreed upon among us, as stated by al-Shāfi'ī."

• According to the Ḥanafīs: "The martyr is every accountable, Muslim, pure person who was killed unjustly by a weapon, and whose death itself did not necessitate a financial liability, and who did not linger (irtaththa)."

Conditions for Martyrdom:

- 1. That the fighting be in the path of Allāh: "Whoever fights so that the word of Allāh is supreme is in the path of Allāh." (Agreed upon). This is a definitive criterion: everyone whose intention was to support Islām and was then killed is a martyr, otherwise not.
- 2. Patience (ṣabr): "If you are killed while patient, seeking reward, advancing, and not retreating, Allāh will expiate your sins except for debt." (Narrated by Muslim). The patient one is he who advances towards the enemy with fortitude and a steadfast heart, and it does not harm him to feel pain in his heart and aversion to death and separation from family. Patience in worship means performing it with its conditions.
- 3. Advancing, not retreating.
- 4. Absence of Ghulūl (pilfering from spoils): "And whoever defrauds [will bring forth] what he_defrauded on the Day of Resurrection," (Qur'ān, Āl 'Imrān: 161) carrying his ill-gotten gains on his back. Ghulūl is theft from the spoils before

distribution. In al-Bukhārī: It is narrated from 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Umar (may Allāh be pleased with them both): "There was a man in charge of the Prophet's (peace and blessings be upon him) baggage, named Karkarah, who died. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "He is in the Fire." They went to look and found a cloak he had pilfered."

The Effect of Debt on Martyrdom and Expiation of Sins:

Debt does not affect martyrdom status, but the expiation of all sins may be affected by debt. Al-Nawawī said: "'Except for debt' ... this draws attention to all rights of human beings. Only the rights of Allāh Almighty are expiated."

Similarly, Ibn 'Abd al-Barr said this. Al-Qurṭubī mentioned a condition for debt preventing the forgiveness of sins, which is: "If he refrains from fulfilling the rights while being able to do so..." However, if he was unable to repay the debt despite trying, it is hoped from Allāh Almighty's generosity – if his intention was sincere and his purpose sound – that Allāh Almighty will satisfy his creditors on his behalf as He wills, until he enters Paradise.

Such are the rights of human beings. As for the rights of Allāh Almighty, it appears that they are all forgiven through martyrdom. In *al-Nawādir*, it is mentioned that the stern warnings regarding debt are all abrogated except for one who incurs debt through extravagance or corruption, and the like, according to Ibn Shihāb. This is the view of the Mālikīs.

Washing the Martyr:

The Four Imams agreed that the martyr is not washed. This is the opinion of the generality of scholars. Only al-Ḥasan, Saʻīd ibn al-Musayyib, and Ibn Surayj al-Shāfiʻī differed on this ruling, saying that the martyr should be washed. They argued that: no one dies except in a state of janābah (major ritual impurity), and one in janābah must be washed.

The majority argued with the Ḥadīth of Jābir: "The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) ordered the martyrs of Uḥud to be buried in their blood; they were not washed, nor was prayer offered for them." And Aḥmad narrated that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said concerning the slain of Uḥud: "Do not wash them, for every wound or every drop of blood will exude musk on the Day of Resurrection," and he did not pray over them.

The opinion of the majority is more preponderant due to the authentic evidence, which almost reaches the level of tawātur (mass narration).

Prayer for the Martyr:

Scholars differed on praying over the martyr, holding two opinions:

The first – which is the opinion of the majority – is that he is not prayed over. This is the view of Mālik, al-Shāfi'ī, and the majority of Ḥanbalīs.

The second – which is the opinion of the Ḥanafīs, al-Thawrī, and a narration from Aḥmad – is that he is prayed over. This is also the view of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyib.

Can one say, "So-and-so is a martyr"?

When we say that so-and-so is a martyr, it means we treat him with the worldly rulings of martyrs regarding not washing him and not praying over him. However, we do not testify for anyone that they are in Paradise or Hell, because hearts are in Allāh's hand, and to Him belongs the unseen of the heavens and the earth, and to Him all matters return.

This is what authors of Sīrah (biographies of the Prophet), Maghāzī (accounts of battles), and Islamic battles have followed, saying: the martyrs of Uḥud, Ḥunayn, al-Yarmūk, al-Qādisiyyah...

Categories of Martyrs:

- 1. Martyr of this world and the Hereafter: The Muslim killed in battle against disbelievers while fighting for the supremacy of Allāh's word.
- 2. Martyr of this world: The Muslim who fights in battle against disbelievers but fights out of partisanship or for show. (This person is treated with the rulings of a martyr by people).
- 3. Martyr of the Hereafter: One who receives the reward of martyrdom but is not treated with the worldly rulings of a martyr. He is washed, shrouded, and prayed over, such as one who dies on the path of emigration (hijrah) or Jihād, one who dies of an abdominal disease (mabṭūn), or one who drowns (gharīq).

Types of Martyrs:

(One who drowns, one who dies in a fire, a stranger who dies, one crushed under a collapsed building, one who dies of an abdominal disease, one who dies of plague (mat'ūn), a woman who dies in childbirth (nufasā'), one who dies on Friday night, one who dies of pleurisy (dhāt al-janb), one who dies seeking knowledge, a pregnant woman, one who dies of tuberculosis (sill), one who dies from epilepsy or fever, one who dies defending his property or life, one killed by a predatory animal, one imprisoned by a tyrant, one killed by beating, one who dies in hiding (from a tyrant), or one bitten by a venomous creature, the muezzin who seeks reward, the truthful merchant, one who vomits at sea, a woman who dies patiently enduring jealousy, one who prays Duḥā, fasts three days each month, and never misses Witr prayer whether traveling or resident, one who adheres to his Sunnah (peace and blessings be upon him), one who says in his illness forty times "There is no god but You; exalted are You! Indeed, I have been of the wrongdoers," one who dies guarding the frontier (murābit), one who recites Sūrah Yāsīn every night, one who falls from his mount and dies, one who sincerely seeks martyrdom, one who dies on a Friday, one who brings food to a city from other cities, one who bathes with snow and dies).

It is mentioned in *Awjaz al-Masālik ilā Muwaṭṭaʾ al-Imām Mālik* (4/267): "Al-Ḥāfiẓ mentioned in 27 of them that their chains are sound." "So, whoever has many reasons for his martyrdom, his bliss is increased."

Al-Murthath (The Fatally Wounded Who Lingers):

This is one who is carried wounded (rathīth) from the battlefield while still having a spark of life (ramaq). The jurists have agreed that the *murthath* is not treated with the rulings of a martyr, as the Messenger of Allāh did with Sa'd ibn Mu'ādh, whom he washed and prayed over, and as the Companions did with 'Umar (may Allāh be pleased with him).

Jurists almost agree that the *murthath* is one who is carried wounded from the battlefield and performs actions of the living, such as eating, writing a will, or a prayer time passes while he is conscious and able to perform it. However, if he does this while the battle is ongoing and he is on the battlefield, he is not considered *murthath*.

As for one whose wounds are fatal (manfūdh al-maqātil), meaning his wound is deep and deadly with no hope of recovery, he is treated like a martyr even if he eats and makes a will. Likewise, one who is transported unconscious (maghmūr) is treated like a martyr even if he remains so for days. So, the conditions for being a murthath are:

- 1. To be transported wounded from the battlefield.
- 2. To perform actions of the living, such as eating, selling, or writing a will.
- 3. That his wound is not fatal.
- 4. That he is not unconscious (maghmūr).
- 5. If these four conditions are not met, he is treated with the rulings of a martyr. (End of quote from *Al-Dhakhā'ir*, vol. 1, p. 314).

I say after these Jihādī juristic selections:

In general, a mujāhid must have a general foundation of Sharīʻah knowledge. For this purpose, I advise him to study some books – under the supervision of a guide if available – to acquire an initial Islamic Sharīʻah literacy in the following:

- A book on creed ('aqīdah), and I recommend Al-'Aqīdah al-Ṭaḥāwiyyah by Imām Ibn Abī al-'Izz al-Ḥanafī.
- A book on Qur'ānic exegesis (tafsīr), such as Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr, and I recommend adding to it Fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān by Sayyid Quṭb (may Allāh have mercy on him).
- A concise book on noble Hadīth, such as *Riyād al-Sālihīn*.
- A concise book on Prophetic biography (Sīrah Nabawiyyah), and I recommend Al-Raḥīq al-Makhtūm.
- A concise book on the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh).
- A concise book on Ḥadīth terminology (muṣṭalaḥ al-ḥadīth).
- A book on the jurisprudence of worship (fiqh al-'ibādāt). I recommend it be according to one of the four schools of thought (madhhabs), especially those known in his place of residence.
- A book on matters of the heart and spiritual conduct (raqā'iq wa al-sulūk). I recommend *Şifat al-Şafwah* and *Al-Targhīb wa al-Tarhīb*.
- Kitāb al-Adhkār by al-Nawawī.
- A book on Sharī'ah-based governance (siyāsah shar'iyyah), such as *Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah* by Abū Ya'lā al-Farrā'.

• I also recommend acquiring and reading *Zād al-Ma'ād* by Imām Ibn al-Qayyim, as it is a comprehensive book on the guidance of the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him).